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THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
This is a study of social mobility and political behavior.
It is related at two levels to a subject that has long interested
political scientists. At the macro level is the relationship between
social classes and the functioning of a political system. At the
micro level is the relationship between social status and individual
political behavior. Knowledge of the association between social
mobility and political behavior can contribute to understanding at
both levels.
Although the behavior of the mobile has been the subject of
much unsubstantiated generalization, empirical evidence has been
lacking. Considerable data have been accumulated about the relation-
ship between social status and political behavior, but relatively
little effort has been expended on accumulating evidence about the
effect of changes in social status on political behavior. Because
such changes are an important feature of the American social system,
it is important to understand how they affect the way the political
system works.
The Problem
It is my purpose (1) to outline a theory of social mobility
and political behavior, (2) to state a number of hypotheses drawn

from the theory, (3) to subject these hypotheses to empirical test
using data from national surveys, and (U) to suggest some of the
implications of the relationship between social mobility and political
behavior for the functioning of a democratic political system.
Political analysts have long been interested in the relation-
ship between an individual's place in the social structure and his
political behavior. The thread runs from Aristotle to Karl Marx
to the frequently quoted passage in The People's Choice which
declared flatly that "a person thinks politically, as he is socially.
Social characterises determine political preference." Yet in
spite of the long ancestry of the idea, the relationship between
status and politics is not yet adequately explored. Warren Miller
has written:
Socio-economic variables . . . exert a major influence on
political attitudes and behaviors. Thanks to the swiftly
changing character of our society, we stand in danger of
mistaking this influence unless we turn to a diligent re-
examination of old concepts and search out the applicability
of new ones. The task of understanding the mechanisms whereby
social and economic factors influence political behavior is
one of the major tasks facing the student of political
analysis today.
*
It is to a portion of the task of understanding the mechanisms whereby
social and economic factors influence political behavior that this
study is devoted.
Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The
People's Choice (New Tork: Columbia University Press, I9I4.8), p. 27.
ntfarren E. Miller, "The Socio-Economic Analysis of Political
Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science
. II, No. 3 (August,
1958), 2#.

Estimates of the amount of social mobility within the
American social system vary with the definition of mobility used,
but all studies concur that a substantial amount does take place.
Lipset and Bendix, in a study conducted in Oakland, California,
found that U7 per cent of the sons whose fathers had been in manual
work had moved into nonmanual work, while 32 per cent whose fathers
3had been in nonmanual work were now in manual work.
Because social mobility is so widespread, and because to
understand the functioning of the political system it is necessary
to understand the relationship between social characteristics and
political behavior, social mobility is an important subject for
political research.
Limitations of the Study
Because of the scanty empirical evidence on the relationship
of mobility to political behavior, and because of the conflicting
results of such evidence as has been published, an exploratory
approach to the subject is necessary. This results in less precision
of focus and depth of analysis than can be obtained when more reliance
can be placed upon prior work.
Both the theory and the data are limited to the United States.
The findings may be subject to wider generalization, but no specific
Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Mobility
and Occupational Career Patterns: I. Stability of Jobholding;
II. Social Mobility." American Journal of Sociology . LVII (19§2),
366-7 U, U9U-S0U.

attempt is made to do so. As in any scientific work measurement
problems exist. I will postpone discussion of these to Chapter IV.
A potentially serious limitation concerns the use of
secondary analysis of survey data. Because existing survey data
are used rather than a survey designed de novo, information is not
always available for testing theoretically interesting propositions.
Beyond this, however, there is a limitation in how far any conven-
tional survey can penetrate into the ways in which social mobility
affects individual behavior. A recent paper suggests that the
motivations which affect the behavior of the mobile "often operate
on a subconscious or only partially conscious level," and are thus
hard to diagnose in a conventional survey interview. Although
this objection may be legitimate from the standpoint of an inquiry
into the sources of individual behavior, it is less serious from
the standpoint of an inquiry into the relationship between a social
phenomenon and the operation of the political system. If the
political behavior of the mobile is different from that of the non-
mobile, inference can be made to the effect of mobility upon the
political system. That the survey technique does not permit complete
understanding of the psychological processes involved in social
mobility may be a serious limitation, but from the standpoint of
political science it is not a fatal one.
^3o Anderson and Morris Zelditch, Jr. , "Rank Equilibration and
Political Behavior" (Stanford University, 1°6§), pp. 17-18 (Ditto).

Definitions of Social Mobility
As with any term which has been widely used, "social mobility"
has been subjected to many definitions, not all of which are compatible.
Since the concept is basic to this study it is necessary that a precise
definition be adopted and used in a consistent way.
Pitirim Sorokin, in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences
,
defines social mobility as "the movement of individuals or groups
from one social position to another and the circulation of cultural
objects, values and traits among individuals and groups. "^
C. Wright Mills is more specific in specifying the changes
involved, defining the rate of upward mobility as "the proportion of
people who rise from one occupation level to another. " In Chapter IV
the role of occupation in social mobility is discussed, but it is
sufficient here to note that while a majority of studies of social
mobility utilize occupation as an index of mobility, Mills is in a
minority in treating it as the sole variable.
Social mobility is usually tied to the concepts of social
class or social status. Joseph A. Kahl, for example, characterizes
mobility as "movement from one class level to another between
generations." Similarly, Milton M. Gordon refers to "movement from
'?P. A. Sorokin, "Mobility, Social," Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1933), X, 55U.
C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford, 1953), p. 272.
•7
'Joseph A. Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York: Rine-
hart, 1953), p. 2^2. Social mobility may occur within generations as




one class to another," and elsewhere as "movement up or down the
various stratification dimensions. " A more elaborate definition is
offered by Bernard Barber:
We have been using the term social mobility to mean move-
ment, either upward or downward, between higher and lower
social classes; or more precisely, movement between one
relatively full-time, functionally significant social role
and another that is evaluated as either higher or lower. °
The thread which unites these several definitions of social
mobility is that all view it as a movement of individuals or groups
from one place, position, or class in society to another. Starting
with this rather vague notion the following sections attempt to
lend precision to the concept.
Social Status
It is proper to speak of movement from one place within
society to another only if places within society can in some sense
be located relative to each other. Further, it is appropriate to
speak of vertical mobility, or of movement upward or downward, only
if there is some means by which positions can be ordered in terms
of higher or lower. To do this it is necessary to devote some
attention to the theory of social status.
11
'
' I ! !
I II
I I,, i . I II!
o
Milton M. Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1958), pp. 3, 19-20.
Q
Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New Yorki Harecurt,
Brace and Co., 1957), p. 356.

A society is a means for the distribution of scarce goods.
While societies may differ on the value placed on any particular
good, most seem to value the same things highly. Harold Lasswell
has listed eight terms which he asserts may be "employed to classify
all the value outcomes of any society. " These universal social
goods are power, wealth, respect, well-being, rectitude, skill,
enlightenment, and affection. Within the limits of any known
society, most of these goods tend to be both relative (in the sense
that the amount an individual has is evaluated not against any
absolute standard, but against how much other people have), and in
limited supply. Because of the relativity and the scarcity of social
goods, members of society compete for preferential access. Some
are more successful in the competition than others because of luck,
ability, or parental advantage. As a result, all complex societies
are stratified in the sense that some people have more of what there
is to get than do others.
The differential distribution of social goods is common
knowledge. An individual is evaluated by his fellows on the basis
of his possession of or access to these goods. Such evaluations,
made in terms of higher or lower, constitute for the evaluator the
Harold Lasswell, Politics; Who Gets What, When, How
(Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958), p. 201.
"Tbid.
, p. 202. See also Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham
Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Tale University Press, 1950)
pp. 83-102.

social status of the person evaluated. The social status of the
individual within the society is a composite of the status evaluations
accorded him by the other members of the society, and the treatment
he receives reflects this status.
Subjective and Objective Status
An individual's own view of his social status is not necessarily
identical to the way others evaluate him. Thus, though different terms
will be used here, it is useful to make a distinction similar to that
made by Richard Centers between social class and social status. For
Centers, "social class" refers to groupings of people who feel a
sense of social identification and shared interest, usually as a
result of membership in a common stratum. Whether or not a class
exists depends upon the psychological criteria of social rank. An
individual's "social stratum," on the other hand, is completely
dependent upon external criteria. Centers writes:
Much confusion can be avoided and great simplicity of
conception gained if one always distinguishes clearly
between stratum and class. Stratification is something
objective; it derives, as has been indicated before,
primarily from the economic system that happens to
prevail in a given culture. The process of getting a
living imposes upon people certain functions, statuses,
and roles.
. . .
But these strata, as some have seen,
are not necessarily classes. •**
Ttichard Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, I9I49), p. 27.

Similarly, while avoiding the term social class, a distinction
will be made between the evaluation of a person 1 s social status by-
others ( objective status ) and his own evaluation of his position in
13
society ( subjective status) . In the same vein, if a person has
changed social position as evaluated by others, he is objectively
mobile . If he thinks he has changed social position he is subjectively
mobile
.
In The American Voter it is reported that occupational status
and subjective class are better predictors of political attitudes and
voting than any of the other status measures, but that they are not
as closely related to each other as are other objective measures to
occupation. They may thus be considered as two equally important
but distinct measures that it is useful to treat separately.
Types of Mobility
A distinction having been made between objective social
mobility and subjective mobility, it is now necessary to distinguish
types of mobility. Changes within a given stratum level, such as
changes from one occupation to another of the same relative prestige,
are sometimes treated as a form of social mobility. These changes
13
For convenience in expression and to conform to the phrasing
of questions in the survey data, the term subjective class will be
used interchangeably with subjective status, though there is no in-
tention of implying the existence of class consciousness in a Marxian
sense.




are horizontal mobility. Social mobility, as understood here, refers
only to vertical mobility—movement from a higher status to a lower,
or vice versa.
The concept of mobility implies measurement at more than one
point in time. Two types of movement are generally distinguished:
intra-generation mobility and inter-generation mobility. Intra-
generation mobility involves the analysis of status at two or more
points in an individual's lifetime. Inter-generation mobility in-
volves the determination of the relationship between the social
status of successive generations. The two are usually related, for
an individual normally begins life in the social status of his
father. The measures used here are of inter-generation mobility
alone.
To summarize. A person has undergone social mobility if his
social status is higher or lower than that of his parents. Objective
social status is determined by the evaluation of a person by other
members of society. This evaluation is based upon his possession
of or access to the things valued by the society. Subjective social
status depends upon a person's own evaluation of his place in
society. An individual is objectively mobile if his objective social
status is higher or lower than that of his parents, as measured at
comparable points in the life cycle. A person is subjectively mobile
if he evaluates his own place in society as higher or lower than he
evaluates that of his parents.

11
Organization of the Study
The remainder of the study is organized as follows.
Chapter II reviews the findings of previous research into social
mobility and political behavior, together with certain related
material on political behavior. Chapter III sets forth a theory of
social mobility and states some hypotheses drawn from the theory.
Chapter IV describes the methods and procedures used in the study
and adopts operational definitions for both objective and subjective
mobility.
The heart of the thesis is contained in Chapters V through IX,
which report the empirical findings of the study. Chapter V provides
a demographic profile of the mobile. Chapter VI investigates the
relationship between mobility and various forms of political allegiance.
Chapter VII examines the relationship of mobility to attitudes on
economic issues and on issues of foreign affairs. Chapter VIII treats
three aspects of political orientation and their relationship to
social mobility. These are (l) political interest and activity,
(2) feeling of political understanding and efficacy, and (3) voting
turnout. The final empirical chapter, Chapter IX, is concerned with
the degree to which the mobile are integrated into their social en-
vironment, satisfied with their place in society, and whether they




The concluding chapter, Chapter X, contains a brief review
of the more important empirical findings, and a tentative assessment




REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There is extensive literature on the twin subjects of social
class and social mobility. In 1953 Donald MacRae published a
bibliography of 6l6 items on stratification and mobility. Six years
later he noted he had since become aware of nearly 500 additional
2items, most of them new. The literature has continued to grow
rapidly since that time. Because a number of excellent bibliographical
articles already exist no attempt at a comprehensive review of the
literature will be undertaken here.
Donald G. MacRae, "Social Stratification: A Trend Report and
Bibliography," Current Sociology , II, No. 1 (1953-5H), 3-7U.
2
Donald G. MacRae, review of Kipset and Bendix, Social Mobility
in Industrial Society, in American Sociological Review , XXIV (August,
1959), 582 (hereafter referred to as ASRJT^
3Extensive reviews and bibliographies may be found in:
Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1957);
Milton M. Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology (Durham, N. C.
:
Duke University Press, 1958); S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, Social
Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1959); D. G. MacRae, "Social Stratification: A
Trend Report and Bibliography," Current Sociology, II, No. 1 (1953-5U),
3-7U; Raymond W. Mack, Linton Freeman, and Seymour Yellin, Social
Mobility: Thirty Years of Research and Theory (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1957); S. M. Miller, "Comparative Social Mobility:
A Trend Report and Bibliography," Current Sociology , IX, No. 1 (I960),
1-89; Harold W. Pfautz, "The Current Literature on Social Stratification:
A Critique and Bibliography, " American Journal of Sociology , XLIII
(January, 1953), 391-UL8 (hereafter referred to as AJS) .

11*
Most studies of social mobility have been concerned with either
(1) measuring the amount of mobility that takes place within a given
society; or (2) examining the process by which mobility is achieved.
Less attention has been paid to the equally important questions of
the consequences of mobility for the individual and his society.
Accordingly, an attempt has been made to select from the extensive
literature on social mobility those items which seemed most relevant
to a study of political behavior.
The review of the literature in this chapter commences with a
discussion of some of the theories that relate social mobility to
party preference and to the operation of the political system. This
is followed by a review of research findings on the association between
mobility and party preference. The following sections review studies
on the relationship of mobility to political attitudes and to political
interest and involvement. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
mobility and extremism, prejudice, and social integration.
^wo omissions should perhaps be explained. Gaetano Mosca and
Vilfredo Pareto both offer theories of politics emphasizing the role of
social mobility into an "elite" or "ruling class." Their work has been
deliberately omitted here. Unless one adopts the dubious assumption
that the effects of mobility upon entrants into the ruling class are
identical to the effects of mobility upon individuals in the society
at large, the two subjects must be studied separately. Further, the
ruling class is likely to be so small relative to the population as a
whole that national sample surveys as used here will leave it essen-
tially untapped. Thus neither the theoretical nor the empirical
portions of this study are directly applicable to ruling elite theories.
(Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi di Scienza Politica)
.
H. D.
Kahm, trans. , edited and revised by Arthur Livingston (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1939); Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, edited and




Party Preference : Theory
It was Marx who amplified the ancient observation that every
society is divided into the rich and poor into a comprehensive political
theory, but he was neither the first nor the last to emphasize the
importance of the linkage between social class and politics. It is
not necessary to believe in a Marxian version of class struggle to
accept the importance of the relationship between class and party.
Every study of voting behavior has reported an association between
social position and political partisanship. As Robert Maclver has
phrased it, "the party-system is the democratic translation of the
class struggle." In the United States the association between class
and party is reflected in the consistent finding that those of low
status are more often Democrats and those of high status more often
Republicans.
It would not be correct, however, to conclude that the link
between class and party in the United States is an indication of self-
conscious class politics. For one thing, correlations between status
and partisanship, while consistent, are relatively low. For another,
evidence indicates that few American citizens are "class conscious"
in any activist sense. Finally, there is no indication that many
individuals make political decisions in terms of anything which could
7be called a coherent ideology.
Robert M. Maclver, The Web of Government (New York: Macmillan
Co., 19U7), P. 217.






iTie combination of class-linked political behavior with the
absence of any strong class consciousness or ideology is not necessarily
paradoxical. The voting studies have contributed information on the
roots of political preference that can explain class-linked behavior
in the absence of any explicit class consciousness. Most individuals
early in their lives acquire a political party preference that tends
to be self-reinforcing throughout life. The choice of a party appears
to find its source mainly in the family and early social environment.
A typical finding is that of Campbell, et al
.
, who report that 79 per
cent of individuals from families where both parents were Democrats
and at least one parent was politically active are themselves Demo-
crats. Even where neither parent was politically active 76 per cent
Q
of those from Democratic families are themselves Democrats.
The influence of social environment is not confined to the
family's role in determining initial political preference. An in-
dividual's political preference usually agrees with that of friends
and coworkers, and the more homogeneous the view of these associates
o
the stronger the individual's political convictions. If an in-
dividual's inherited familial political preference is in harmony with
the social milieu in which he finds himself as an adult, the chances
10
of his deviating are slight.
Ibid
. , p. 1U7.
o
Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N„




Thus status-linked political behavior need not result from
class consciousness on the part of any particular individual. Political
preferences may be inherited from a class conscious ancestor, retained
from some past event of sufficient magnitude to make an individual
temporarily class conscious (such as a major depression), or influenced
by contact with friends and co-workers with status-linked political
preferences. These friends and co-workers need not themselves think
consciously in class terms, but may have formed their own political
preferences in similarly indirect ways. Although the association
between status and party is rooted ultimately in the economic re-
lationship, there is no need of much conscious awareness of the fact
to maintain the linkage.
The nature of the link between status and party is important
for a theory of social mobility and political behavior. If all po-
litical preferences were based on a calculation of present economic
advantage uninfluenced by an individual's previous history or
present social contacts, social mobility would be of little political
relevance. Rich men would vote for policies that favored the rich,
poor men for policies that favored the poor, uninfluenced by whether
they had always been in their present economic circumstances. But
political preferences are not often based on rational calculation,
but are strongly influenced by an individual's social experiences,
past and present. Thus it is that a mobile individual, who has been
subject to different socializing experiences than a non-mobile
individual, may be expected to behave in politically different ways.

18
Almost all theorists -who have discussed the relationship of
social mobility to politics have focussed upon the effect of mobility
on status polarization and the intensity of class conflict, Lipset
and Bendix, in Social Mobility in Industrial Society , state that "the
process of social interchange through "which some men rise in status
and others fall weakens the solidarity and the political and economic
11
strength of the working class." A similar but broader view is
expressed in The American Voter ; "An open-class society, in which
social mobility across culturally-defined boundaries between classes
is frequent, has less potential for polarization than a society in
12
which avenues to such mobility are blocked. n
Some of the mechanisms by which social mobility is supposed
to reduce status polarization and moderate the intensity of class
conflict are spelled out by Ralf Dahrendorf . He sees knowledge of
the possibility of mobility as reducing individual involvement in
class struggles: "If the individual sees for his son, or even for
himself, the chance of rising into the dominant or falling into the
subjected class, he is not as likely to engage his whole personality
in class conflicts. "^ In addition, the possibility of mobility
Lipset and Bendix, op. cit
. , p. 70.
12Campbell et al. , op. cit
. . p. 377.
"^talf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial




directs energy away from the class struggle. "As mobility increases,
group solidarity is increasingly replaced by competition between
individuals, and the energies invested by individuals in class con-
flict decrease." Thus Dahrendorf sees an inverse relation between
the degree of openness of classes and the intensity of class conflict.
He states this as a formal hypothesis: "The intensity of class
conflict decreases to the extent that classes are open (and not
closed)." 5 It might be added that mobility dilutes the solidity
of experience and perspectives among members of any class.
Marx himself recognized the role that mobility might play in
reducing class conflict. Regarding the relative mildness of the
class struggle he saw in the United States, he comments: "in the
United States of America, where, though classes, indeed, already
exist, they have not yet become fixed, but continually change and
interchange their elements in a constant state of flux. " But in
spite of this recognition that any considerable amount of social
mobility can interfere with class cohesion, Marx does not assign an
important role to social mobility in his class theory. This is
because implicit in Marx's work is the assumption that the position
an individual occupies in society—his class—is fixed at birth.






Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
Marxist Library, Works of Marxism-Leninism, Vol. XXIV (New York:
International Publishers, no date), 22.
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this a rare occurrence in capitalist society, and views the relatively
high rate of mobility he sees in the United States as an indication
of an early stage of capitalism. Because he views mobility as an
infrequent exception to a prevailing situation of class rigidity, Marx
does not develop further his insight into the effect of social mobility
on the class struggle.
Marx was wrong in viewing social mobility as characteristic
only of an early stage of capitalism. The available evidence shows no
tendency for the amount of mobility to decline as industrial societies
17
mature. Marx's failure to include social mobility as an essential
element of his theory may account in large part for the failure of
his prediction that class conflict in industrial societies must become
more and more intense. If a class theory is to adequately explain
the functioning of the political system of a modern industrial society
it must incorporate a theory of social mobility as an integral element.
Unfortunately, however, the present state of knowledge of the political
correlates of social mobility is inadequate to support such a theory.
Party Preference t Research
Some information is available on the relationship between
social mobility and party preference. Lipset and Bendix compare data
on political affiliation of mobile individuals in a number of countries.
The downwardly mobile behave similarly in all countries, being more
76-113.
17
See, for example, Lipset and Bendix, op. cit . . pp. 11-38,

a.
apt to prefer a conservative party than are other members of their
new class. In comparing the political affiliation of upwardly mobile
individuals, however, they find a difference between the results of a
number of European studies and data for the U.S. Their data are
reproduced in Table 1. The difference between the United States and
European countries they explain as a result of greater differences in
class living styles in Europe than in the U.S. This is said to make
it more difficult for mobile Europeans to adopt a new style of life,
including appropriate political preferences. As a result, mobile
Europeans "are more likely than comparably successful Americans to
retain links to their class of origin. " On the other hand, Lipset
and Bendix report that "in America the successfully mobile members of
the middle class are more conservative (that is, more often Republican)
than those class members who are in a social position comparable to
19
that of their parents." In support they cite the study by Eleanor
20
E. Maccoby et al . "Youth and Political Change. " The pertinent data
from Maccoby' s study are reproduced in Table 2. Maccoby* s data however
do not offer unequivocal support to Lipset and Bendix' s conclusion.
Although the upwardly mobile more often prefer Eisenhower than do the





. , p. 66.
20
Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton,




TABLE 1.—Party choice of German, Finnish, Swedish, and American
middle class men related to their social origin3
Father* s Occupation
Country and Party Choice Manual Non-manual Farm
% # % § % §
Germany: 1953 Social
Democratic 32 200 20 1U2 22 58
Finland: 19h$ Social
Democratic & Communist 23 357 6 356 10 183
Sweden: 1950 Social
Democratic U7 135 20 315
Norway: 1957 Labor &
Communist h9 6l 29 73 2k U6
United States: 1952
Democratic 22 67 30 79 3U $9
a
S. M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in
Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California
Press, 1959), Table 2.7, p. 67.
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aAdapted from Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and
Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly ,
XVIII, No. 1 (Spring, 195U), Table 6, 35.
For purposes of comparison, the non-mobile cases have been
weighted to cancel out differences between them and the mobiles in
SES. That is, for the first comparison, the non-mobiles have been
weighted so as to have the same SES distribution as the mobile
people at their point of origin . For the second comparison, the non-
mobiles have been weighted so as to have the same SES distribution
as the mobiles have in their destination class.
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preference as Democratic. If party choice is taken as an indicator,
the Maccoby results are closer to the European data reported by Lipset
and Bendix than to those they report for the U.S.
A study by Patricia Salter West also fails to support Lipset
and Bendix* s conclusion that the upwardly mobile are more often
Republicans than are their non-mobile peers. She reports that among
college graduates "self-made men [are] less likely to be Republican;




West goes on to report that the difference between the self-
22
made and initially more privileged groups declines with age. This
is consistent with an interpretation that the effects of later
socialization are becoming stronger than the effects of earlier
socialization. A contrary finding is reported by Maccoby et al .
,
who find that "the mobile young people seldom consider themselves
Independents : they seem to make a definite party choice more often
23
than non-mobile people." Though there are substantial differences
in the sample base of the two studies, West's being confined to college
graduates and Maccoby' s including only those in the age bracket ZL-2U,
this is not an adequate explanation of the opposed findings. It may
21
Patricia S. West. "Social Mobility among College Graduates,"
in Bendix and Lipset (eds.;, op. cit . , p. U78.
22
^Tbid.
-^Maccoby et al., loc. cit. , p. 3U.
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be that Maccoby's sample, being drawn from the 1952 election, revealed
that Eisenhower's political personality and middle-of-the-road political
stance were particularly attractive to the upwardly mobile in her
sample. Data bearing on this possibility are reported in Chapter VI.
The American Voter examines the relationship between mobility
and change in party affiliation, reporting that "even among the people
who report both a change in partisanship and a change in their own
occupational status there is no suggestion of a relationship between
the two kinds of change." Further, the same work reports that there
is little evidence of association between inter-generational mobility
and changes in political preference, though "upward mobile people are
slightly more likely to have shifted from Democratic to Republican
25identification" than are the downward mobile.
Similar to the hypothesis that change in political preference
may accompany change in social status is the hypothesis that changes
in political preference are associated with moves from the city to
the suburbs. The underlying assumption is that movement from the city
to the suburbs is part of a process of upward mobility, and that those
who have made such moves are likely to change political allegiance
^Campbell et al. , op. cit
. , p. U58. This finding is difficult
to interpret, however, depending as it does on recollection by the
respondent both of changes in occupational status and changes in
partisanship. Retrospective data of this sort are notoriously weak.
Ibid
. , p. U$9» The measure of mobility used is similar to
that operationally defined as "subjective mobility" in the following
chapter and is not necessarily the best measure of studying political





from the Democratic to the Republican party. The findings of
several studies afford some support to the hypothesis that moves to
the suburbs are associated with conversion to the Republican party,
but only as part of a relatively slow process rather than any whole-
27
sale change on the part of new suburban residents.
Political Attitudes
Evidence on the effect of social mobility on attitudes toward
political issues is even scarcer than evidence on party preference.
Political issues are often treated as though they can be placed along
a unidimensional liberal-conservative continuum, with those of low
status more often liberal and those of high status more often con-
servative. This is an inadequate conceptualization. Attitudes on
political issues are associated with social status, but not all in
the same way. The authors of Voting
,
for example, report that
"There is no correlation between 'liberalism 1 on domestic-economic
(Position) issues and •liberalism 1 on international-ethnic (Style)
9ft
issues." It is necessary to investigate attitudes toward a variety
of,
But note that The American Voter found that there was no
higher incidence of upward mobility among those who moved to the sub-
urbs than among those who remained in the city, and an only slightly
higher incidence of Republican converts among the new suburban resi-
dents. Campbell et al. , op. cit . , pp. U55-U59o
27Fred I. Greenstein and Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Suburbs and
Shifting Party Loyalties," Public Opinion Quarterly , XXII, U ("Winter,
1958), U73-U82; J. G. Manis and L. C. Stine, "Suburban Residence and
Political Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly , XXII. k ("Winter, 1958),
U83-U89; B. Lazerwitz, "Suburban Voting Trends: 19U8 to 1956," Social
Forces , XXXIX, 1 (October, I960), 29-36.
erelson et al. , op. cit . , p. 3h2.
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of issues before generalizing about the attitude structure of a group.
Such a variety of data are not available for the mobile, but some
findings on related matters are pertinent.
Marvin Olsen, investigating the degree to which individual's
attitudes are consistently liberal or consistently conservative,
reports that the more, and the more intense, social cross-pressures
29
a person encounters the less consistent are his attitudes. If it
can be assumed that the socially mobile are more often subject to
social cross-pressures, Olsen's finding should be applicable to the
mobile.
Another study of attitudes toward political issues that is
potentially applicable to mobility is that by Gerhard Lenski on
30
status crystallization. Lenski divided respondents into groups of
high crystallization (consistently high or consistently low on several
measures of status) and low crystallization (high on some measures
of status, low on others). After controlling for status differences,
Lenski found that low crystallization was associated with preference
for the Democratic party and liberal responses to a series of
29
Marvin E. Olsen, "Liberal-Conservative Attitude Crystal-
lization," Sociological Quarterly , III, 1 (January, 1962), 17-26.
30Gerhard E. Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical
Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review, HX, No, U




economic-political questions. If the mobile are more often un-
crystallized, as a result of not having moved equal distances on
all indicators of status, they should resemble Lenski' s uncrystal-
lized individuals. But unless both the upwardly and downwardly
mobile have the same type of attitude distributions, the crystal-
lization approach would not seem very useful in explaining attitudes
of the mobile toward political issues. Both the upwardly and down-
wardly mobile are likely to be uncrystallized, but as noted above,
the evidence on party preference indicates that the downwardly
mobile more often prefer conservative political parties than do those
of stable low status—a finding contrary to that expected from the
crystallization hypothesis. An explanation of the attitude of the
mobile toward political issues in terms of a socialization hypothesis
is offered in Chapter VII.
Political Interest and Involvement
Several studies have suggested that mobile individuals are
more often subject to social "cross-pressures" and that this is
reflected in their political behavior. The cross-pressure hypothesis,
31
In spite of subsequent work along the same lines the re-
lationship of status crystallization to political attitudes is by no
means clear. See: Gerhard E. Lenski and William F. Kenkel, "The
Relationship between Status Consistency and Politico-Economic
Attitudes," ASR, XXI, No. 3 (June, 1956), 365-369; Gerhard E. Lenski,
"Social Participation and Status Crystallization," ASR, XXI, No. h
(August, 1956), U58-U6U; Irwin W. Goffman, "Status Consistency and
Preference for Change in Power Distribution," ASR , XXII, No. 3 (June,
1957), 275-281; Werner S. Landecker, "Class Crystallization and Class
Consciousness," ASR, XXVIII, No. 2 (April, 1963), 219-229 •
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first set forth in The People's Choice , states that voters exposed to
conflicting political influences react by political withdrawal and
32indecision. As a result the cross-pressured individuals change
political preference more often, vote less frequently, and are less
active politically compared to those exposed to homogeneous political
33influences.
Lipset and Bendix provide one example of the application of
the cross-pressure hypothesis to social mobility. They conclude,
on the basis of the limited evidence available, that both upwardly
and downwardly mobile individuals "are more likely to be apathetic,
to abstain from voting and to show low levels of political interest
than are the immobile." This is explained as a special case of
cross-pressure: "The mobile individual, who is in many ways a mar-
ginal man, retaining old ties and experiences, is more likely to be
3 I3
subjected to cross-pressure than the non-mobile person.
"
Lipset has elsewhere offered a similar hypothesis concerning
the political behavior of the mobile:
Occupational mobility, upward or downward, and the hope
of improving one's class position would be expected to
create an ambiguity of class position and interest for
32J P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. R. Berelson, and Helen Gaudet, The
People's Choice (2d. ed. ) (New York: Columbia University Press, 19U8),
33
e.g . Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, op. cit . , pp. 19-20,
27, 128-132, 333-3U7; Campbell et al.. op. cit.. pp. 50-88.
^dpset and Bendix, op. cit




the individual "which would lead to cross pressures and
withdrawal from political choice. The greater expectation
of mobility in the United States might therefore be another
factor making for lower voting rates here as compared with
Europe . 3°
A reformulated version of the cross-pressure hypothesis is
used in The American Voter to explain the fact that class voting is
blurred among people who are in different objective and subjective
classes. The authors state:
In this case, the cross-pressures as operationally defined
consist of a sociological variable (occupation) on the one
hand and a psychological variable (perception of class
location) on the other. The individual has reason to identify
with one class, but the occupational milieu in which he
operates from day to day consists primarily of members of the
opposing* class. The class with which he sympathizes has
one set of political norms, but his active social group, to
the degree it is class-oriented, has opposing norms. Under
these cross-pressures, the aggregate of such marginal in-
dividuals behaves in a manner that does not clearly fit
either set of norms. 37
This formulation is of particular interest, because as reported
below in Chapter VI, the mobile are considerably more often class
misidentifiers than are the status stable. The question of whether
this results in a withdrawal from political involvement is examined
in Chapter VIII.
36S. M. Lipset et al
.
, "The Psychology of Voting: An
Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook
of Social Psychology , II (Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 195>U),
37




There are many suggestions in the literature of a link between
social mobility and extremism, authoritarianism, or prejudice. A
study by Morris Janowitz on social stratification and mobility in
West Germany, for example, contains the implicit assumption that the
downwardly mobile are political extremists. That no one of the
major parties has a predominant concentration of downwardly mobile
persons he considers to be highly beneficial for the stability of
39German political behavior.
In a similar vein, a frequently repeated explanation of the
radical right movement in the United States is that it is at least
partially a result of status inconsistencies and insecurity about
social class position. Stanley Rothman utilizes a similar hypothesis
in explaining the widespread affiliation of Catholics with the radical
right in terms of the desire of Catholics to assimilate U.S. culture
and remove the taint of being "un-American. " Little data is offered
in support of these explanations, however, and a recent study that
Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and Mobility in
West Germany," AJS, LHV, No. 1 (July, 1958), 6-2U.
39Ibid
. , pp. 22-23.
Daniel Bell (ed.), The New American Right (New York:
Criterion Books, 1955) j Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955)5 Daniel Bell (ed. ), The Radical Right
(New York: Doubleday, 1963).
Stanley Rothman, "American Catholics and the Radical
Right," Social Order, XIII, No. k (April, 1963), 5-8.
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examined the hypothesis in the case of one rightist organization
found it unsupported.
Lipset finds extremist and intolerant views characteristic
of low status as such. After reviewing a considerable quantity of
evidence from several countries he concludes that "low status and
low education predispose individuals to favor extremist, intolerant,
and transvaluational forms of political and religious behavior.
"
MacKinnon and Centers, and Christie and Cook report similar findings,
MacKinnon and Centers noting that authoritarianism increases with
the intensity of class identification.
A study by H. J. Eysenck distinguishes between two dimensions
of social attitudes: a conservative-radical dimension and a tough-
minded-tender-minded dimension. ^ He finds that within all four
British political parties (Conservative, Labor, Liberal, Communist)
there is a consistent difference on both dimensions between working
class and middle class party members. All working class groups are
Raymond E. Wolfinger et al
.
, "America's Radical Right,
Politics and Ideology," in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Dis-
content (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 196U), pp. 262-293.
Seymour Martin Lipset "Democracy and Working-Class Author-
itarianism," ASR, XXIV, No. k (August, 1959), U82.
^I. J. MacKinnon and Richard Centers, "Authoritarianism and
Urban Stratification," AJS, LXI, No. 6 (May, 1956), 610-620; Richard
Christie and Peggy Cook, "A Guide to Published Literature Relating
to the Authoritarian Personality," Journal of Psychology , XLV (April,
1958), 171-199.
nl. J. Eysenck, "Primary Social Attitudes as Related to
Social Class and Political Party," British Journal of Sociology
,
II, No. 3 (October, 1951), 198-209.
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less radical than the corresponding middle class groups within the
same party, and all working class groups are more tough minded, in
the sense of favoring compulsory sterilization, favoring harsher
treatment of criminals, believing that Jews are too powerful, etc.
Although Eysenck is not using quite the same concepts, the combination
of conservatism-tough-mindedness he finds for the working class
adherents of all parties is strikingly similar to the views which
characterize the American radical right, not normally considered a
working class movement.
Several studies examine a hypothesized association between
mobility and prejudice directly, but the findings are not entirely
harmonious, Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz find greater pre-
judice among the downwardly mobile than among the stationary, but
) 7
somewhat less prejudice among the upwardly mobile. Joseph Green-
blum and Leonard Pearlin find that both upward and downward mobility
are associated with prejudice, but that prejudice is linked with
subjective class identification as well. The upwardly mobile
individual who claims middle class membership and is presumably less
secure about his status tends to be more prejudiced than the upwardly
mobile individual who claims working class status,
^Ibid., pp. 20U-20£.
)i7
Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, The Dynamics of Pre-
judice (New York: Harpers, 19!?0).
1 A
Joseph Greenblum and Leonard I, Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility
and Prejudice: A Socio-Psychological Analysis," in.Reinhard Bendix
and Seymour M, Lipset, Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, 111,: The
Free Press, 19£3) pp. U80-U91.
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Fred Silberstein and Melvin Seeman find that mobility as such
is not related to prejudice except through the individual's attitude
Ii9toward mobility. Those who are highly mobility-minded tended to be
prejudiced, and whether or not mobility affect3 ethnic prejudice depends
upon the individual's concern with mobility. A similar hypothesis is
put forth by W. C. Kaufman, who suggests that the specific attitude
toward status offers one explanation of anti-semitism.
A study by Melvin Tumin and Ray Collins finds an entirely
different pattern. In studying the effect of mobility upon attitudes
toward desegregation they find status is a much better index of prejudice
than is mobility. The upwardly mobile, though less ready for deseg-
regation than those born to high status, are more ready than those of
their class of origin. The downwardly mobile as well are less pre-
judiced than others of low status, though more so than either the
upwardly mobile or those of a stable high status.
Social Integration
A recurrent theme of writings on social mobility is the dis-
ruption of social ties which can accompany mobility and the effect on
the individual of this disruption. Morris Janowitz has pointed out
li9
Fred B. Silberstein and Melvin Seeman, "Social Mobility and
Prejudice," AJS, LXV, No. 3 (November, 1959), 258-26U.
W. C. Kaufman, "Status, Authoritarianism, and Anti-Semitism,"
AJS , IXEI, No. h (January, 1957), 379-382.
^"Melvin M. Tumin and Ray C. Collins, Jr., "Status, Mobility
and Anomie: A Study in Readiness for Desegregation," British Journal
of Sociology, X, No. 3 (September, 1959), 253-267. •
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that the consequences of mobility for social integration may vary
depending on -whether the focus is upon primary or secondary groups.
He finds that while upward mobility has disruptive implications for
primary group relations, the upwardly mobile seem to join and
to
participate in secondary structures with relative effectiveness.
For the downwardly mobile, Janowitz sees more difficulty. Primary
group relations tend to be disrupted, with no compensating involvement
in secondary groups. Janowitz notes that while results are not clear,
"if anything, downward mobility does not produce effective involvement
^3in secondary group structures in pursuit of self-interest." Thus
for the downwardly mobile both primary and secondary ties are dis-
rupted.
The Janowitz hypothesis on the relationship of social mobility
to membership in secondary groups has been examined in several studies
by Richard Curtis. In one study he compares the membership rates of
mobile and non-mobile persons in several types of formal voluntary
associations. He finds that, "In so far as non-membership in such
[formal voluntary] associations represents social isolation, these
data do not support the contention that mobile persons are any more or
5Uless isolated than their stable peers.
"
Morris Janowitz, "Consequences of Social Mobility in the




'Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Membership in




In a second article, Curtis examines the finding of Seymour
Lipset and Joan Gordon that downwardly mobile workers are less likely
to be trade-union members than are non-mobile workers. ^ Curtis 1
findings reinforce those of Lipset and Gordon: the downwardly mobile
are slightly less likely to be union members than non-mobile manual
workers, and upwardly mobile non-manual workers are more likely to
belong to a union than the non-mobile. Curtis concludes, however,
that the differences between mobile and non-mobile are relatively
minor.
In examining church membership, Curtis finds no difference
between the mobile and the non-mobile in frequency of membership. When
they are church members, however, both the upwardly and downwardly
mobile tend to attend church more frequently than do the non-mobile
57
church members.
In evaluating his findings on the effect of social mobility
on membership in formal voluntary associations, Curtis concludes that
in most cases it produces no measureable effect. He notes that this
finding is consistent with the view that the socially isolating effects
of mobility "are limited to, first, rapid or extreme mobility, and
Seymour Martin Lipset and Joan Gordon, "Mobility and Trade
Union Membership," in Bendix and Lipset, op. cit . , pp. H91-500.
56
Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Union Member-
ship in Detroit: A Replication," Social Forces , XXXVIII, No. 1
(October, 1959), 69-71.
57
^ Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Church
Participation," Social Forces , XXXVIII, No. k (May, I960), 315-319.
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second, isolation (if any) in primary rather than secondary re-
58lationships.
"
The hypothesis that dilemmas faced by the mobile inhibit
social integration has been examined by Peter Blau. He finds the
mobile evidence insecurity by a greater preoccupation with their
health and by hostility toward minority groups. Blau describes the
socially mobile:
Without extensive and intimate social contacts, they do not
have sufficient opportunity for complete acculturation to the
values and style of life of the one group, nor do they continue
to experience the full impact of the social constraints of the
other. 60
Evidence bearing on the hypothesis that social mobility
inhibits social integration is offered in several other studies. In
a study by Evelyn Ellis, twenty-seven successful unmarried career
women who had been socially mobile were compared with a control group
of thirty-three equally successful unmarried career women who had not
been mobile. The finding was that the socially mobile career women
tended to be emotionally maladjusted, with superficial, impermanent
5 Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Membership in
Formal Voluntary Associations: A Note on Research," ASR , XXIV , No. 6
(December, 19$9) 9 8U8.
to
^ Peter M. Blau, "Social Mobility and Interpersonal Relations,"
ASR
, XXI, No. 3 (June, 19£6), 290-295. A much more extensive catalog
of the detrimental effects of mobility is set forth by Melvin Tumin,
although it is unsupported by convincing evidence. (Melvin M. Tumin,
"Some Unapplauded Consequences of Social Mobility in a Mass Society,"
Social Forces , XXXVI, No. 1 (October, 1957), 21-37.)
^31au, op. cit
. , p. 291. For a similar view see Everett V.
Stonequist, The Marginal Man (New York: Scribners, 1937).
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primary group relations. Another study, by E. E. Lemasters, was
designed specifically to examine the relationship between social
mobility and family integration. Using participant observation
reports on seventy-eight families, Lemasters found excellent family
integration, communication, and adjustment in non-mobile families,
whereas in upward mobile families integration tended to be good within
the nuclear family, but sometimes strained and disrupted within the
extended family. The strains existed between the mobile members of
the family and those who had been left behind in the mobility
62
process.
A recent study by Robert Stuckert examined the relationship
of mobility to four dimensions of extended family cohesion, using
266 white married females as subjects. The four dimensions examined
were frequency of family visiting, family identification, use of the
family as reference group, and concern for maintaining family unity.
In each case Stuckert found that the mobile women had fewer ties with
their extended family and were less likely to be oriented toward them
than were the stable wives. Stuckert concluded that the mobile women
were characterized by a general pattern of non-involvement outside of
Evelyn Ellis, "Social Psychological Correlates of Upward
Social Mobility among Unmarried Career Women, "_ASR, XVII (October,
1952), 558-563.
E. E. Lemasters, "Social Class Mobility and Family Inte-




the nuclear family, including participation in fewer voluntary
associations than non-mobile wives.
Most studies have indicated that the problem of social
integration is more serious for the downwardly mobile than it is
for those who have risen in status. One reason for this seems to
be that the conflict between their acquired norms and their actual
life situation is more serious. Harold Wilensky and Hugh Edwards
found that the downwardly mobile, socialized in early life toward
the middle class norms of success, tend to retain these norms.
However, those non-mobile who inherit a lower class position insulate
themselves from frustration in various ways. For example, Ely
Chinoy found that automobile workers tended to limit their goals
and to redefine their aspirations toward ambitions for their children
rather than to be personally ambitious. In a similar vein, Herbert
Hyman found "reduced striving for success among the lower classes, an
awareness of lack of opportunity, and a lack of valuation of education,
normally the major avenue to achievement of high status." The
^Robert P. Stuckert, "Occupational Mobility and Family Re-
lationships," Social Forces , XII, No. 3 (March, 1963), 301-307.
Tlarold L. Wilensky and Hugh Edwards, "The Skidders Ideo-
logical Adjustments of Downward Mobile Workers," ASR, XXIV, No. 2
(April, 1959), 215-231.
^Sly Chinoy, "The Tradition of Opportunity and the Aspirations
of Automobile Workers," AJS, LVTI (March, 1952), U53-U59.
Herbert H. Hyman, "The Value Systems of Different Classes,"
in Bendix and Lipset, op. cit
. , p. U38.
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downwardly mobile, on the other hand, seem to be denied this psycho-
logical insulation. Wilensky and Edwards found the "skidders" more
conservative in values and beliefs, more apt to reject identification
with the working class, more apt to attach importance to promotion,
and more apt to believe firmly in the free mobility ideology than were
67
those of stable working class status.
In Suicide Emile Durkheim suggested that individuals who are
socially mobile are more likely to find themselves in an anomic
s a
situation, disoriented and thus more likely to resort to suicide.
Direct evidence on this hypothesis is offered by Warren Breed. Breed
examined data on 103 white males who committed suicide between 195U
and 1959. Comparing these with a control group, he found an extra-
ordinary amount of downward mobility among the suicides, both inter-
generational and during the individual's own worklife. Breed reports,
on the other hand, no evidence of a correlation between suicide and
69
upward mobility.
It is to be expected that poor social integration of mobile
individuals would be reflected in a higher than normal incidence of
psychiatric disturbance. However, the evidence on this is mixed.
67
Wilensky and Edwards, loc. cit .
6fi




Wnite Males," ASR, mill, No. 2 (April, 1963), 179-188.
W rren Breed, "Occupational Mobility and Suicide among
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Rolling she ad, Ellis, and Kirby found some indication of correlation -
between upward mobility and certain types of mental disturbance, though
70
the evidence is not unequivocal. Mary Iystad found that schizo-
phrenics were significantly more likely to be downwardly mobile but
71less likely to be geographically mobile than controls.
When the evidence on social mobility and social integration
is assessed, it is fairly well established that a link exists between
downward mobility and poor integration. The link is more tenuous in
the case of upward mobility. A tutored guess is that upward mobility
seriously affects the social integration of individuals only where
the process of mobility has been abrupt, or where the social distance
between the individuals status of origin and status of destination is
unusually large.
Conclusion
The literature on social mobility and political behavior is
richer in hypotheses than in verified findings. Although numerous
theorists have suggested that social mobility reduces class polar-
ization and the violence of class conflict in the political arena,
there is a shortage of hard empirical evidence on the mechanisms
7
°A. B. Hollingshead, R. Ellis, and E. Kirby, "Social
Mobility and Mental Illness," ASR, XVIX, No. $ (October, 195U),
S77-58U.
"Slary H. Iystad, "Social Mobility among Selected Groups




through which this is assumed to take place. This chapter has
reported on a number of studies that shed some light on the relation-
ship of social mobility to political behavior, but unfortunately the
evidence is neither as comprehensive nor as unequivocal as would be
necessary to support a theory of social mobility and politics.
The study that most directly examined the relationship of
mobility to political behavior, Lipset and Bendix's Social Mobility
in Industrial Society, reported that in the United States the down-
wardly mobile retain the political loyalties of their class of origin,
but that the upwardly mobile abandon their earlier beliefs and become
even more conservative than others in their new class. Some reasons
for doubting their assessment of the behavior of the upwardly mobile
were set forth in this chapter. In the following chapter a theory
of mobility is developed that results in hypotheses at variance with





Although a number of suggestions that social mobility affects
political behavior were reviewed in Chapter II, the available empirical
evidence could not convincingly establish the nature of the relation-
ship. It is the task of the present chapter to set forth a theory
accounting for the relationship between social mobility and political
behavior, and to state in testable form some hypotheses derived from
the theory.
In any study that focuses upon the effect of a single variable
there is danger of an impression that it is offered as a total ex-
planation. Quite obviously, social mobility is but one of many
factors that affect political behavior. Accordingly, in all subsequent
theoretical statements "other things being equal" should be assumed.
Stratification and the Political System
As was noted in the previous chapter, a persistent finding
of all studies has been that those of high status tend to hold con-
servative viewpoints on economic matters and to vote Republican, while
those of low status tend to hold more radical views on economics and
vote Democratic. This makes sense in terms of economic self-interest.
Those who are presently well-off naturally wish to leave things as
they are, while those not so well off want to change things in their

kh
own favor. Thus the political preferences of an individual are
influenced by his place in the stratification system.
The association between status and party preference is far
from perfect. As Table 3 indicates, the highest proportion of
Republicans is found in the high income Business and Professional
category, coupled with the lowest proportion of Democrats. The lowest
status group, low income blue-collar workers, report the highest
proportion of Democrats and the lowest proportion of Republicans.
Thus even among groups of the highest or of the lowest status there
are substantial numbers of supporters of both major parties.
Other types of political misidentification than just belonging
to the "wrong" party are also important. The notion of subjective
status and objective status was introduced earlier. Using two measures
of status, there are many individuals who assign themselves to one
social level, but who would be assigned by an analyst to another.
Heinz Eulau, using objective and subjective class identifications
taken from the 195>6 SRC survey, reports that of those who are ob-
jectively middle class 30 per cent assign themselves to the working
class. Of those who are objectively working class 22 per cent assign
1
themselves to the middle class. Eulau examines the relationship
between objective and subjective identifications and political be-
havior. He reports that subjective identification is most important
Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years (New
York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 5U.
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and Business Collar Collar
Democratic 3C# 19% U3#
$7,500 up Republican U2 36 25
Independent or other 28 25 31
100* 100# 99^
N 296 59 liU
Democratic 10* h3% \M>
$3,500-$7,U99 Republican 31 32 22
Independent or other 28
_2£ 28
100$ 10C# 99#
N 392 173 670
Democratic h9% hk% 50^
$0-$3,U99 Republican 28 30 22
Independent or other 2k 26 28
ica.% 100$ 10C#
N 195 122 701
"About what do you think your total income will be this year
for yourself and your immediate family?"
"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or what?"
Occupation of head of household.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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for attitudes where direct action is unnecessary, but that "capacity
for role performance seems to be more immediately grounded in objective
2
class position. " The data reported by Eulau show a consistent
tendency for the class misidentifiers—-those objectively in one class,
but subjectively in another—to display distributions of partisan
preference and attitudes intermediate between the groups of consistent
high and consistent low class identification. As Table k indicates,
class misidentifiers are, for example, less often Democrats than those
who are both objectively and subjectively working class, but more
often Democrats than those who are consistently middle class. In this
way the class misidentifiers serve to weaken the closeness between
class and party.
Social mobility has also often been thought to affect the
closeness of the association between class and party. One version of
this theory has been stated by Eulau:
If the party system operates with considerable indifference
to class stratification, the social situation is presumably
one of high mobility and relatively weak 'class awareness. 9
The parties are hardly distinguishable from one another with
respect to principles or objectives. The party struggle is
one between the 'ins 1 and the 'outs. 1 On the other hand,
if the social situation is one of low mobility and high
'class awareness, 1 the parties are likely to divide on
issues, notably economic issues—with voters higher in the
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TABLE 1*. --Objective class identification, subjective class identification
and party identification, 1952 and 1956a
Objectively Working Class
Party Self-identified as:
Identification Working Class Middle Class
1952 1956 1952 1956
Objectively Middle Class
Self-identified as:
Working Class Middle Class
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Adapted from Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower
Years (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962;, Table 3, p. 62.
Data Source: Michigan Survey Research Center, 1952, 1956,
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Implicit in the theory that social mobility reduces class polarization
in politics is an assumption about the effect of mobility on individual
political behavior. If social mobility is to reduce political polari-
zation, the mobile individual's political behavior must be less closely
linked to his new status than is the non-mobile individual, or his
presence in a new social position must somehow reduce the class-
linkage of those around him, or both. It will be argued subsequently
that under certain circumstances both are true, but first it is
necessary to examine alternative hypotheses about the effect of
mobility upon political behavior.
The Over-Identification Hypothesis
The classic folk speculation about the behavior of upwardly
mobile individuals is that the parvenu is meticulous in his adoption
of the values and symbols of his new group in the attempt to convince
himself or others that he really does belong. The picture is painted
by Dostoevsky:
Already the merchant grows more and more eager for rank,
and strives to show himself cultured though he has not a
trace of culture, and to this end meanly despises his old
traditions, and is even ashamed of the faith of his
fathers.
This view would suggest that, to the extent that political affiliation
is a visible indicator of status, at any given social level upwardly
T?yodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazoy , trans. Constance
Garnett (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Brittanica Inc. [Great Books of the
Western World, No. 52j, 19^2), p. 165.
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mobile people are even more likely to be Republicans than those at
the same level -whose status has been stable. This view is adopted by
Lipset and Bendix, who state that in America persons who move up
into the middle class are more often Republican than those born to
the middle class. They contrast this with the situation in most of
Europe, where the upwardly mobile tend to be less conservative than
those born to the middle class. The difference is explained as the
result of differences in class living style between Europe and
America. In the case of downwardly mobile persons, lipset and Bendix
find political behavior the same in Europe as in America: "they vote
more conservatively than the stationary members of the class into
7
which they have fallen."
Some of the difficulties of the over-identification hypothesis
were noted in the previous chapter, but there are other problems as
well. Even if the parvenu over-identifies with the norms of his new
status, his over-identification involves only those traits which he
recognizes as characteristic of the status. In the United States,
-'Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in
Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1959), p. 66. Their evidence for this conclusion is discussed
in Chapter II.
Lipset and Bendix' s reasoning is that the upwardly mobile
Europeans, finding it difficult to adjust to the life style of higher
levels, retains his working class party identification along with other
working class elements in his style of life. In the United States, where
the upwardly mobile individual can more easily fulfill the requirements
of his new social position he presumably adopts a Republican party
identification along with a middle class style of life. This does not
explain, however, the finding that the mobile are "even more conservative





party preference does not have this kind of a clear status coloration.
This is demonstrated in Table 5. At most, only a small majority of
those who identify themselves as members of the middle class or
working class are able to say definitely whether their own class will
vote Democratic or Republican. In 1956 only 36 per cent of the middle
class thought that their class would vote mostly Republican, compared
with 1|8 per cent who thought it would split evenly or vote mostly
Democratic and 16 per cent who did not know. In the working class
37 per cent thought the working class would vote mostly Democratic,
while I4I per cent thought it would be evenly split or vote Republican,
and 22 per cent did not know. This ambiguity of party preference as
a status symbol, coupled with the previously reported finding that
politics is of only minor importance for most people, makes it un-
likely that political affiliation serves as a means of status re-
assurance for very many people.
Nor does Lipset and Bendix's explanation of the difference
between findings in Europe and the United States in terms of differ-
ences in class living style between the two continents suit their
finding. If class living styles differ more in Europe than they do
in the U.S., one would expect the parvenu reaction to be more prevalent
there. "Where upward mobility is accompanied by a radical change in
o
On the basis of these data Eulau concludes: "In 1952 • • *
only small majorities in either class could definitely say whether
their own class would vote Democratic or Republican. In 1956 only
minorities in either class were definite in their perceptions of the
voting behavior of their own class, while majorities were either
ambiguous in their perceptions or had no perceptions at all." Eulau,











TABLE 5.—Middle and working class expectations of own class vote,
1952 and 1956a
Middle Class Working Class
1952b 1956c 1952b 1956c





Total 1CX# 10(# 100$ 1(X#
Adapted from Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower
Years (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 96, Table 1U.
"Now I'd like to ask some questions about how you think
other people will vote in this election—How about working class
(middle class) people—do you think they will vote mostly Republican,
mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?"
"Now how about working class (middle class) people—do you
think more working class (middle class) people will vote Republican,
more will vote Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly
split?"
Data Source : Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1952-1956.
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style of life, insecurity is more likely. The less secure an
individual is in his new status, the greater is his need to adopt
reassuring symbols to convince himself and others that he really
has arrived. Thus the upwardly mobile European, faced with a
radically different social situation, should feel more in need of
o
status reassurance than the mobile American. Finally, party
affiliation seems a more likely status indicator for Europeans than
for Americans. Although evidence is lacking, I suspect that European
political parties are seen as more clearly class-colored than are
U.S. parties. If this is true, the European parvenu is more likely
to view party affiliation as a status symbol than is his counterpart
in the U.S. If, even so, upwardly mobile Europeans do not "over-
identify" with middle class parties, it seems unlikely that the
upwardly mobile American will behave differently.
One of the hypotheses of this study is that persons who move
up into the middle class are less often Republicans and less often
economic conservatives than those born into the middle class. Before
formalizing the hypothesis, however, it is necessary to examine the
view of political socialization upon which it is based.
9
It might be argued that it is the very vagueness of status
symbols in the U.S. that creates a need for status reassurance, but
this argument is incompatible with that of Lipset and Bendix, who argue
that it is the European mobile individual who has more trouble gaining
status acceptance.
There is abundant evidence (a) that political analysts see
European parties as more class-colored than they see American parties,
and (b) that there actually is higher class polarization in voting in
Europe than in the U.S., but neither of these facts bears directly on
whether the citizens at large view parties as class-affiliated, I




Bernard Barber has stated: "It is an essential feature of
human behavior that social norms, ideas, and emotions are not innate
but have to be learned by participation in society. " Evidence
that this is the case for political behavior has been summarized by
12Herbert Hyman. Although socialization is a life-long process,
the attitudes learned in the family are reflected throughout an
individual's life. This seems to be as true of political behavior
as of other behavior, one study reporting that
most citizens tend to locate themselves in a political
party at an early point in their adult life, and . . .
this identification typically gains strength throughout
life. The party that wins favor appears to depend pre-
dominantly upon social transmission from the family or
early reference groups. 13
One way in which attitudes learned in the family are reflected is in
the high correlation between the party preferences of respondents
and their parents. The influence of parental party preference and
its persistence are shown in Table 6. Where both parents were Demo-
crats, more than 70 per cent of respondents are also Democrats at any
age level. Where both parents were Republicans, the percentage of
respondents with the same identification range from 60 per cent to
71 per cent, with the oldest respondents the most apt to agree with
Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & Co., 1957), p. 26U.
Tierbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: The Free
Press, 1959).
13




TABIE 6. --Parental politics in relation to party identification and
age of respondent3
Age and Party Parental Politics
Identification Shifted, Do Not
of Both Parents Both Parents Know, Neither
Respondent Democrats Republicans Voted
Under 35
Democratic 12% 15% 37*
Independent 22 25 ko
Republican 6 60 Jl
100$ 100£ 10C#
N 231 220 88
?5-??
Democratic m 1$ k%
Independent ik 23 37
Republican 12 Jl 20
100# 100$ 100$
N 276 163 119
55 and over
Democratic 11% 15* IM




N 139 118 50
aAdapted from V. 0. Key, Jr., Public Opiilion and American
Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
, 1961), p. 300, Table 12.2.
"Do you remember when you were growing up whether your
parents thought of themselves mostly as Democrats or Republicans or
did they shift around from one party to another?"
Independents include those who, when pressed, confessed that
they felt closer to one or the other of the parties.
Data Source : Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1952.
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their parents. Thus roughly two-thirds of all voters follow their
parent's party preference.
It could be argued that the high degree of association between
an individual's party preference and that of his parents is not a
reflection of early socialization, but of the fact that most individuals
remain in the status of their fathers and that the similarity of
preference reflects only the similarity of adult social environment.
Evidence that this is not the case is reported in Voting . Differences
in the proportion of sons agreeing with their father's party preference
between those who have risen above their father's status and those who
have not range from 8 to 21 per cent. But with change in status
controlled, differences assignable to father's party preference range
from 32 to h$ per cent, making it clear that the inheritance of party
preference is not simply a matter of sons being in the same status as
their fathers.
Political socialization by the family is important for a
theory of social mobility because socialization patterns are different
at different status levels. The low status child undergoes substantially
different socializing experiences than does the higher status child,
in school as well as in the family and neighborhood. An individual's
Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee,
Voting (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 195U) Chart XXXEX,
p. 91.
Allison Davis, Social-Class Influences upon Learning (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 196l)j Allison Davis, "American Status Systems
and the Socialization of the Child," American Sociological Review , VI,
No. 3 (June, 19lil), 3U5-5Uj E. Litt, "Civic Education, Community Norms,
and Political Indoctrination," American Sociological Review , XXVIII,
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political habits and his political attitudes are strongly influenced
by the social ambience of his childhood. Because at any given status
level mobile individuals will have been subject to socializing ex-
periences that differ systematically from those to which non-mobile
individuals are exposed, they should have different political habits
and attitudes.
Yet socialization is not a process that ends with childhood.
Voting studies have emphasized repeatedly the importance of an in-
dividual's current social milieu to his political behavior,, Vote
decisions are strongly influenced by relatives, friends, and co-
workers, and the more homogenous these personal associates, the more
certain the agreement. It is reported in Voting that where a
respondent's three closest friends intended to vote for the Republican
candidate he was in agreement 88 per cent of the time, and where all
three intended to vote for the Democratic candidate he was in agree-
17
ment 85 per cent of the time. Agreement is almost as high in the
-i o
case of voting preferences of co-workers. The importance of personal
influence is further reflected in the finding that disagreements among
No. 1 (February, 1963), 69-75; Genevieve Knupfer, "Portrait of the
Underdog," in Bendix and Iipset, Class, Status and Power , pp. 255-263;
Herbert Hyman, "The Values Systems of Different Classes; A Social
Psychological Contribution to the Analysis of Stratification," in
Bendix and Lipset, op. cit
. , pp. U26-li]±2„
Berelson et al.. op. cit . . p. 335.
17




the primary groups to -which an individual belongs constitute one of
19
the most important sources of party irregularity and defection.
Given the importance of socialization and social contact to
political behavior, -what effect can social mobility be expected to
exert? People -who are socially mobile differ from those of stable
status in politically important ways. First, for the mobile the
influence of early socialization in family, school, and neighborhood
is likely to be incongruent with that exerted by the friends, neighbors,
and co-workers who inhabit their new social milieu . Second, the
mobile are more likely to have social contacts across status lines.
Family and old friends serve as links to their former status, whereas
new friends and co-workers are likely to be peers of their new status.
Because, as has been noted, contact with people is of paramount
importance as an influence on political behavior, it is to be expected
that the difference in patterns of social contact will be reflected
politically.
Mobility as a Process of Socialization
There are two alternative hypotheses about the effect of
social mobility on political behavior. The one advanced by Lipset
and Bendix has already been discussed. An alternative view is that
the effects of mobility are principally the result of a process of
socialization, a view that has been expressed by Peter Blau:
19
H. McClosky and H. E. Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence on




This pattern, -which may be called the pattern of acculturation,
can be explained in terms of the hypothesis that mobile persons
are not well integrated in either social class. Without ex-
tensive and intimate social contacts, they do not have sufficient
opportunity for complete acculturation to the values and style
of life of the one group, nor do they continue to experience the
full impact of the social constraints of the other. But both
groups exert some influence over mobile individuals, since they
have, or have had, social contacts with members of both, being
placed by economic circumstances amidst the one while having
been socialized among the other. Hence their behavior is ex-
pected, to be intermediate between that of the two non-mobile
classes. 2°
To the extent that the adoption of political norms is a
result of the social interactions taking place in the new environment-
being exposed to new friends, changing habits to meet changed cir-
cumstances, accepting new norms—the process is one of gradual social-
ization into the new status. This should result in a relatively
smooth change in attitudes and behavior from what was appropriate to
the old station in life to what is appropriate to the new station.
If, on the other hand, the adoption of political attitudes
is a form of symbolic justification—attempting to prove to oneself
and others that one really does belong—the process may involve a
more radical change in attitudes and behavior. The mobile person
may even "over-identify" with new norms, presenting us with an
example of parvenu behavior. Such behavior can be expected only when
both of two conditions are present. First, there must be psychic
insecurity sufficient to create the need for symbolic justification.
20Peter M. Blau, "Social Mobility and Interpersonal Relations,"
American Sociological Review , XH, No. 3 (June, 195>6), 291.
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Second, such behavior can occur only with regard to those norms of
attitude or behavior which are status-linked in the mind of the
mobile individual, since one proves nothing about one's status by-
adopting norms which are not perceived as related to status.
I incline to the alternative view that political behavior
tends to be affected more often by processes of gradual socialization
than by needs for symbolic justification. Politics is of such peripheral
concern for most people, and of sufficiently ambiguous status coloration,
that the mechanisms of symbolic justification are not likely to be
called into play. Further, in a society like the United States, where
there is a substantial amount of mobility, where there is a widespread
belief in relative social equality, and where there is not a vast gap
in the styles of life of people in adjacent social strata, there is
unlikely to be much psychic insecurity generated by moderate social
21
mobility. My argument is similar to that stated by Everett Stonequist:
What is true of the parvenu is equally true of the declasse
.
He is forced through a period of acute maladjustment, from
which he may never recover his peace of mind. But in a
society of relatively open classes, where ancestors count
less heavily in the balance sheet of the individual's present
status, the parvenu is the rule instead of the exception.
Instead of being regarded with suspicion, as in an old country
like England, in America he becomes glorified in the epic
'from log-cabin to Miite House.' In such a situation there
are strictly speaking no parvenus .^
21
It has been suggested that the absence of unambiguous status
symbols can make for status anxiety, but even if this is so I see no
reason for believing that the mobile are more susceptible to this type
of anxiety than the non-mobile. If no one can prove or be sure of his
status all are likely to be equally anxious.
22




Under these circumstances symbolic justification or "over-identification"
would be expected to occur only where the gulf between original status
and new status is unusually large. For cases of more moderate mobility
the individual should encounter no serious problems in adjusting to
his new environment.
Statement of Hypotheses
A number of hypotheses have been drawn from the preceding
theory of social mobility and the review of the social mobility
literature in the previous chapter. The first group of hypotheses are
based on the view that social mobility is accompanied by a continuous
process of socialization into a new environment, with attitudes and
beliefs undergoing gradual change to conform to those prevalent in
the new status environment.
1.0—For both the upwardly and downwardly mobile, political
loyalties and attitudes tend to change in the direction
appropriate to their new status, resulting in political
behavior intermediate between that typical of their old
and their new status.
When this basic hypothesis is translated into terms of the political
party loyalties characteristic of high and low strata in the United
States, the following two hypotheses result:
1.1—The upwardly mobile more often prefer the Democratic
Party than do non-mobile members of their new stratum,
but they less often prefer the Democratic Party than do
non-mobile members of their original stratum.
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1.2—The downwardly mobile less often prefer the Democratic
Party than do non-mobile members of their new stratum,
but they more often prefer the Democratic Party than
do non-mobile members of their original stratum.
With the passage of time the influence of a mobile individual's
new stratum should increase relative to that of his original status.
Occupational status is normally determined during young adulthood, and
therefore older persons generally will have spent a higher proportion
of their lives in their new status than have younger persons. As a
result, political attitudes of the older mobiles should more closely
resemble those characteristic of the new stratum because of their
longer exposure to the new norms. Thus:
1.3—Political preferences of older mobile individuals are
closer to those typical of their new stratum, whereas
those of young mobile individuals are closer to those
typical of their original stratum.
Hypothesis 1.0 predicts an association between social mobility
and changes in political preference. Thus the mobile are more likely
to have changed party allegiance.
l.U—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile have more often
changed political party allegiance at some point in
their lives than have the non-mobile.
The mobile, who are exposed to conflicting political influences,




1.5—Both the upwardly and the downwardly mobile more often
view themselves as "independents" or as "weak" party
members than do the non-mobile at the same status level.
Accompanying an individual's actual change in status a change
in subjective status is likely. The class label an individual assigns
himself—his subjective class—is of considerable consequence to his
23political behavior. Although subjective class, because more
clearly a means of status reassurance, is more likely to be distorted
by the need for symbolic justification than is party affiliation,
it should also be subject to the same pulls of early socialization
and personal contact as other political attitudes. Thus:
1.6—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile are more
often class misidentifiers than are non-mobile
individuals.
Because of the American norm of success, an individual should find it
psychologically easier to transfer his self-assigned class position
upward to conform to upward mobility than downward to conform to
downward mobility. As a result:
1.7—The downwardly mobile are more often class misidentifiers
than are the upwardly mobile.
The second group of hypotheses is based upon the assumption
that mobile individuals are more likely to be subject to politically
23
Angus Campbell et al. , op. cit . , pp. 333-380; Eulau, Class
and Party in the Eisenhower Years, passim .
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incongruent personal influences and socialization experiences than
are the non-mobile. As noted in the previous chapter, there have
been several suggestions that as a result the mobile behave as cross-
pressured individuals. If this is true, then they should evidence
the lack of interest and involvement in politics that have been
reported as characteristic of those subject to conflicting political
pressures. Specifically:
2.1—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often
show low levels of political interest than do the non-
mobile at the same status level.
2.2—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often
feel politically ineffectual than do the non-mobile
at the same status level.
2.3—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often
abstain from voting than do the non-mobile at the
same status level.
A recurrent theme of much of the literature on social mobility
is that the mobile are more isolated from their social environment
than are the non-mobile. A number of consequences of this presumed
isolation have been suggested by various authors. The mobile have
been reported to be more often prejudiced or intoleratnt, to have
lower rates of membership in unions and voluntary organizations, and
to be more withdrawn, suspicious, and dissatisfied than the non-
mobile. In some cases these traits have been reported as characteristic
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of the downwardly mobile only, sometimes as characteristic of both
upwardly and downwardly mobile. To examine these aspects of the
social integration of the mobile and its effects, the following
2Uhypotheses will be tested:
3.1—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often
hold prejudiced or intolerant attitudes than do the non-
mobile at the same status level.
3.2—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile less often be-
long to voluntary organizations than do the non-mobile
at the same status level.
3.3—The downwardly mobile less often belong to trade unions
than do the non-mobile at the same status level.
3. U—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile less often trust
other groups in the society than do the non-mobile at
the same status level.
3.5—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile are less often
satisfied with their social circumstances than are the
non-mobile at the same status level.
\Lt had been my original intention to compare not only the
social integration of the mobile with the non-mobile, but that of the
extremely mobile with the moderately mobile. Unfortunately, the index
of extreme mobility adopted—movement from the highest occupational
category to the lowest, or vice-versa, classified a substantial majority
of mobile respondents as extremely mobile, and only a small number as
moderately mobile. Using this index no significant differences were
found between the moderately and extremely mobile, but I attribute the
lack of difference primarily to the inadequacy of the index used. I
would expect that if an adequate index to extreme mobility were de-
vised that it would show the extremely mobile less well integrated in
their social environment than the moderately mobile.
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These hypotheses are tested against the data in subsequent
chapters. Hypotheses 1.0-1.7 are examined in Chapters VI and VII;






The empirical data on which this study is based were obtained
through preelection and postelection interviews of survey samples
designed to represent the non-institutional adult population of the
United States. The material, originally gathered for other purposes,
is subjected here to secondary analysis.
This chapter discusses secondary analysis as a research
technique, describes the sample design, adopts and justifies operational
definitions for both objective and subjective mobility, describes the
manner of testing propositions, and discusses the statistical procedures
used.
Secondary Analysis
This study uses the method of secondary analysis, the fresh
use of accumulated data. This method allows the researcher, faced
with the inevitable limitations of time and funds, to undertake
research projects considerably more ambitious than would otherwise
be practical.
There are two varieties of secondary analysis. One makes use
of published findings, making its contribution in the form of synthesis
and interpretation. An excellent example of this kind of secondary
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analysis is Herbert Hyman's Political Socialization. The second makes
use of accumulated data in less finished form—interview sheets or IBM
cards—and uses them to test hypotheses other than those for which it
was originally collected. It is the latter variety of secondary
2
analysis which is used here.
The potential of this kind of secondary analysis is exemplified
in recent works by Robert E. Lane, Heinz Eulau, Morris Janowitz and
Dwaine Marvick, and V. 0. Key, all of which use data obtained from the
3
Michigan SRC archives.
The gains thus achieved are not unflawed. As Heinz Eulau
points out, "Secondary analysis of social science data collected for
other purposes always runs the risk of doing violence to the data
and their original interpretation." This danger is reduced, however,
Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: The Free
Press, 1959).
2
The data used here were obtained through the facilities of the
Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, which was created
by a group of cooperating universities and the Survey Research Center
of the University of Michigan to provide easier access to the data
repository created at the SRC through its research program in political
behavior, together with other data that has been deposited at the
Center. For information on the IUCPR see: Warren Miller, "Inter-
University Consortium for Political Research," Institute for Social
Research Newsletter (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, October,
1962).
Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press,
1959); Heinz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years (New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick,
Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent (Ann Arbor: Bureau of
Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan,
1956); V. 0. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 196l).
^einz Eulau, Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years , p. ix.
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when the reanalysis is based upon the data as originally coded rather
than a reanalysis of published data. A potentially more serious
problem is that the area of inquiry which interests us may have been
only touched upon in the original surveys. Consequently data to test
propositions of great theoretical importance may be scanty or absent
altogether. Thus data from the 1958 and 1962 election surveys could
not be used here, because despite desirability on other grounds, they
did not include questions necessary to the measurement of mobility.
For similar reasons it has at times been necessary to compromise on
indicators less appropriate to a particular use than might have been
available had a survey been designed de novo . But there seems little
doubt that what is sacrificed is more than compensated for by the
increase in scope and generality obtainable through secondary analysis,
Sample Design
The data upon which this study is based are those collected
by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center for the national
elections of 1952, 1956, and i960. Analysis cards containing the
required data were obtained through the facilities of the Inter-
university Consortium for Political Research.
The samples (about 1700 respondents each year) were repre-
sentative cross-sections of adults living in private households in
the United States, excluding those living on military reservations
and on some institutional properties. Also excluded were places such
as large rooming houses, hotel rooms, dormitories for students or
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workers, barracks, and living quarters for inmates of institutions,
where persons lived outside the usual family household.
The samples were selected by the probability method known as
area sampling. By this method every member of the population sampled
has a known chance of being selected. To insure a close fit between
the sample and the parent population on certain characteristics,
the population was stratified by population density, geographic
location, and several other variables.
For these surveys, sixty-six strata were formed from all the
counties in the United States. The twelve largest metropolitan areas
and their suburbs account for twelve of the strata and contain about
30 per cent of the population. From each of the remaining fifty-four
strata, one county-unit (sometimes consisting of several counties)
was chosen by a controlled selection procedure to represent the
stratum. In the twelve largest metropolitan areas, each of the
twelve central cities was included in the sample. A sample was also
drawn from a list of the cities, towns, and suburban areas surrounding
these central cities.
Within each of the fifty-four primary sampling units outside
of the large metropolitan areas a rather general urban-rural sub-
7
stratification was established. The urban areas were further classified
The information in the following four paragraphs is obtained
from the IUCPR Analysis Book for the elections involved.
For a description of the procedure see Roe Goodman and Leslie
Kish, "Controlled Selection—A Technique in Probability Sampling," Journal
of the American Statistical Association
. XLV Q-9fj0), 3^0-37 2.
7
Briefly, places of 2,5>00 or more population at the time of
the 19£0 Census are classified as urban.
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by size before a probability selection was made to obtain repre-
sentation of each population subgroup. Similarly, from the rural
parts of the primary sampling units, two classifications were formed
according to the density of the population: (l) rural congested
areas, and (2) open country areas. Probability selections were then
made from each type of rural area.
Only one respondent was interviewed within each selected sample
dwelling. The respondent to be interviewed was selected by an ob-
jective procedure, and no substitutions were allowed. From three
to ten call-backs were made in an attempt to interview respondents
not at home on the first call. Even so, a small proportion were
never reached—U per cent in 1952 and 5 per cent in 1956. In addition,
6 per cent of the sample in 1952 and 8 per cent in 1956 refused to be
interviewed, and another h per cent in 1952 and 2 per cent in 1956
could not be interviewed because of illness, senility, or language
problems. In the I960 survey the figures are similar, but not
precisely comparable because of the inclusion of a panel design in
o
the basic cross-section study.
o
Leslie Kish, "A Procedure for Objective Respondent Selection




Of the respondents who had been interviewed in 1956, 838
were reinterviewed in i960. These reinterviewed respondents constitute





Wherever possible, data from the three elections are aggre-
gated. For theoretical reasons the mobile are expected to have
distributions on political variables intermediate between those of
stable high and stable low status, and thus observed differences
should be of relatively small magnitude. A large number of cases
is therefore desirable to help avoid the interpretation of chance
differences as real differences. Further, many of the analyses
involve breaking the sample down into large numbers of cells, and
if cell frequencies are not to fall so low that they are unusable,
large numbers of cases are required.
In order to aggregate data from the three study years certain
procedures are necessary. First, in the original SRC codings the
occupational classifications are not coded identically for each of
the three study years. It was therefore necessary to recode
occupation uniformly. Since the occupation code used in 1952 is
nearest to a common denominator, occupation of both father and son
in the 1956 and I960 surveys were re-coded to conform to the 1952
a 10code.
Second, in the I960 survey a number of respondents were
weighted by a factor of two or four in order to maintain a repre-
sentative national sample. Because this weighting procedure makes
the use of standard statistical techniques inappropriate, and because
The 1952 occupation code is reproduced in Appendix A«
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a perfectly representative national sample was not considered important
in studying social mobility, the I960 sample was used in unweighted
form. This reduces the I960 sample by 773, making it about two-thirds
the size of the 1952 and 1956 samples.
Finally, the use of a panel design involving reinterviews of
respondents in the later study years made the aggregation of study
years more complex. If the 1956 and I960 studies were simply added
together, this would result in counting twice those respondents who
had been interviewed both in 1956 and I960. To avoid double counting,
reinterviewed respondents were dropped from the I960 sample prior to
aggregation. "Wherever the I960 survey is reported separately both
new and reinterviewed respondents are included, but wherever it is
combined with the 1956 survey only those respondents interviewed for
the first time in I960 are included.
Measuring Objective Mobility
In order to measure social mobility status ranks must be
obtained for father and son, together with a measure of the difference
between them. In the interest of practicality it is desirable to use
a single measure that is simple, a valid measure of social status;
one which is stable over time and place and which can be provided
reliably by the son for both himself and his parents.
The most commonly used measures of social status are income,
education, occupation, and status as estimated by the interviewer.
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or ranking by a panel of experts -who personally know the respondent.
The latter two measures, although useful in studies of social class,
are of little utility in the study of social mobility because it is
difficult to establish parental status reliably and because the use
of panels of experts is obviously impractical in a national sample
survey. Of the remaining measures, neither parental income nor
education is ascertainable with as high reliability as is desirable.
A more serious defect is their instability as measures of status.
The social meaning of a given level of income or education changes
with the average level of education or income in the society. Forty
years ago twelve years of education and an income of $3,000 a year had
an entirely different meaning in terms of social status than they do
now. A son who has no more income or education than his father had
several decades earlier would occupy a lower relative position in
society than did his father. While this difficulty could be overcome
to some extent by developing an index that would provide multipli-
cation factors compensating for shifts over time, such an index would
be cumbersome and would be subject to inevitable inaccuracies and
regional variations. Because of the deficiencies of alternative
measures, and because occupation correlates highly with most other
measures of status, almost all research on social mobility has used
occupation to measure social status.
For a comprehensive discussion of possible indices to social
status see Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 1957), pp. 96-185.

7U
Occupation as a Measure of Objective
Mobility
Occupation has several advantages over alternative measures
as a basis for measuring inter-generational mobility. Matthews
states that !tWhile an individual's occupation is by no means a certain
index to his social standing, it is the closest approach to an in-
12
fallible guide." The reasons occupation and social standing are
so closely related have been set forth succinctly by Joseph Kahl:
In the first place, a man's occupation is the source of his
income, which in turn provides the style of life that serves
as one of the major clues used by his neighbors in making
their evaluations. But occupation stands for more than merely
a certain level of income. It indicates a man's education:
it suggests the type of associates he comes in contact with
on the job; it tells something of the contribution he makes to
community welfare; it hints at the degree of his authority over
other people. 13
As a result, occupation tends to correlate highly with other measures
of social status.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of an occupational index is
stability over time and place. Deeg and Paterson compared a prestige
rating of twenty-five occupations made in 1925 with a similar rating
12
Donald R. Matthews, "United States Senators and the Class
Structure," in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz
(eds.), Political Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), p. 185.
13Joseph A. Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York:
Rinehart and Co., 1957), p. 53.
iflJ. U_oyd Warner reports a correlation of .87 between income
and occupation and a correlation of .77 between education and income
(W. LLoyd Warner et al., Social Class in America (Chicago: Science
Research Associates, Inc., 19U9), Table 13, p. 172), but these high
correlations have not been duplicated in broader studies. Reiss found
correlations in the ranges ,h to .6 utilizing a much wider sample.
(Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Occupations and Social Status (New York: The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. ll;Off.)
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made in 19U7 and obtained a correlation of .97. Inkeles and Rossi
found a relatively standard hierarchy of occupational prestige in
the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, Germany, Soviet Russia,
and Japan despite cultural differences. Kaare Svalastoga, after
examining the findings of twenty-nine studies on occupational prestige,
concludes:
Empirical research on occupational prestige in various
countries and ranging in time from 1925 till today has
revealed one basic finding confirmed by all studies.
This finding is the high degree of consensus on the oc-
cupational prestige hierarchy of any given nation.
. . .
Moreover recent international comparisons in general .. „
reveal a high level of international prestige consensus.
After completing his measurements of occupational prestige in Denmark
and comparing his findings with those of other studies, he concludes
"it is no great exaggeration to say that there exists within Western
civilization a nearly invariant rank-order of occupational prestige.""^
Occupational indices have proved useful in social theory be-
cause, as Bernard Barber has pointed out, "practically all of the
relatively full time, functionally significant social roles that are
the criteria of social evaluation are defined as 'jobs,' that is, as
Martha E. Deeg and Donald G. Paterson, "Changes in the Social
Status of Occupations," Occupations , XXV (19U7), 205-208.
Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi, "Cross National Comparisons of
Occupational Ratings," American Journal of Sociology , IXC, No. k (Jan-
uary, 1956) , 329-339.
17
Kaare Svalastoga, Prestige, Class and Mobility (Denmark:




19positions in a single occupational sphere." Similar considerations
led Chinoy to observe that the use of occupations in the study of
mobility was useful for all important contemporary theories of
stratification.
Ranking of Occupations
Most studies have used occupational groupings similar to those
ZLdeveloped by Dr. Alba M. Edwards of the U. S. Bureau of the Census.
The occupational groupings devised by Edwards were intended to pro-
vide a rough scale of occupations in terras of increasing prestige,
education and income.
Evidence from a number of sources indicates that an Edwards
type scale does provide an effective ordering of the social status
of occupational groups. The ordering of occupational groups tends
to be the same whether they are ranked by education, income, prestige
as evaluated by others, or self-evaluated prestige.
Joseph A. Kahl reports that professional and technical workers
22have the highest median educations. Next highest median educations
are found in the occupational groups of managers and officials and
clerical and sales. At a lower education level are found blue-collar,
19Bernard Barber, op. cit
. , p. 171.
20
E. Chinoy, "Social Mobility Trends in the United States,"
American Sociological Review , XX (1955), 180-186.
21
A. M. Edwards, Alphabetical Index of Occupations by In-
dustries and Socio-Economic Groups (Washington, D. C: Government
Printing Office, 1937, Bureau of the Census).
22
Joseph A. Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York:
Rinehart and Co., 1957), p. 66.
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service and farm workers. The ordering of income groups reported by
Kahl is similar. The professional and managerial groups have the
highest median incomes, the clerical and sales and the skilled
laborers intermediate incomes, and other blue-collar workers, service
23
workers, and farm laborers the lowest median incomes.
The ordering of occupational groups by evaluated prestige is
similar to the order of rank by education or income. Of the studies
which have evaluated occupational prestige, perhaps the best known
2k
is the National Opinion Research Center study by North and Hatt.
Using the occupational prestige scores obtained in this study, Albert
J. Reiss, Jr., computed average prestige scores for major occupational
25
groups. He found the following prestige order of occupations:
(l) Professional and technical; (2) Managers, officials, and pro-
prietors; (3) Craftsmen and foremen; (k) Sales and Clerical; (5) Op-
eratives and kindred workers; (6) Protective-service workers;
(7) Service workers; and (8) Laborers. The notable inversion of the
usual order is to be found in the rating of craftsmen and foremen above
sales and clerical workers. With this single exception the usual
white-collar to blue-collar status order is followed.
23
Ibid . See also Herman P. Miller, Income of the American
People (New York: Wiley, 1955), p. $h.
National Opinion Research Center, National Opinion on Oc-
cupations: Final Report of a Special Opinion Survey among Americans
lU and Over (University of Denver: National Opinion Research Center,
March, 1°U7). This study has recently been replicated with virtually
identical results. See Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H.
Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States: 1Q 2£-1°63"




Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Occupations and Social Status (New
lork: The Free Press of Glencoe, l°6l), p. 68.
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As important as prestige ranks assigned by others are self-
ratings of occupational prestige. Many studies have examined the
subjective class identifications of people in different occupational
groups. The finding has consistently been that individuals in
occupations -which rate high on other indicators of status are more
likely to identify themselves as members of higher social classes
than are individuals in lower rated occupations and vice versa.
A study by Stanley Hetzler uses a technique that permits a
much finer breakdown of self-evaluated prestige than does the tech-
27
nique of choosing between social class ,fboxes. " Hetzler presented
his subjects with a scale one foot in length, containing no markings
other than an indication of the high and low ends of the scale. He
then asked them to estimate their social position in 19H0 and at the
present time by placing a mark at the appropriate point on the scale.
The results are shown in Table 7. Using the "median score on present
scale," and omitting farmers, the order of self-evaluated social
status is: (l) Professionals; (2) the single Big Business Owner;
(3) Executives; (U) Employee-Supervisors; (£) White-collar; (6) Pro-
prietors; (7) Skilled; (8) Unskilled; (9) Semiskilled. The notable
inversions here are between unskilled and semiskilled, and in the
low ranking of proprietors, who are usually included with managers
e.g« , Richard Centers, The Psychology of Social Glasses
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19k9)i Eulau, op. cit .
"
27
'Stanley A. Hetzler, "Social Mobility and Radicalism-
Conservatism," Social Forces , XXXIII, No. 2 (December, l°f>U), 161-166.
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TABLE 7.—Median scores obtained in relating occupation to estimated
social position in 19U0 and present social positiona
Median Median Net Loss
Score Score or Gain
Occupational on 19U0 Present Since Number
Category" Scale Scale 19U0 (N = 300)
Unskilled 5.7 5.8 +.1 U3
Semi-skilled 5.1 5.3 +.2 31
Skilled 6.U 6.6 +.2 67
White-collar 7.2 7.5 +.3 73
Farmers 9.0 7.0 -2.0 13
Empleye e-Supervi sor
s
6.7 8.0 +1.3 25
Proprietors 7.3 7.1 -.2 32
Professionals 10.0 9.6
-.U 9
Executives 9.0 9.0 .0 6
Big Business Owners 9.5 9.$ .0 1
Adapted from Stanley A. Hetzler, "Social Mobility and
Radicalism-Conservatism," Social Forces, XXXIII, No. 2 (December, 195U
Table 2, p. 162.

80
and officials, but by and large the ranking follows the by now
familiar pattern.
Sufficient evidence has been presented to indicate that the
Edwards type of occupational grouping does form at least a rough
scale of social status. Inconsistencies are present, but any re-
grouping would involve other inconsistencies, for the measures of
social status do not correlate perfectly with each other. As a
result little is gained by any wholesale attempt at regrouping, and
comparability with the dozens of other studies that have used oc-
cupational scales of the Edwards type would be lost.
Two further problems of measurement involve the instability
of job-holding and the unreliability of occupational data obtained
in the interview situation. The problem of the instability of job-
holding is raised by Lipset and Bendix in a pair of articles in the
28
American Journal of Sociology . Basing their conclusions on a
study of the job histories of 935 respondents in Oakland, California,
Lipset and Bendix indicate that most of the respondents had unstable
occupational careers. "While this may cast some doubt on the use of
occupation as a stable measure of social position, it does not seem
to interfere seriously with the use of occupation as a measure of
mobility for several reasons. First, change of social status and
change of job are often an integral part of the process of social
Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Mobility and
Occupational Career Patterns, I. Stability of Jobholding; II. Social




mobility -which we are studying. Second, the time and location of
the study—not long after World War II and in a region characterized
by high geographic mobility—would tend to overstate the amount of
occupational instability to be found in the country as a whole.
Finally, as Lipset and Bendix point out elsewhere:
It is important to note . . . that there are major areas of
stability; there are certain limits to the variety of oc-
cupational experience of the respondents. In the first
place, their mobility is largely confined to mobility on
either side of the dividing line between manual work and
the nonmanual occupations. There is little permanent oc-
cupational movement across this basic line. This means
that although many persons have experience in a wide
variety of occupations, most of it will be homogenous to
the extent that it will be either manual or nonmanual. 2
°
One further problem involves the reliability of the method
of determining the occupations of father and son. If, as in the data
used in this study, the respondent is asked what his occupation is
and what his father's occupation is, the father 1 s occupation will
usually be obtained at the high point of his occupational career,
while the son's occupation will be reported at a stage below the peak
30
of his career. The effect of any error thus introduced would be to
overstate downward mobility and to understate upward mobility. The
problem is avoided in the data used here, however, by asking for the
father's occupation during the time the respondent was growing up.
29Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility
in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1959), p. 180.
30
In the majority of cases, however, this would not involve
a shift from one major occupational category to another.
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An Operational Definition of Objective
Mobility
This study uses occupation as coded in the 1952 SRC election
survey, with the 1956 and i960 data recoded to conform to the 1952
code as explained above. Occupations are grouped in the following
manner for purposes of analysis. The professional and business
category includes managers and officials, self-employed businessmen
and artisans, and those in professional and semi-professional oc-
cupations. Clerical, sales, buyers, agents, and brokers form the
white-collar category. Skilled, semiskilled, unskilled, service
workers, farm laborers, and protective service form the blue-collar
category. Dropped from the sample prior to analysis are instances
where either the head of the respondent's household or the head of
his parental household (while the respondent was growing up) are
coded as unemployed, retired, or a housewife or student. Cases
where the head of the respondent's household is a farm operator are
also dropped, though where the head of the parental household was a
farm operator the respondent is retained and classified in the ex-
farm category.
The three occupational categories form a status scale, with
the professional and business category highest, the white-collar
category in the middle, and the blue-collar category at the lower
end of the status scale. Respondents are assigned to occupational
categories on the basis of their occupation, or where respondents are
not themselves the family head, the occupation of the head of the
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household is used, since the family normally constitutes a status
unit with the social attributes of the family head being the chief
31determinant of status for dependent relatives in the household.
Within occupational categories a respondent is classified into one
of four objective mobility categories. The four categories are
status stable, upwardly mobile, downwardly mobile, and ex-farm.
Respondents are assigned to objective mobility categories on the
32
basis of a comparison of their occupation with that of their father.
A respondent is status stable if in the same broad occupational
category as his father, upwardly mobile if in a higher occupational
category, and downwardly mobile if in a lower occupational category.
Where the father was a farm operator the respondent is assigned to
the ex-farm category.
Objective Mobility Sample Size
Of the original total of 5,516 respondents included in the
SRC samples for 1952, 1956 and I960, 2,738 cases had to be dropped
prior to aggregating study years for three reasons: (l) 1,129 cases
31Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical
Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review , XIX, No. k
(August, 195U), 1|07; Talcott Parsons, "A Revised Analytical Approach
to the Theory of Social Stratification," in Reinhard Bendix and S. M.
Lipset (eds.), Class, Status and Power (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953),
pp. 116-117; Kingsley Davis, Human Society (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 191+9), p. 36U.
32
The question asked to determine father 's occupation was:
"What kind of work did your father do for a living while you were
growing up?" Wherever someone other than the respondent's father was




were dropped because either the respondent or the respondents father
was in an unclassified occupational category; (2) 838 of the respondents
in the I960 survey were dropped because they had been interviewed in
the 1956 survey; (3) 771 cases from the I960 survey were dropped be-
cause they were not actually additional interviews, but were "weighted"
cases added to the sample by duplication of data on respondents already
33in the sample.
The classification procedure assigns 837 respondents in the
aggregate sample to the professional and business category, of whom
309 are status stable, 338 are upwardly mobile, and 190 are ex-farm.
The white-collar category has 36O respondents, of whom 87 are down-




Subjective mobility, as defined here, is dependent upon
whether an individual thinks that he has moved up or down the social
ladder relative to his parents, or that he occupies about the same
position. The most straightforward way of finding out this information
is simply to ask, and fortunately for our purposes the Michigan SRC
has asked useful questions in two of the surveys used here: those
33
As noted above, this is a legitimate technique for balancing
a sample to obtain a correct national profile, but prevents the use of
standard statistical techniques, and offers no compensating benefits
for a study of the present type. Therefore weighted cases were re-
moved from the sample prior to aggregation.
A complete breakdown may be found in Appendix B.
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for the 1956 and I960 elections. The question evolved by the SRC to
identify self-perception of class is
:
There 1 s quite a bit of talk these days about different social
classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle
class or to the working class. Do you ever think of yourself
as being in one of these classes? Which one? 35
An individual's answer to this question may be taken as an indication
of his perception of his own place in society. Of the same re-
spondents the Michigan SRC asked "What would you say your family was
37
when you were growing up, middle class or working class?" Persons
who place themselves in the same class as they place their parental
family are subjectively status stable. Those who place themselves
in the middle class while placing their parents in the working class
are subjectively upwardly mobile; those who place themselves in the
working class and their parents in the middle class are subjectively
downwardly mobile.
Applying these criteria to the samples from the 1956 and I960
election surveys gives a subjectively middle class group of 730 and
3$
-Tor a fuller description of techniques see Angus Campbell,
et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, I960),
p. 3U0ff.
36
For many purposes it would be desirable to have finer gra-
dations than simply middle or working class. In the 1956 survey the
Michigan SRC is able to supply this in terms of perception of location
in the "upper" or "average" part of the class. Unfortunately this was
not done in the I960 survey, and in aggregating data all that can be
salvaged is middle or working class identification.
If designing a study de novo, it would be worthwhile to con-
sider the use of a more direct question as an index to subjective
mobility, e.g . "Would you consider your place in society to be higher,
about the same,. or lower than that of your parents?"
37Campbell et al. , loc. cit .
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a subjectively working class group of 1,253. In the middle class
sample, 222 are subjectively upwardly mobile and 508 are subjectively
status stable. For the working class, 1,155 are subjectively status
stable and 98 subjectively downwardly mobile. •"
Manner of Testing Propositions
The propositions developed in Chapter III are tested against
the data in the following chapters. The technique used consists of
comparing the distributions of the mobile and the status stable on
a number of politically relevant characteristics. The independent
variable is social mobility throughout, but separate tests are con-
ducted for objective mobility and subjective mobility using the
operational definitions adopted above. An extensive series of
politically relevant dependent variables are used, including a
standard array of demographic traits, party preference, voting choice,
changes in party preference, strength of party preference, subjective
class, a series of issue attitudes, political interest and activity,
feeling of political understanding and efficacy, voting turnout,
feelings of personal satisfaction, and rates of membership in unions
and voluntary organizations. The results are displayed in contingency
tables, and a standard format has been followed to permit easier
interpretation of the tables.
As with objective mobility, weighted cases and reinterviews
with the same respondents are removed prior to aggregation.
39A complete breakdown is contained in Appendix C.
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Wherever there is a likelihood that a relationship is affected
by a third or contaminating variable, the third variable is introduced
as a control. This is done by dividing the sample into subgroups based
on the control variable (as for instance, into Protestant, Catholic,
and Jewish subgroups) and then comparing the relationship of the in-
dependent and dependent variable within subgroups. Operational
definitions for both dependent and control variables are reported in
footnotes to each table.
Statistical Procedures
The statistical test used as a measure of statistical signif-
icance is chi square. Chi square is a particularly useful measure
for analyses of the type employed in the following chapters because
of its additive properties. In many of the tables in the following
chapters a statistical test which tested the entire table at once
would give a false indication, because differences due to social status
would be combined indiscriminately with differences due to mobility.
Because chi square values may be summed, it is possible to test for
statistical significance between mobility categories within status
groups, and then sum chi square values to determine the statistical
significance for the table as a whole. This procedure has the effect
of factoring out the influence of social status upon the variable in
question so far as the statistical test is concerned.
Quinn McNemar, Psychological Statistics (3d ed. rev.) (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. , 1962), pp. 222-223.

88
The level of probability adopted as a criterion of statistical
significance is .0$, Wherever a difference would occur more often
than five times out of 100 by chance, it is reported as not significant
(NS). Wherever the probability of the difference occurring by chance
is less than .05 the actual probability level reached is reported.
Although when using chi square it is desirable to use a cor-
rection for continuity whenever predicted cell frequencies are low,
this correction cannot be easily made in the case of a general
contingency table. Thus, although in a few instances predicted cell
frequencies are sufficiently low that a correction for continuity
would be desirable, none has been used.
^"Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York:




CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOBILE
Before turning to an examination of the relationship between
social mobility and political behavior it is well to determine whether
the mobile differ from the stable in any systematic way. High and
low social strata differ with regard to characteristics such as income,
education and religion, and these are related to political behavior.
If differences in social characteristics exist between the socially
mobile and the status stable at a given status level, caution must
be exercised to avoid attributing to social mobility behavior which
is really a reflection of other factors.
This chapter examines differences between the mobile and the
stable with regard to six important demographic characteristics,
using the data described in the previous chapter. The six character-
istics examined are income, education, religion, age, race, and
nativity.
Income
Although income is an important indicator of status, its
relations to other indicators is imperfect. This is particularly
likely to be the case for the socially mobile. Even though the son
of a poor family succeeds in moving into an occupational category of
higher status, he remains at a competitive disadvantage with the son
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of a higher status family. The child of a high status family is
likely to have a better education, better clothes, more polished
manners, and better contacts. These social advantages can be turned
to economic advantage, and as a result, within any occupational
group those born to high status tend to make more money than those
born to low status.
Evidence that this is the case for both objective and sub-
jective mobility is presented in Tables 8 and 9. Where the family
is headed by a professional or businessman almost half of the status
stable have annual incomes exceeding $7,500, while less than a third
of tho upwardly mobile have an income this large. Among blue-collar
workers the downwardly mobile also evidence the advantage of their
higher status origin by substantially higher income levels than are
enjoyed by the status stable blue-collar families. The exception
to the rule is in the white-collar category, where the stable have
higher incomes than either the upwardly mobile, which is expected, or
the downwardly mobile, which is not expected. Unfortunately, it is
in this category that the fewest cases are available, and the result
is not statistically significant. It may be noted that the white-
collar category will prove deviant in several of the analyses in
the next few chapters.
Although the data are not reported here, it is interesting to
note that this competitive advantage is greater in the case of business
than for the professions. Status stable businessmen, on the average,
have substantially higher incomes than do upwardly mobile businessmen,
but the advantage of status stable professionals over upwardly mobile
professionals is relatively small.
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TABLE 8.—Objective mobility and annual family incomea
Annual Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Family Professional
Income and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
($) SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
0-3,999 1<# 23$ 39$ 33$ 26$ 37% 31$ 20£ h2% 60£
U,000-7, 1*99 la U8 U3 U5 k9 50 52 6U U9 36
7,500 up k9 29 19 22 26 13 lU 16 9 k
10C$ 100% 100% 10C$ 100$ 100$ 100$ 100% 100# Too?
N 301 397 183 85 35 lli8 85 lli3 769 568
Statistical Measures
X2 38.999 (df: 2) 5.789 (df: h) 26.275 (df: 2)
Probability .001 NS .001
X2 for entire table . 71.063 (df: 8)
Probability .001
"About what do you think your total income will be this year
for yourself and your immediate family?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source ; 1952, 1956, I960.
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$0-33, 999 23£ 21$ 32fo 16%
$ii,000-$7,U99 HO UO 5U h3
$7,500 up 37 36 Ik 10
"Too% 100$ 100$ ~~9%














"About what do you think your total income will be this year
for yourself and your immediate family? M
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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For subjective mobility the difference is apparent only for
the working class, where the downwardly mobile are more prosperous
than are the status stable. Among those who identify themselves as
middle class, however, the upwardly mobile evidence about the same
income distribution as do the status stable.
Education
In spite of the relatively equalitarian system of public
education in the United States, the son of a high status family is
much more likely to receive a good education than is the son of a
low status family. At any given status level, therefore, the down-
wardly mobile individual is likely to have more years of formal
education than the status stable individual, while the upwardly mobile
2individual is likely to have fewer years of education. Evidence
that this is the case is presented in Tables 10 and 11.
In the professional and business category more than two-
thirds of the status stable have education beyond the high school
level, while less than half of the upwardly mobile or those from
3farm families have reached this level. In the blue-collar category
2
This is true in spite of the fact that education is a prin-
cipal route to social mobility. An examination of the accompanying
tables reveals that the upwardly mobile tend to be better educated
than the non-mobile of low status, but less well educated than the non-
mobile of high status.
3It should be recalled that status categories are assigned on
the basis of the occupation of the head of the family, while edu-
cational level is reported for the respondent, who may or may not be
the head. Thus the educational levels reported are not necessarily




TABLE 10.—Objective mobility and educational level
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Respondent's Professional
Education and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
(Years) SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Low (0-8) 10 15* 26* II4* 6* 13* 25* 21* 3li* 57*
Med (9-12) 25 38 37 32 37 H7 38 k9 52 35































in each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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Low (0-8 yrs.) 11$ 21$ 29$ 10*
Med. (9-12 yrs.) 31 38 38 hk























Data Source: 1956, I960.

96
the downwardly mobile are twice as likely to have been educated
beyond high school as are the status stable. The white-collar
category is again somewhat deviant, with the status stable being
slightly better educated than either the upwardly or downwardly
mobile. Even here, however, the downwardly mobile are better
educated than the upwardly mobile.
The educational pattern of the subjectively mobile is similar
to that of the objectively mobile. In the middle class category £8
per cent of the status stable have some education beyond high school,
while but 1±2 per cent of the upwardly mobile reach this level. This
is particularly noteworthy because of the fact that there is no
difference in income distribution between these two groups. The
liability of lower status parents is apparently reflected much more
strongly in the educational attainments of the subjectively upwardly
mobile than in their pocketbooks. Among the working class 3I4. per
cent of the downwardly mobile have some education beyond high school,
but only lU per cent of the status stable members of the working class
have this much education. The difference between groups is again
stronger with regard to education than for income.
Religion
The earliest settlers of the United States were primarily
Protestant, while later waves of immigration were largely Catholic.
As a result Protestants have often enjoyed economic and social
advantages over Catholics. That this situation still exists in some
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measure may be seen from Table 12, where it is clear that Protestants
are somewhat over-represented in the professional and business
category -while Catholics are over-represented among blue-collar workers.
This suggests that the upwardly mobile would more often be Catholics
than would the status stable at the same level, while the downwardly
mobile would less often be Catholics than those of stable low status.
As Table 12 indicates, this is indeed the case. 'While in the
professional and business category only 16 per cent of the status
stable are of the Catholic faith, 28 per cent of the upwardly mobile
are Catholics. In the white-collar category, though the differences
are small, the downwardly mobile are least often Catholics, the status
stable next, and the upwardly mobile most apt to be of the Catholic
faith. Among blue-collar workers the status stable are more often
Catholics than are the downwardly mobile. In each case the difference
is statistically significant, and in each case the difference is in
the anticipated direction. In all three occupational categories
those born to farm families are least likely to be Catholics.
For subjective mobility the pattern is similar. Table 13
shows that in the middle class category there are 27 per cent Catholics
among the upwardly mobile, but only 12 per cent Catholics among the
status stable. In the working class the difference is negligible, with
23 per cent of both the downwardly mobile and the status stable of the
Catholic faith. The difference is statistically significant for the




TABLE 12. --Objective mobility and church preference'
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent,'s Mobility Category
Professional
Church and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
Preference SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Protestant 7C# 632 8142 692 71* 582 862 652 6o2 822
Catholic 16 28 13 22 26 28 12 27 36 13
Jewish 10 6 1 9 7 5 2
Other U 2 2 6 2 3 2 5
1002 ~99% Too2 loo? 1002 99$ Ioo2 ioo2 ioo2 ioo2
N 305 U03 187 87 35 151 85 1U7 777 576
Statistical Measures
X2 16.653 (df : 3)
Probability .001








"Is your church preference Protestant, Catholic or Jewish?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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TABLE 13.—Subjective mobility and church preference*
Church
Preference
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility







Protestant 8$ 6# 7i£ 72$
Catholic 12 27 23 23

















(df: 3) 2.U68 (df:
NS
27.336 (df : 6)
.001
3)
'Is your church preference Protestant, Catholic or Jewish?"
Data Source ; 1956, I960.
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As a final observation on religion it may be noted that those
of the Jewish faith are conspicuous by their rarity in the working
class category. Whether by subjective or objective measure, they
are predominantly middle class.
Age
In Chapter IV it was noted that a possible distortion involved
in the use of occupation as a measure of mobility was that it might
compare respondent and father at different points in the life-cycle,
with the respondent reporting his present occupation, but reporting
his father's occupation at the peak of his career. If this were the
case young persons would be more likely to be reported as downward
mobile, not having had time to reach the high point of their careers.
In order to guard against this possibility it is necessary to examine
the age distribution of our sample.
As may be seen in Table Ik, the objectively downwardly mobile
have an age distribution very similar to that of the status stable in
both the white-collar and blue-collar categories. If any difference
does exist it is in the direction of the downwardly mobile being
slightly older than the status stable. In the professional and business
category the upwardly mobile individual is likely to be younger than
the status stable individual. For objective mobility, then, there
seems to be no tendency to exaggerate downward mobility through
measuring status at different points in the life cycle.
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TABLE lU.—Objective mobility and age
Respondent's
Age Groupa
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
i and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Young 20% 30% 19% 30% 31$ 26% 1W 36% 35% 23%













N 305 U06 189 87 35 150 8U lli8 783 575
Statistical Measures
X
2 8.920 (df: 2
Probability .02











because of differences in coding, age groups are not homogeneous.
Age groups are as follows: 1952 and I960 Young: 18-29, Med: 30-U9,
Older: 50 up; 1956 Young: 18-3U, Med: 35-5U, Older: 55 up.
In each case chi square computation omit the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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For the case of subjective mobility the problem is somewhat
different. In determining parental social class the respondent is
asked the class of his family -when he was growing up—thus presumably
permitting less variation of the point in the life cycle at which
status is determined. That no serious distortions are introduced
thereby may be seen from Table l£, where there is little difference
in age distributions for the mobile and the stable either in the
middle class or working class category.
Race
In America Negroes have tended to be confined to the lower
end of the social scale. In Table 16 Negroes constitute but 2 per
cent of the status stable members of the professional and business
category, while at the other end of the scale they constitute 12 per
cent of the status stable blue-collar workers and 18 per cent of the
blue -collar workers from farm families. If no outside factors were
operating, this over-representation at low status levels and under-
representation at high status levels would lead to an expectation
that Negroes would also be over-represented among the upwardly mobile
and under-represented among the downwardly mobile.
While Table 16 shows some slight differences in the antici-
pated direction, it is also apparent that other factors are operating,
In the white-collar category 7 per cent of the upwardly mobile are
Negroes as compared with 3 per cent of the status stable, but this is
only about half the number of upwardly mobile Negroes to be expected
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TABLE 15.—Subjective mobility and age
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status









X2 for entire table
Probability
2Q% 27% 30% 30%
1*6 U8 U8 U3
26 2U 22 28
100$ 99% ~ibo£ 101#












because of differences in coding age groups are not homogeneous,
Age groups are as follows: 1956 Young: 18-3U, Med: 35-5U, Older: $$
up; I960 Young: 18-29, Med.: 30-U9, Older: 50 up.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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TABLE 16.—Objective mobility and race
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
Race SS DM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
White 9S% 91% 91%




N 308 U06 190
Statistical Measures
9% 91% 93% 9% 9$% 88$ 82$
3 3 7 3 5 12 18
10 1 -a -a
9W lW 100J 9% 10o£ loolc 100$
87 35 152 86 1U8 785 579
X2 .789 (df: 2) 3.661 (df: U) 5.826 (df: 2)
Probability NS NS NS
X2 for entire table 10.275 (df : 8)
Probability NS
Less than 1 per cent.
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, i960.
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on the basis of their proportion of the blue-collar category. Again,
£ per cent of the downwardly mobile blue-collar workers are Negroes
as against 12 per cent of the status stable—but this is about twice
the percentage to be expected on the basis of the small number of
Negroes in higher status occupations.
The same pattern is apparent in Table 17 for subjective
mobility. Negroes are again over-represented in the working class,
their representation among the upwardly mobile is less than their
proportion of the working class would indicate, and there is somewhat
more downward mobility than the sparse representation of Negroes in
the middle class would lead us to expect.
"While in neither subjective nor objective mobility is
statistical significance reached, the tendencies are in each case
in agreement with common knowledge. Negroes are over-represented
in lower status positions, under-represented in higher positions.
They are relatively less often upwardly mobile, relatively more often
downwardly mobile. In brief, it appears harder for a Negro to
improve his social status than it is for a white man, and harder to
maintain the improved status once it is achieved.
Negroes constitute about 12 per cent of the blue-collar cate-
gory. If sons of Negro families were upwardly mobile with the same
frequency as for whites, the upwardly mobile professional and business
and white-collar groups should contain this same proportion of Negroes
instead of the 2 to 7 per cent that they do contain.
That is, as compared with the very small proportion of Negroes
in the higher status categories.
It should be remembered that these conclusions are based upon
data collected between 19£2 and I960. It may be that some improvement
in the Negro's competitive position has been achieved since that time,




TABLE 17.—Subjective mobility and race
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
Race Stable Mobile Mobile Stable
White 98$ 91% 9$$ 872
Negro 2 2 $ 13
Other 1 _a
Toby, 100% lobj Ibo£


















T,ess than 1 per cent.




At one time in the United States a heavy over-representation
of immigrants would be expected among lower status groups. Re-
strictions on immigration have reduced the relative numbers of
immigrants, however, and it may be that immigrants now tend to bring
higher skill levels with them than was once the case. In any event,
as Table 18 indicates, there now seems to be little difference in
the proportions of native to foreign born at different status levels.
To the extent that any difference does exist, it is in the direction
of some over-representation of recent arrivals at the lower levels,
but the difference is slight.
When objective mobility is used as a measure the difference
in nativity between the mobile and stable is in no case statistically
significant, but two things are worth mention. First, in each
occupational category those born into farm families are most likely
to be natives. Second, and of interest because as has been noted
previously the white-collar category most often deviates from
anticipated patterns, the status stable white-collar workers are
substantially more often natives than are any other group.
"When subjective mobility is the measure, however, as in
Table 19, the upwardly mobile more often are immigrants or from
immigrant families than are the status stable. The difference
between objective and subjective mobility in this regard may perhaps
be explained in terms of a subjective downgrading of status levels
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TABLE 18. --Objective mobility and number of generations in the U.S.
-^&— : : ' .- *
Number of
Generations
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent
Professional
and Business Wiite-Collar




Native 682 652 772 632 81$ 632 792 652 602 7ii2
2nd Gen. 25 29 21 29 13 3U 16 27 33 19































Definitions: Native-respondent and parents native born;
2nd generation-respondent native born, one or both parents foreign born;
1st generation-respondent foreign born.
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956.
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Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
Stable Mobile Mobile Stable
Native 77$ 62$ 72$ 70$































Definitions: Native-Respondent and parents native born; 2nd
generation-Respondent native born, one or both parents foreign born;





in the "old country." Such an explanation would be consistent with
the fact that there is virtually no difference between the mobile
and the status stable in the working class category.
Conclusion
When compared with the status stable the upwardly mobile are
more often members of the Catholic faith, and on average have lower
incomes and less education. Conversely, when compared with the
status stable the downwardly mobile have higher incomes, more edu-
cation, and are less often Catholics. These relationships hold
whether objective or subjective measures of mobility are used, except
that the subjectively upwardly mobile are under no income liability,
and the subjectively downwardly mobile are as often Catholics as
are their status peers.
When objective mobility is used as a measure the upwardly
mobile are somewhat younger than their status stable counterparts,
but when subjective mobility is used as a measure the relationship
is not apparent. For the downwardly mobile no significant pattern
exists, though perhaps the subjectively downwardly mobile are a
little younger than subjectively status stable members of the
working class.
Primarily because of the rarity of Negroes in the upper
strata the relationship between race and mobility in the data
7That is, the immigrant feels that things are "better here"
than in the old country, and feels that his status is improved, whether
or not this is objectively the case.
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presented here is not statistically significant. It seems clear,
however, that upward mobility is more difficult for Negroes, and
compared with their small representation in higher strata downward
mobility occurs more often.
With objective mobility used as a measure there is little
difference between the mobile and the status stable in regard to
nativity, with the possible exception of the high proportion of
status stable individuals in the white-collar category who come
from native families. When subjective mobility is the measure
there is little difference among working class members, but in the
middle class those who are subjectively upwardly mobile more often
are immigrants or from immigrant families.
Perhaps the simplest description of the differences here
reported between the mobile and the status stable is that on most
characteristics the mobile have a distribution of the trait which
falls between that of their status of origin and their present
status. Because this pattern is similar to that hypothesized for
the mobile with regard to political variables the distribution of
these social characteristics will be taken into account when political




SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE
In most democratic political systems political alignments take
the form of political parties, and individuals "choose sides" by-
adopting a party loyalty. In the United States an individual's party
loyalty is usually to the Democratic or the Republican party, and as
we have seen, which he adopts is affected by whether he is of high or
low status. This chapter investigates a further relationship: that
between social mobility and party allegiance.
In the following sections the relationship of both objective
and subjective mobility to various forms of political allegiance is
investigated. The forms of allegiance examined are party preference,
voting choice in presidential elections, changes in party preference,
party regularity, and the strength of party preference. In addition,
the party preferences of parents and friends, the relation of age to
party preference, the relation of interest level to party preference,
and the effect of mobility upon subjective class are examined.
Party Preference
In the United States the person who moves from a position
of low social status to a position of high status moves from a social
environment where most people consider themselves Democrats to one
where preference for the Republican Party is more prevalent. For the
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person -who is downwardly mobile the opposite is true. The hypotheses
to be tested here are based on the assumption that a mobile individual's
party preference may undergo a change from that appropriate to his
original environment to that typical of his new social environment.
Two hypotheses have been stated formally: 1.1--The upwardly
mobile more often prefer the Democratic Party than do non-mobile
members of their new stratum, but they less often prefer the Democratic
Party than do non-mobile members of their original stratum ; and 1,2—
The downwardly mobile less often prefer the Democratic Party than do
non-mobile members of their new stratum, but they more often prefer
the Democratic Party than do non-mobile members of their original
stratum
.
Table 20 illustrates the relationship between objective
mobility and preference for a political party. In the highest status
group, the professional and business category, of those status stable
who usually think of themselves as belonging to a political party
$k per cent are Republicans. Among the upwardly mobile only UU per
cent consider themselves Republicans. The result is statistically
significant, and is in the direction predicted by hypothesis 1.1.
In the blue-collar category 70 per cent of the status stable
blue-collar workers who express a party preference consider themselves
Democrats, compared with 60 per cent of the downwardly mobile workers.
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"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (if Rep or Dem) Would
you call yourself a strong (R)(D) or not a very strong (R)(D)? (if
Independent or Other) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican
or Democratic party?" Table includes only those who identified themselves
as Republicans or Democrats in response to the first question.
b ?
In each case the ex-Farm category is omitted from the X
computation.
Data Source: 1952, 1956, I960.
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In the -white-con ar category the picture is not so clear.
The upwardly mobile are, as predicted, much more likely to choose the
Democratic Party than are the status stable, 63 per cent of the up-
wardly mobile as opposed to but 28 per cent of the status stable. But
the downwardly mobile, who according to hypothesis 1.2 should less often
prefer the Democrats than do the status stable, actually more often
consider themselves Democrats. The deviant group in this case would
seem to be the status stable white-collar workers, who are substantially
more often Republicans than even the status stable business and pro-
fessional workers. This same group will prove deviant in a number of
subsequent analyses.
With the exception of the status stable white-collar workers,
the rest of the white-collar group fits the anticipated pattern rather
well. The downwardly mobile white-collar workers are less often
Democrats than are the upwardly mobile, but more often Democrats than
are the higher status business and professional group. The upwardly
mobile white-collar workers are less often Democrats than the status
stable blue-collar workers, but more often Democrats than any group
of equal or higher status. This is in line with both hypotheses 1.1
and 1.2. It is unfortunate that the one deviant category, the status
stable members of the white-collar group, is also the category having
the fewest cases.
Turning to the relationship between subjective mobility and
political preference, Table 21 provides additional evidence in support
of hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. In the middle class group there is little
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TABLE 21.—Subjective mobility and party preference
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status































"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (If Rep or Dem)
Would you call yourself a strong (R)(D) or not a very strong (R)(D)?
(if Independent or Other) Do you think of yourself as close to the
Republican or Democratic party?" Table includes only those who
identified themselves as Republicans or Democrats in response to the
first question.
Data Source; 1956, I960.
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difference between the upwardly mobile and the status stable. In
the working class sample $0 per cent of the downwardly mobile who
make a party choice are Democrats compared with 68 per cent of the
status stable, a statistically significant difference in the predicted
direction.
In Chapter V it was noted that the mobile differed from the
status stable in several ways, notably in income, education, and
religion. Thus it is necessary before accepting hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2
to determine whether or not the relationship of mobility to party
preference presists when these characteristics are held constant. This
may be done by dividing respondents into groups based on the character-
istic in question, and seeing if the relationship holds within each
group.
In Table 22 the relationship between objective mobility and
party preference is controlled by income. As the table indicates,
in the professional and business category the upwardly mobile are
Democrats more often than are the status stable at each income level,
although the difference is most marked in the low income group and
almost vanishes in the middle group. In the blue-collar category the
downwardly mobile are at each income level less often Democrats than
are the status stable. In the white-collar category the pattern is
again deviant, with the status stable consistently more often Republicans
than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile. In the highest and low-
est occupational status groups in every case differences are in the
"When southern residents are omitted, as in Table 26, a statis-
tically significant difference in the hypothesized direction does appear.
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TABLE 22.—Objective mobility and party preference by income groups
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Income Group Professional
and Party . and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
Preference SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
$0-3,999
Democrat 282 5l2 562 362 1*1*2 1*52 522 382 502 502
Republican \& 29 21 39 56 25 21 3k 22 22
Ind. , Other 28 21 23 25 29 28 28 28 28
lbifc 1012 100^ 100^ ioo2 1% 1012 100^ 1002 1002
N 29 91 70 28 9 & 29 29 325 338
$U, 000-7,1*99
Democrat 392 i*i2 1*52 502 122 1*32 U82 U52 512 1*92
Republican 32 32 27 26 65 23 39 2k 20 25
Ind., Other 29 27 28 2l* 2k 3k 11* 31 29 26
1002 1002 1002 1002 ioi2 1002 ibT2 1002 1002 io52
N 123 191 78 38 17 7U kh 91 37U 205
$7,500 up
Democrat 282 302 1412 1*22 222 322 582 302 U62 U52
Republican 1*3 36 53 32 56 37 25 30 23 27
Ind. , Other 29 3k 6 26 22 32 17 39 30 27
100£ 1002 1002 1002 Ioo2 1012 1002 ~99% "992 "992




























































Sum of X2 for
Income Groups 6.585 (df
:
Probability NS











"About what do you think your total income will be this year for
yourself and your immediate family?"
"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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hypothesized direction, though no longer statistically signifi-
cant.
Party preference is controlled for education in Table 23.
In the professional and business category the upwardly mobile are
more often Democrats than are the status stable in both the highest
and lowest educational groups, though in the low education group
they are also somewhat more often Republicans as well because of the
large numbers of Independents among the status stable. At the
intermediate level differences wash out completely. In the blue-
collar group the downwardly mobile, when compared with the status
stable, are more often Republicans and less often Democrats at each
educational level, though again the difference is greatly reduced at
the intermediate level. In the white-collar group the status stable
are at every level more often Republican, less often Democrats than
either the upwardly or downwardly mobile. For the table as a whole
differences remain statistically significant.
Table 2U illustrates the relationship between objective
mobility, party preference, and religion. In the professional and
business category the upwardly mobile are more often Democrats than
are the status stable in all three religious groups. Among blue-
collar workers the downwardly mobile are less often Democrats than
are the status stable within each group. The white-collar category
is again deviant, with the status stable more often Republicans than
either of the mobile groups for Protestants and Catholics. None of
the white-collar Jews are Republicans so mobility within that group
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Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Low (0-8)
Democrat 252 50% 14$
Republican 17 28 30
Ind., Other 58 22 26
1002 100$ 100$
N 12 60 50
\2% 0% H52 16% M k*>% 512
25 100 35 23 31 2k 20
33 20 32 3U 30 29
1002 Ioo# 1062 100$ ~992 1062 1002
12 20 22 32 266 326
Med (9-12 )
Democrat U6% hli% h&%
Republican 28 28 25
Ind., Other 26 28 29
322 31* W& hl%
39 $k 21 3U




1002 1002 1002 ioo2 io"o2 1002 1002 1002 1002 1012
N 78 155 69 28 13 72 32 72 U05 200
High (12+)
Democrat 282 3U2 512 512 202 ¥>2 562 322 522 372
Republican U3 36 33 30 60 27 3U 36 19 33
Ind. , Other 28 29 16 19 20 33 9 32 29 29
"992 ~99% ioo2 ioo2 1002 ioo2 ~992 1002 1002 "992










































































"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or "what?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.








Head's Occupational Status & Respondents Mobility Category
Professional
and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Protestant
Democrat 32$ 35$ H7$
Republican I46 39 31
Ind., Other 23 26 23
IbT$ 100$ 101$
N 212 255 157
k2% 23$ 38$ U9$
37 62 35 32
22 15 27 19
IoT$ ioo# Tod% 100^







Democrat 39$ U8$ 51$
Republican 29 20 25
Ind., Other 33 32 ZL
101$ 100$ 100$
N k9 112 2U
1*2$ 22$ 51$ 50$ k9% 58$ 70$
32 56 16 ko
.
23 1U 12
26 22 33 10 28 27 18
100$ 100$ 100$ 100$ ioo$ "99$ 100$
19 9 li3 10 39 277 7k
Jewish
Democrat U3$ 68$ 50$
Republican 10 8
Ind., Other k7 2k 50
100$ 100$ 100$
N 30 25 2
63$ 0$ 5% 0$ 75$ 85$ 100$
38 U5 25 15
101$ ~~"o$ 100$ ~$ 100$ 100$ 100$































































"Is your church preference Protestant, Catholic or Jewish?"
"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Jewish table omitted because of low cell frequencies.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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is immaterial. As before, the hypothesized relationship between
mobility and party preference holds for the highest and lowest
occupational groups, but not for the white-collar status stable
category.
One further control is worth reporting: that for geographical
region. The southern part of the United States has been traditionally
a Democratic stronghold, and generally speaking, the association
between status and party is lower in the South than for other regions
2
of the country. As a result the hypothesized relationships between
mobility and political preference should be sharper when southerners
are eliminated from the sample than when they are included.
Data on party preference with southern residents omitted are
reported in Tables 25 and 26. For both objective and subjective
mobility differences remain in the same directions as before the
control for region was introduced, but are of increased magnitude
and statistical significance.
The evidence for both objective and subjective mobility offers
strong support for hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. With the exception of the
consistently deviant status stable white-collar group, relationships
are as predicted by the hypotheses, and do not wash out when controls
for income, education and religion are introduced. When southern
residents are omitted from the analyses the strength of the relation-
ship is increased.
2
Angus Campbell et al. , The American Voter (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, I960), pp. 367-368.
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TABLE 25.—Objective mobility and party preference with Southern residents
omitted
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar



















38$ 17$ 33% 36$
39 67 30 hh
23 17 37 20
100$ lbl$ 100$ 100$
6k 30 119 50
1^.837 (df : k)
.01







6.619 (df : 2)
.05
"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source ; 1952, 1956, I960.
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TABLE 26. --Subjective mobility and party preference with Southern residents
omitted
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status











N 322 159 7U 791
Statistical Measures
Probability









"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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Thus the data for upward mobility support West's finding that
the upwardly mobile are less likely to be Republicans, rather than the
finding of Lipset and Bendix that they are more likely to prefer the
3
conservative party. The upwardly mobile in the United States exhibit
behavior similar to that reported by Lipset and Bendix for upwardly
mobile Europeans : both retain political links to their status of
origin. The same is true for the downwardly mobile. The data reported
here confirm the finding of studies in many countries that the down-
wardly mobile more often prefer a conservative party than do other
members of their new status.
Voting
An individual's declared party preference by no means insures
that in any particular case he will vote for the candidate of that
party. This may be seen in Table 27, where in all three election
years a higher proportion of respondents report voting for the
Republican candidate than would be expected on the basis of the pro-
portion of individuals in each group who consider themselves
Republicans.
Even so, the relationship of mobility to voting is similar to
its relationship to party preference. Table 27 records the relation-
ship of objective mobility to presidential votes in 1952, 1956, and I960.
3
Patricia Salter West, "Social Mobility among College Graduates,"
in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset (eds.), Class, Status and Power
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), p. hlQ, Seymour M. Lipset
and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), P« 66.
\Lipset and Bendix, loc. cit .
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Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business White-Collar






cratic 252 3h2 292 332 1W 262 332 U3% UL% 382
Voted Repub<
lican "*U 52 57 50 71 58 \6 36 32 30
Didn't Vote 11 1U 1U 17 lU 16 21 21 27 32
10® 100& 1002 100& 19% 100^ *992 100$ 1002 100^
N 106 182 87 ko Ik 50 33 28 30U 212
1226
Voted Demo-
cratic 232 272 272 352 72 3ltf 322 282 362 262
Voted Repub-
lican 68 52 $k 50 73 kl k2 U5 37 36
Didn't Vote 9 22 19 15 20 19 26 28 27 38
ioo% IcT2 loofc Ioo2 ibo£ 1002 Too% TbT% Too% Too%
N 1U7 162 85 3k 15 73 38 9k 366 273
I960
Voted Demo-
cratic 382 w 362 UL% kh% U72 U82 502 552 U02
Voted Repub-
lican 55 kk 53 50
>
56 U3 32 33 32 35
Didn't Vote 7 8 11 9 10 19 17 13 2k
1002 1012 ioo2 1002 1002 ioo2 "992 1002 1002 "992




























































"In talking to people about the election we find that a lot of
people weren't able to vote because they weren't registered or they were
sick or they just didn't have time. How about you, did you vote this
time? (IF YES) Who did you vote for for President?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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In the professional and business category the upwardly mobile in each
election more often voted for the Democratic candidate for President
than did the status stable. In the blue-collar group the status stable
more often voted for the Democratic candidate in 1956 and I960 than did
the downwardly mobile, though not in 1952. The downwardly mobile
members of the blue-collar group did, however, vote more often for the
Republican candidate in 1952 as well as for the Democratic candidate.
The apparent paradox is explained by the fact that the status stable
blue-collar workers were more likely not to>have voted in that election.
The white-collar category is again deviant. The status stable
white-collar workers more often voted for the Republican candidate
in each of the elections than did either the upwardly or downwardly
mobile workers.
Data on voting patterns in relation to subjective mobility in
the 1956 and I960 elections are presented in Table 28. The patterns
are not identical in the two years. In 1956 the middle class up-
wardly mobile voted for Eisenhower in as high proportion as did the
status stable members of the middle class, and almost equal proportions
of both the status stable and the upwardly mobile voted for Stevenson.
In discussing Maccoby's findings in Chapter II it was suggested that
a possible explanation of her findings might be that Eisenhower was
particularly appealing to the upwardly mobile. While the data on
objective mobility show no such tendency, it is possible to interpret
the data of Table 28 that way, particularly since in the I960 election
the more normal pattern of the upwardly mobile preferring the Democratic
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Voted Democratic 28$ 29$ 352 30$
Voted Republican 56 56 la. 35
Didn't Vote 16 15 2k 35
ioq$ 100$ 100$ 100$
N U31 183 80 953
I960
Voted Democratic 30$ li3* 39$ Uo$
Voted Republican 58 hh w 31
Didn't Vote 11 Ik 13 29
~99$ IoT$ 100$ 100$




























"In talking to people about the election we find that a lot of
people weren't able to vote because they weren't registered or they were
sick or they just didn't have time. How about you, did you vote this
time? (if Yes) Who did you vote for for President?"
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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candidate recurs. In this connection it should be noted that £6 per
cent of the status stable members of the middle class voted for
Eisenhower in 1956 and a slightly higher 58 per cent voted for Nixon
in I960. Mean-while the upwardly mobile changed from a 56 per cent
vote for Eisenhower to but LjJU per cent for Nixon. Thus within the
middle class the swing to Kennedy took place exclusively among the
upwardly mobile. There is a suggestion here that the mobile may more
often change their votes from party to party, a possibility to be
examined later in this chapter.
There is a difference between years in the subjectively working
class portion of the sample as well. In 1956, due to the high pro-
portion of non-voting among the status stable members of the working
class, the downwardly mobile more often voted for both Stevenson and
Eisenhower. In i960, with a smaller rate of abstention the downwardly
mobile less often voted for Kennedy, more often voted for Nixon, as
compared with the status stable.
In contrast to the subjectively middle class, among the working
class the swing to Kennedy took place primarily among the status stable.
The downwardly mobile, who had given I4I per cent of their votes to
Eisenhower in 1956 increased this to 1±8 per cent for Nixon in I960.
At the same time the proportion of status stable workers voting for
the Republican candidate dropped from 35 per cent in 1956 to 31 per
cent in I960. In the more highly polarized i960 election differences




The evidence suggests that the mobile carry with them some
remnant of the voting habits of their status of origin along -with
the party identification, though the voting habits are perhaps
retained with less tenacity than the party identification. The re-
lationship of voting to mobility revealed by the evidence examined
here is essentially the same as the relationship between mobility
and party preference reported in the previous section.
Parents and Friends as a Political Influence
A point already made is that other people influence political
preferences and attitudes. The mobile were born into a different
social environment than they now inhabit and presumably have been
exposed to the influence of people with attitudes somewhat different
than those typical of their new stratum. As a specific example, the
upwardly mobile should more often have Democratic parents than the
status stable at the same occupational level, and the downwardly
mobile should more often have Republican parents than do those of
stable low status.
In 1952 respondents were asked for their parent's party
identification, which provides a means for examining the relationship
between mobility and parents' political preference. The data are
presented in Table 29. In the professional and business category
lj6 per cent of the upwardly mobile had parents who thought of them-
selves as* Democrats, compared with 38 per cent among the status stable,
In the blue-collar category UO per cent of the downwardly mobile had
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Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar





38£ k6% 51$ k2% 35% 53% 53%
38 28 31 33 UL 23 28
25 25 15 2k 2k 23 19
101$ ~99% 100$ ~99% 100$ "99$ 100%










x2 for entire table
Probability






"Do you remember when you were growing up whether your parents
thought of themselves mostly as Democrats or Republicans or did they
shift around from one party to another?"
Democratic and Republican categories include cases where both
parents were of one party or where one had a preference but the other
did not.





Democratic parents, while $1 per cent of the status stable's parents
were Democrats. In each case the difference, though not statistically
significant, is in the anticipated direction.
The information presented in the white-collar portion of
Table 29 may help to shed some light on the persistent deviance shown
by that group. The relationship between the upwardly mobile and the
downwardly mobile is in the normal direction, the parents of the
downwardly mobile being more often Republicans, those of the upwardly
mobile more often Democrats. The status stable white-collar workers,
however, more often came from Republican families than did any other
group of any status. This finding is in haimony with the consistent
deviance of the status stable white-collar group in the direction of
allegiance to the Republican party. The status stable white-collar
group not only contains a high proportion of Republicans but comes
disproportionately from Republican families. Again, however, the
numbers involved are quite small, and any generalization must be
tentative
.
Parents are only one kind of personal influence upon political
attitudes. Friends are another important influence. It has been
assumed that the mobile are more likely to retain ties with their old
status group. If this is the case, the upwardly mobile should have
more friends who intend to vote Democratic, the downwardly mobile
more friends who intend to vote Republican. The relationship is
recorded in Table 30.
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TABLE 30.—Objective mobility and friend's votes




Vote of and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
Friends3 SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
All will vote
Democratic 2li$ 29$ 20$ 31$ 13$ 32$ 32$ 1;2$ U6$ k9%
Most will vote
Democratic k 5 8 5 13 5 12 7 6
Split 17 26 2k 23 31 16 20 29 18 19
Most will vote
Republican 13 5 5 5 13 7 u k k
All will vote
Republican k2 3k k2 36 31 • la 36 25 2k 21
Ioo£ 1% "^9% 100$ 101$ 101$ 100$ 100$ ~99$ ~99%

















"Now how about your five best
most' likely to vote?"
. friends—how do you think they 're




In the professional and business category in Table 30 the
friends of the upwardly mobile are more likely to vote for the Demo-
cratic candidate than are the friends of the status stable. Among the
blue-collar workers the friends of the status stable are somewhat more
likely to vote for the Democratic candidate than are the friends of
the downwardly mobile, while the friends of the downwardly mobile are
more often split or Republican. In the white-collar category the
friends of the status stable are perhaps somewhat less likely to be
Democrats, but beyond that the pattern is not clear. In no case do
differences reach statistical significance.
If the white-collar category is excepted, the upwardly mobile
do seem to be somewhat more often exposed to Democratic personal
influences than their status stable peers, both from parents and
friends. In like manner the downwardly mobile somewhat more often
have Republican parents and friends than those of stable low status.
Party Preference and the Passage of Time
While socialization is a life-long process, the importance
of different socializing agencies tends to change with the passage of
time. For most people the influence of family and school is most
important during the first two decades of life. Thereafter the in-
fluence of the social environments provided by occupation, friends
and neighborhood become relatively more important. The longer an
individual is in a given social environment the more closely his
attitudes and preferences should resemble those held by others in
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the same position. Thus hypothesis 1.3 states: Political preferences
of older mobile individuals are closer to those typical of their new
stratum, whereas those of young mobile individuals are closer to those
typical of their original stratum .
In terms of party preference the hypothesis would predict that
among the upwardly mobile the young would be more often Democrats and
the old more often Republicans. The downwardly mobile young should be
more often Republicans, while the older downward mobiles should be
Democrats.
Table 31 reports data on the relationship between age, party
preference, and objective mobility. In the professional and business
category 1;3 per cent of the young upwardly mobile are Democrats, with
the proportion falling to ijl per cent for those of moderate age and to
33 per cent for the older respondents. At the same time preference
for the Republican Party among the upwardly mobile increases from 2U
per cent among the young to 32 per cent among the middle age group to
k2 per cent among the older group. This by itself does not prove the
operation of a socialization process, since on average older persons
more frequently prefer the Republican Party anyway. A more direct test
of the hypothesis is to see whether the distribution of party preference
for the mobile more closely resembles that for the status stable with
the passage of time.
Among the young in the professional and business category the
difference in preference for the Democratic Party between the mobile
and the stable is lU per cent. In the middle age group the difference
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Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business 'White-Collar





Democrat 29$ U32 572 51*2 252 1*92 U32 3C# 19% 16%

















N 66 122 37 26 12 la 1U 53 278 136
Democrat 362 ia% U52 382 1% 14*2 562 562 522 512
Republican 35 32 33 36 73 25 26 19 21 23
Ind., Other 29 26 22 26 20 31 18 25 27 27
100% "992 100$ 1002 1002 1002 1002 Ioo2 1002 1012
Older
N 175 198 88 k2 1$ Qk 39
U22 502 302 U52
32 50 33 39
Ind., Other 21 25 22 26 37 15
100& 100^ 100& 100% 1002 100& "992
Democrat 282 332 U52
Republican 5l U2 33





























































Sum of X for
age groups 6.378 (df
Probability NS












"Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or "what?"
Because of differences in coding, age groups are not homogeneous.
Age groups are as follows: 1952 and I960, Young: 18-29, Med: 30-1*9,
Older: 50 up; 1956, Young: 18-3U, Med: 35-5U, Older: ^ up.
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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falls to 5 per cent, and remains at $ per cent in the older age group.
Thus the difference between the mobile and the stable is less for the
older age groups, as hypothesized. This is not true when preference
for the Republican Party is examined. While the difference does fall
from 9 per cent in the youngest age group to 3 per cent in the middle
age group, it rises again to 9 per cent in the oldest group. Thus the
professional and business category offers only weak support for
hypothesis 1.3.
In the blue-collar group the tendency for Republican preference
to increase with age for all groups is less marked. While there is
a small but steady increase in the per cent of Republicans among the
status stable as age increases, the same thing is not true for the
downwardly mobile. The highest per cent of Republicans among the
downwardly mobile—36 per cent—occurs in the youngest age group.
This is as would be anticipated on the assumption that the influence
of their parental family was still strong compared to that of their
new status environment. In the middle age group the proportion of
Republicans among the downwardly mobile falls off to but 19 per cent,
even less than among the status stable of the same age. In the
oldest age group the proportion of Republicans among the downwardly
mobile rises again to 35 per cent.
When the difference between the proportions of status stable
and downwardly mobile who are Republicans is examined at each age level,
the downwardly mobile report a Republican preference 18 per cent more
often than do the status stable in the youngest age group, while the
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difference falls to 3 per cent in the opposite direction in the middle
group, and rises to 6 per cent at the oldest level. Preference for
the Democratic Party occurs 19 per cent less often among the down-
wardly mobile at the youngest level, h per cent more often in the middle
group, and 19 per cent less often in the oldest group. In the -white-
collar group no significant patterns are apparent. Again, the evidence
in support of hypothesis 1.3 is weak at best.
The relationship between party preference, age, and subjective
mobility is demonstrated in Table 32. In the middle class the young
upwardly mobile are Democrats more often than the status stable 3 per
cent of the time, while in the middle age group the upwardly mobile
are Democrats 1 per cent less often than the status stable, and in the
oldest group they are Democrats 8 per cent less often than the status
stable. While the proportion of Democrats among the status stable
stays about constant as age increases, among the upwardly mobile the
proportion of Democrats falls slightly but steadily.
Preference for the Republican Party occurs 13 per cent more
often among the young middle class status stables than among their
upwardly mobile contemporaries. In the middle age group the difference
falls to 6 per cent, while in the oldest group the upwardly mobile are
6 per cent more often Republicans. Among the status stable Republican
preference increases by only 13 per cent from the youngest to the oldest
group, while among the upwardly mobile it increases by 32 per cent.
This would seem to confirm West's finding that the difference between
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Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
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"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or "what?"
Because of differences in coding, age groups are not homogeneous.
Age groups are as follows: 1956, Young: 18-3U, Med: 35-5U, Older: ^
up; I960, Young: 18-29, Med: 30-U9, Older: 50 up.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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the upwardly mobile and those who were initially more privileged
declines with age.
In the working class the differences between the subjectively
mobile and the status stable do not appear to lessen with the passage
of time, but seem to increase. In the youngest age group the down-
wardly mobile are 18 per cent less often Democrats and 3 per cent
less often Republicans than the status stable, the majority of them
considering themselves independents. In the oldest age group the
downwardly mobile have become 16 per cent less often Democrats and
25 per cent more often Republicans than the status stable. The change
is opposite to that predicted by hypothesis 1.3.
While the data for both objective and subjective mobility
offer some support to hypothesis 1.3 in the case of the upwardly
mobile, no support is afforded for the hypothesis with regard to the
downwardly mobile in either case.
Level of Interest and Party Preference
The American Voter reports that the prevalence of status voting
varies directly with political involvement. The more highly involved
an individual is in politics the more likely it is that he will choose
the "correct" party for his status. Knowing this, it could be hypoth-
esized that those mobile individuals who are most strongly interested
"Vest, op. cit
. , p. U78.
Angus Campbell et al. , The .American Voter (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., I960), p. 3£U.
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in politics would also be those most likely to have abandoned their old
party loyalties and to have adopted a new party preference more appro-
priate to their new status. This hypothesis can be examined with the
aid of Tables 33 and 3U.
In Table 33 those high status individuals who report themselves
very interested in the political campaign are more often Republicans
and less often Democrats than are those of high status who are not as
interested. In the blue-collar category the opposite is true, with
the proportion of Democrats among the status stable increasing with
increased interest. Thus Table 33 supports the finding of The American
Voter reported above. Status polarization increases with political
involvement, with highly involved individuals more often choosing the
"correct" party for their status.
It is not at all clear, however, that increased involvement
brings the political loyalties of the mobile into line with their new
status. Although in Table 33 the very interested among the upwardly
mobile in the professional and business category are more often
Republicans and less often Democrats than are those who are not as
interested, the same is true of the status stable and differences
between the two groups remain relatively constant. In the blue-collar
category the most interested among the downwardly mobile are least
likely to prefer the Democratic Party, normally appropriate for their
new status. It is among the least interested of blue-collar workers
that differences between the downwardly mobile and status stable are
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Democrat 21% 35% \6% 38* 18* la* 52* 314* 57* ^%
Ind., Other 33 29 16 18 27 25 6 3U ZL 19
Republican UL 36 38 uu 55 3U U2 32 21 26
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N 158 170 73 39 n 56 31 56 22U 136
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Not Interested
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Sum of X2 for
interest levels U.798 (df : 6)
Probability NS











"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns.
How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested,
somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political
campaigns so far this year?"
"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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smallest. Thus it cannot be concluded that increased involvement is
associated with correct political choice in status terms. If anything,
increased interest exaggerates the difference between the objectively
mobile and non-mobile.
The situation is less clear for subjective mobility. In Table
3U the largest differences in party preference between mobile and non-
mobile occur in the least interested group in the middle class, and in
the "somewhat interested" group in the working class. Differences are
statistically significant, however, only in the working class. As for
objective mobility, the subjectively upwardly mobile are more likely
to be Republicans at higher interest levels, but in this case the
difference between mobile and non-*nobile does reduce as interest
increases. In the working class differences between the downwardly
mobile and the status stable are least where interest is lowest.
It appears that any tendency for increased involvement to
reduce differences in party preference between the upwardly mobile
and the non-mobile of high status occurs only in the case of sub-
jective mobility. It may be that the subjectively mobile are more
class conscious than are the non-mobile, and that at high interest
levels this operates more strongly in pulling subjective status and
political preference into line than is the case for the non-mobile.
Increased interest seems to magnify the difference in party
preference between the downwardly mobile and those of stable low
status for both objective and subjective mobility. As interest levels
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Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status






































































1.98$ (df : 2)
NS
3.623 (df : 2)
NS
Sum of X2 for interest
levels 6.997 (df: 6)
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"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns.
How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested,
somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political
campaigns so far this year?"
"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what7"
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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increase, those of stable low status prefer the Democratic Party in
even larger measure, but the downwardly mobile are less apt to be
Democrats. Apparently the most interested among the downwardly mobile
are the least willing to adopt political loyalties in line with their
new status.
Party Loyalty
Hypothesis l.H states: Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile
have more often changed political party allegiance at some point in
their lives than have the non-mobile . Table 35 presents data on the
relationship of mobility to changes in party affiliation.
A slight tendency for the mobile to have changed parties more
often is indicated in Table 35 for both the professional and business
category and for the blue-collar category, though in neither case is
the difference large or statistically significant. In the white-
collar category the difference between the mobile and stable may be
considered negligible.
Table 36 permits examination of the relationship between
subjective mobility and change in party affiliation. When subjective
mobility is the criterion, there is little difference between mobile
and non-mobile in the middle class, but in the working class the down-
wardly mobile report having changed parties substantially more often
than do the status stable. Differences are statistically significant
for the working class and for the table as a whole.

15U
TABLE 35.--Objective mobility and change in party affiliation
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Change in Professional
Party and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
Affiliationa SS UM ex-F EM SS UM ex-F EM SS ex-F
Change 21$ 21$ 26$ 19$ 21$ 22$ 9$ 19$ 16$ 19$
No Change 79 76 7U 81 79 78 91 81 8U 81
~Too$ Tools 100$ 100$ 100$ 100$ 100$ ~Io6$ 100$ 100$
















"Was there ever a time "when you thought of yourself as a
(Republican) (Democrat) rather than a (Democrat) (Republican)?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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Respondents Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status




























7.709 (df : 1)
.01
"Was there ever a time when you thought of yourself as a
(Republican) (Democrat) rather than a (Democrat) (Republican)?"
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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In all cases but that of the objectively mobile white-collar
group sane tendency in the hypothesized direction exists, though
perhaps not of sufficient magnitude to consider the hypothesis con-
firmed. An alternative way of measuring party loyalty is available:
party loyalty as expressed in actual voting behavior. This is done
in Tables 37 and 38.
In the professional and business category in Table 37 the
upwardly mobile are no more likely to have voted for various parties
than are the status stable, though they more often report always
having voted for the Democratic candidate for President. In the blue-
collar category there is again little difference between the downwardly
mobile and the status stable in regard to changing votes, though the
downwardly mobile have more often been consistent Republican voters.
In the white-collar group there is a slight tendency for the mobile
to have more often been swing voters, though even here the difference
is not statistically significant.
In Table 38 the subjectively upwardly mobile are not much more
likely to have voted for various parties than are other members of the
middle class, but the downwardly mobile members of the working class
have substantially more often voted for presidential candidates of
both parties than have their status stable peers. In spite of the
fact that the downwardly mobile are more often Republicans than are
other members of the working class they are not any more likely to be
consistent supporters of Republican presidential candidates.
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TABLE 37. —Objective mobility and party regularity
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar




Democrat 27$ 33$ 37$ 33$ 31$ 33$ 35$ 37$ U8$ U5$
Always
Republican 30 2k 19 2k 31 21 27 26 17 19
Various Ui k3 kh k3 38 U7 38 37 35 36
101$ 100$ 100$ Too% 100$ 101$ 10C# 100$ 100$ 100$


















6 .996 (df: 2)
.05
"Have you always voted for the same party or have you voted for
different parties for president? (If same) Which party was that?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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Always Democrat 2lrf 21% 21% 3Q%
Always Republican 32 27 18 20
Various liU U6 56 III
"Too# ~i00# 101% ~T6o%
















'•Have you always voted for the same party or have you voted
for different parties for president? (if same) Which party was that!"
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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No firm conclusions can be based on the data presented here,
but there seems to be some tendency for the mobile to have more often
changed their party identity or to have voted for candidates of more
than one party than is true for the status stable. Any firm conclusion
on the degree of association between mobility and party regularity
would require data more reliable than retrospective recall.
Strength of Party Affiliation
Hypothesis l.£ states: Both the upwardly and the do-wnwardly
mobile more often view themselves as "independents" or as "weak" party
members than do the non-mobile at the same status level . Data against
which this hypothesis can be tested are presented in Tables 39 and UO.
Table 39, which presents data on objective mobility and strength
of party preference, lends almost no support to the hypothesis. There
is virtually no difference between the upwardly mobile and the status
stable in the business and professional category. In the blue-collar
category there is a slight tendency for the downwardly mobile to be
more often independents or weak party members, but the tendency falls
far short of statistical significance. In the white-collar category no
consistent pattern is discernible. On the basis of Table 39 no apparent
relationship exists between objective mobility and the strength of
party affiliation.
Table UO presents data on the relationship between subjective
mobility and strength of party preference. The mobile less often con-
sider themselves strong supporters of a party than do the status stable
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Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business White-Collar




Strong D or R 32$ 32$ 33$ 36$ 3U$ 30$ U2$ 31$ 35$ 36$

















N 308 hp$ 189 87 35 152 86 1U8 783 577
Statistical Measures
X2
.13U (df : 2)
Probability NS
X2 for entire table
Probability






"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (if Rep or Dem) Would
you call yourself a strong (R)(D) or not a very strong (R)(D)? (If
Independent or Other) Do you think of yourself as closer to the
Republican or Democratic Party?"
Includes those who, -when pressed, stated that they felt closer
to one party or the other.
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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Strong D or R 39£ 31# 332 35#
Weak D or R 37 38 33 38
Independent 2U 31 35 27
100# 100$ loS 100$

















"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (if Rep or Dem)
Would you call yourself a strong (R)(D; or not a very strong (R)(D)?
(if Independent or Other) Do you think of yourself as closer to the
Republican or Democratic Party?"
Includes those who, when pressed, stated that they felt closer
to one party or the other.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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in both the middle class and working class groups, although the
relationship is not as strong in the working class. The difference
is statistically significant for the middle class, but not in the
working class.
The relationship between mobility and the strength of party
preference is thus apparent only for subjective mobility, no relation-
ship being apparent in the case of objective mobility. Hypothesis
1.3> may thus be accepted only if rephrased in terms of subjective
mobility alone.
Objective Mobility and Subjective Class
Hypothesis 1.6 states: Both the upwardly and downwardly
mobile are more often class misidentifiers than are nonmiobile in-
dividuals . The relationship between objective mobility and subjective
class is presented in Table Lil.
If it is assumed that the professional and business and the
white-collar categories are middle class, and that the blue-collar
workers are working class, then the data of Table ill support the
hypothesis. While 79 per cent of the status stable in the professional
and business category correctly place themselves in the middle class,
only £8 per cent of the upwardly mobile do so. In the blue-collar
category 78 per cent of the status stable properly consider themselves
members of the working class, while 66 per cent of the downwardly
mobile so classify themselves. In both cases the difference is in the
hypothesized direction and statistically significant. In the white-
collar group the status stable are apparently more convinced of their
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TABLE Ul.—Objective mobility and subjective class
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar






1% $Q% \&% $1% 6o£ k3% h3%
21 U2 H U9 UO 57 57
100$ 100$ 10C# 100$ 100$ 100$ 100$






X 2 30.906 (df;
Probability ,001
X2 for entire table
Probability







Two different questions were used: 1952 "There's quite a bit of
talk these days about four different social classes. If you were asked to
use one of these four names for your social class, which would you say you
belonged in—the middle class, lower class, working class or upper class?"
(Almost all respondents chose either middle or working class identification.
)
1956 and I960 "There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social
classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or to the
working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of these
classes? Which one?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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membership in the middle class than either the upwardly or downwardly-
mobile, though in this case the difference is not statistically significant.
With the exception of the white-collar group hypothesis 1.6 may be ac-
cepted.
The effect of class identification upon party preference can be
examined with the help of Table 1|2, where party preference is controlled
by subjective class. In the professional and business category this
causes the difference in party preference between the status stable and
mobile groups to wash out almost entirely. Apparently when the upwardly
mobile shift their class perception to conform to their new objective
status their party preference is also likely to be brought in line. In
the white-collar category the status stable are still disproportionately
Republicans whatever their subjective class. In the blue-collar category
the difference in party preference between the status stable and the
downwardly mobile washes out for those who are subjectively middle class,
but not for those who are subjectively working class. Even where down-
wardly mobile individuals locate themselves in the working class they
are more often Republicans than are their non-mobile peers.
Subjective class identification accounts for virtually all of
the difference in party preference between the upwardly mobile and
those of stable high status. The relationship of subjective class
identification to the party preferences of the downwardly mobile is
less clear. Among middle class identifiers there is no significant
difference in party preference between those born to blue-collar status
and those who have moved down from a higher status. But among working
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Democratic 29$ 32$ ko% k3% 19$ 3W U6$ kl% UL% U5$
Republican la 37 kk 36 57 35 U3 30 28 36
Ind. , Other 30 30 16 20 2k 31 11 23 31 19
100$ ~99% lOOfc ~99% lOOfc 100^ 100$ 100$ Ioo£ 100$
N 228 228 80 uu 21 62 35 U7 163 73
Working Class
Democratic hl% 52$ 53$ h$% 29$ 51$ 57$ 39$ 53$ 50$
Republican 26 23 17 26 6U 18 2k 28 19 23
Ind., Other 27 25 30 29 7 31 20 33 28 27
100$ Too$ 100& 100$ 100$ 100$ 101$ 100$ 100$ 100$






































Glass and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
Sum of X2 for
class levels 1.13U (df : k) 19.U70 (df : 8) 7.910 (df : k)
Probability NS .02 NS
Sum of X2 for table 28.51U (df : 16)
Probability . 0$
owo different questions were used: 1952 "There's quite a bit
of talk these days about four different social classes. If you were
asked to use one of these four names for your social class, which would
you say you belonged in—the middle class, lower class, working class or
upper class?" (Almost all respondents chose either middle or working
class identification.) 1956 and I960 "There's quite a bit of talk these
days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either
to the middle class or to the working class. Do you ever think of your-
self as being in one of these classes? Which one?"
"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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class identifiers the downwardly mobile are more often Republicans
and less often Democrats than are their non-mobile status equals.
The fact that the upwardly mobile are more often working class
identifiers than are those of stable high status serves as an adequate
explanation of the fact that they also more often prefer the Democratic
Party. But the fact that the downwardly mobile more often identify
with the middle class than do those of stable low status does not
adequately explain the greater preference of the downwardly mobile
for the Republican Party. The data of Table h2 would seem to indicate
that the party preference of the downwardly mobile is not substantially
affected by their subjective class.
In Chapter III it was further hypothesized that it would be
psychologically easier to shift one's self-assigned class position
upward to conform to upward mobility than downward to conform to
downward mobility. This assumed tendency was reflected in a formal
hypothesis as follows: 1.7--The downwardly mobile are more often
class misidentifiers than are the upwardly mobile . This hypothesis
also may be examined using the data in Table III. If it is again
arbitrarily assumed that the blue-collar category constitutes the
working class and that the other two occupational groupings constitute
the middle class, then the hypothesis must be rejected. Using this
criterion I|2 per cent of the upwardly mobile in the professional and
business category are misidentifiers, as are 57 per cent of the upwardly
mobile in the white-collar group. The downwardly mobile are mis-
identifiers U9 per cent of the time in the white-collar group and but
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3k per cent of the time in the blue-collar group. If any difference
does exist it is in the direction of the upwardly mobile more often
being class misidentifiers.
Another possible approach is to assume that the percentage of
status stable within a status category identifying with a class
represent the "correct" proportion. This can then be used as a base
figure against which to compare the proportion of the mobile who
identify with the class. By this criterion, and again using Table ljl,
19 per cent of the professional and business category should consider
themselves middle class, while for the upwardly mobile only £8 per
cent do so, a difference of 21 per cent. In the white-collar group
9 per cent of the downwardly mobile are "wrong" compared with 17 per
cent of the upwardly mobile. In the blue-collar category there are 12
per cent more misidentifiers among the downwardly mobile than would be
expected. Thus the downwardly mobile are again less often class mis-
identifiers than are the upwardly mobile. By either criterion hypothesis
1.7 must be rejected.
The available evidence thus indicates that mobility in either
direction makes class misidentification more likely, but that contrary
to expectations the downwardly mobile are not more likely to misidentify
than are the upwardly mobile.
Summary
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the following
conclusions. "When compared with the status stable at the same status
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level the upwardly mobile are more often Democrats and less often
Republicans, while the downwardly mobile are more often Republicans
and less often Democrats. The exception to the rule is the case of
the status stable members of the white-collar category who are con-
sistently more often Republicans than others of the same status, and
in some cases more often Republicans than any other group in any
category. The relationships do not wash out when controls for income,
education, and religion are introduced. The pattern of voting behavior
is much the same as for party preference, with the exception that
Eisenhower was apparently particularly appealing for the subjectively
upwardly mobile.
The upwardly mobile are more likely to have Democratic parents
and Democratic friends than are others of equal status, while the
downwardly mobile more often have Republican parents and friends than
do their status peers. The status stable group in the white-collar
category is again deviant, having a greater proportion of Republican
parents than any other category—though not necessarily a higher
proportion of Republican friends.
There is some tendency for the distribution of party preferences
among the upwardly mobile to become more like that of the status stable
in the older age groups, but the passage of time seems to exaggerate
the differences between the downwardly mobile and those of stable lower
status.
Increased levels of political interest seem to affect the degree
of difference in party preference between the upwardly mobile and the
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status stable only in the case of subjective mobility. At lover
status levels increased political interest magnifies differences
in political preference between the status stable and the downwardly
mobile, the downwardly mobile becoming more often Republicans, the
status stable more often Democrats as interest increases.
There is some tendency for the mobile to have more often
changed party identification or to have voted for candidates of both
parties than have the status stable. The similar hypothesis that the
mobile should be weaker in their declared strength of party affiliation
is supported only in the case of subjective mobility.
Finally, the evidence indicates that the mobile are more often
class misidentifiers than are the status stable, but that contrary
to the hypothesized relationship the downwardly mobile are not more
often class misidentifiers than are the upwardly mobile. The tendency
of the upwardly mobile to identify with the working class constitutes
one possible explanation of their more frequent preference for the
Democratic party, as compared with the non-mobile of their new status.
When party preference is controlled by subjective class, the upwardly
mobile are only slightly more likely to be Democrats than are the non-
mobile. The same is not true of the downwardly mobile, who are
Republicans in almost the same proportion whether they identify with
the middle or the working class. Apparently even when the downwardly
mobile are willing to admit their new working class status their
political socialization at higher status levels continues to incline




SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES
That an individual prefers a certain political party or even
that he has voted for a particular candidate does not tell us much
about his attitude toward any set of political issues. The nature
of the democratic political process is such that only rarely is a
political contest fought on a single clear-cut issue. The task of
this chapter is to investigate the relationship between social
mobility and attitudes toward certain kinds of political issues.
Attitudes toward political issues are often treated as though
they lay along a single conservative-liberal continum. For many
purposes this is an inadequate conceptualization, because conservatism
on one type of issue need not imply conservatism on issues of other
sorts. As V. 0. Key points out, the
division of people into liberal and conservative categories
is a great convenience in the description of political
opinions. It is also misleading, for people do not divide
into two camps, with members of one group in agreement on
one side of all domestic economic issues and united to
oppose the other group united within itself in opposition
on the same issues.
^
V. 0. Key, Jr. , Public Opinion and American Democracy (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 163.
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Further, any classification of opinions that implies an organization
of individual opinions into consistent liberal or conservative
ideologies is unrealistic. As The American Voter demonstrates, few
voters in the United States view politics from anything approaching
2
an ideological stance.
Yet there is a relationship between certain kinds of attitudes,
and in the interest of clarity some oversimplification is justified.
Key himself finds it useful to distinguish between opinions on foreign
issues, which he classifies along an isolationist-internationalist
dimension, and opinions on domestic welfare issues, which he classifies
3
along a liberal-conservative dimension. A similar, but perhaps even
more useful distinction is made by Seymour Lipset. In Political Man
he distinguishes between economic liberalism (issues concerned with
the distribution of wealth and power) and noneconomic liberalism
(issues concerned with civil liberties, race relations and foreign
affairs). He notes:
The fundamental factor in noneconomic liberalism is not
actually class, but education, general sophistication, and
probably to a certain extent psychic security. But since these
factors are strongly correlated with class, noneconomic liberal-
ism is positively associated with social status (the wealthier
are more tolerant), while economic liberalism is inversely cor-
related with social status (the poor are more leftist on such
issues).
Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., I960), pp. 216-265.
o
Key, op. cit . , p. l£>.
Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N. Y. : Anchor




Lipset's distinction between economic and noneconomic liberalism
is not only useful in itself, but his hypothesized relationship between
education, general sophistication, psychic insecurity and noneconomic
liberalism is particularly relevant to a study of social mobility
because it is in just these qualities that the mobile are likely to
differ from the non-mobile. Lipset himself suggests a relationship
when he states
:
Actually within the conservative strata it has not been the
wealthier classes in general which have led the political
struggle for noneconomic liberalism, but rather those of
established 'old family' background as differentiated from
the nouveaux riches.
Thus the upwardly mobile should be less inclined toward noneconomic
liberalism than those of stable high status, because predisposed by
their background more toward economic liberalism. In similar fashion
the downwardly mobile, being better educated and exposed to a pre-
sumably more sophisticated home environment, should be more often
noneconomic liberals than those of stable low status, and less often
7
economic liberals.
This chapter will investigate the relationship between social
mobility and economic liberalism together with one dimension of non-
economic liberalism, attitudes toward foreign affairs. The relation-
ship between mobility and other kinds of noneconomic liberalism is
examined in Chapter IX.
6
Ibid
. , pp. 318-319.
7If the mobile are more often psychically insecure this would re-
inforce the tendency for the upwardly mobile to be less liberal on non-
economic issues, but interfere with the tendency of the downwardly mobile
to be more liberal on noneconomic issues. Investigating this relationship






One recurrent political issue is whether or not government
should perform certain kinds of economic functions, particularly in
the fields of electric power and housing. Using Lipset's concepts,
the economic liberal would favor publically owned power and housing,
while the economic conservative would prefer that they be left to
private businessmen. The hypothesis to be tested is that on economic
issues of this kind the upwardly mobile are more liberal than their
status equals, while the downwardly mobile are more conservative than
their status equals.
The data for objective mobility in the professional and business
category of Table U3 lend no support whatsoever to the hypothesis that
the upwardly mobile are more economically liberal than their status
stable peers, almost equal proportions of each group agreeing or dis-
agreeing with the statement. In the blue-collar category the downwardly
mobile are somewhat more likely to adopt an economically conservative
attitude, though the result is not statistically significant. In the
white-collar category the downwardly mobile are a bit more conservative
than the upwardly mobile, as would be expected, but the status stable
are more conservative than either. Again, the results are not statis-
tically significant.
"When subjective mobility is used as a criterion, as in Table
hh, an interesting relationship emerges. In the middle class there is
not a great deal of difference between the status stable and the upwardly
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TABLE U3.—Objective mobility and attitude toward government economic
activity
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
Attitude3 SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Agree strongly H72 532 39% kl% 532 U32 m U22 362 U32
Agree, but not
very strongly 15 10 Ik 13 13 16 29 19 17 15
Not sure, it
depends 15 11 10 3 7 u 12 10 8 10
Disagree, but
not very
strongly 8 9 13 17 13 6 6 9 12 9
Disagree
strongly 15 17 25 20 13 30 9 21 27 23
1002 100^ 10T2 1002 "?92 ~99% 1002 1012 1002 1002



















"The government should leave things like electric power and
housing for private businessmen to handle."
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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TABLE Idi.—Subjective mobility and attitude toward government economic
activity-
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status






















X' 5.535 (df : k)
Probability NS














"The government should leave things like electric power and
housing for private businessmen to handle."
Data Source ; 1956, I960.
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mobile. If a difference does exist, it is in the direction of the
mobile being more often economic conservatives. In the working class,
however, a strong relationship is apparent. The downwardly mobile are
much more conservative than the status stable, and even, in their
response to this particular question, somewhat more conservative than
either of the middle class groups.
To investigate the extent to which these relationships are
due to differences in average income and educational level between
the mobile and the status stable, data on attitudes toward government
economic activity at various income and educational levels are reported
in Tables h$ and I4.6 for subjective mobility. "When attitude is con-
trolled by income, as in Table 1|£, there is still no clear pattern in
the middle class. In the low income group the upwardly mobile are
more often economic liberals, while in the middle and high income
groups the upwardly mobile are slightly more often economic conservatives.
In no case, however, is the difference statistically significant. In
the working class differences are substantial only in the middle income
group, where the downwardly mobile more often are economic conservatives.
Thus at least a certain amount of the greater conservatism of the down-
wardly mobile on this issue may be attributed to their income advantage
over those of stable low status.
In Table 1|6 attitude toward government economic activity is
controlled by educational level. In the middle class differences are
small at all educational levels. In the working class the downwardly
mobile are more often conservative in their view of what constitutes
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TABLE U5. —Subjective mobility and attitude toward government economic




Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status







































































































"About -what do you think your total income will be this year
for yourself and your immediate family?"
"The government should leave things like electric power and
housing for private businessmen to handle."
Data Source: 1956, I960.
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TABLE I46.—Subjective mobility and attitude toward government economic





Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
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"The government should leave things like electric power and
housing for private businessmen to handle."
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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appropriate government economic activity at every educational level,
although the difference is statistically significant only at the
medium education level. With education controlled little relationship
exists between mobility and attitude in the middle class group. In
the working class, however, the downwardly mobile are more often
economic conservatives and the status stable more often economic
liberals in every educational group, indicating that the economic
conservatism of the downwardly mobile is not just a result of their
better education.
The evidence indicates that little relationship exists between
upward mobility and attitude toward government's role in housing and
electric power at the higher status levels, either for objective or
subjective mobility. At lower status levels, however, the downwardly
mobile partly because of their income advantages, more often choose
a conservative position on the question than do the status stable.
Economic Liberalism—Full Employment
Policy
The government's role in maintaining full employment has been
an important political issue in the United States since the early
1930' s. Data on attitudes toward the issue are displayed in Tables U7
and U8. Both tables provide evidence supporting Lipset's thesis that
economic liberalism is inversely correlated with social status, if
economic liberalism is equated with agreement that "The government in




TABLE U7. --Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring full
employment
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
Attitudea SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Agree strongly 262 3l$ 312
Agree, but not
very strongly 12 13 20
Not sure, it
depends 10 9 11
Disagree, but
not very
strongly 16 17 16
Disagree
strongly 35 27 22
~% 1002 100$
N 176 183 88
Statistical Measures
X2 U.225 (df : k)
572 382 562 332 W 582 582
Ik 19 10 13 19 Ik Ik
12 10 10 8 6 6
Ik 12 10 19 11 9 9
Ik 19 Ik 25 22 12 13
"99^ ioo2 ioo2 1002 1002 "992 1002
35 16 79 U8 106 i;05 300
6.2U6 (df: 8) 12.872 (df: k)
Probability NS NS NS
Xd for entire table 23.3UU (df : 16)
Probability NS
"The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody
who wants to work can find a job."
v.
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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TABLE U8. —Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring
full employment
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
Stable Mobile Mobile StableAttitude'
Agree, strongly 332 hb% UL% 572
Agree, but not
very strongly 13 15 10 15
Not sure, it
depends 9 7 11 8
Disagree, but not
very strongly 15 13 10 9
Disagree strongly 30 21 28 11
100$ 100$ 100$ 100^
















"The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody
who wants. to work can find a job."
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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Using objective mobility as a measure, Table 1;7 lends some
slight support to the hypothesis that the mobile are influenced by
attitudes typical of their status of origin. In the professional
and business category hi per cent of the upwardly mobile agree that
the government should insure full employment, while only 38 per cent
of the status stable are in agreement. In the blue-collar group 72
per cent of the status stable think the government should insure
employment compared with £° per cent of the downwardly mobile. The
differences are in both cases in the anticipated direction, the up-
wardly mobile being more often economic liberals, the downwardly mobile
more often economic conservatives when compared with their status peers.
In the white-collar group the usual pattern of deviance is evident,
the status stable being somewhat more conservative than either the
upwardly or downwardly mobile.
The relationship between attitude toward full employment policy
and subjective mobility is shown in Table 1;8. In the middle class
group 59 per cent of the upwardly mobile agree that the government
should insure full employment, as compared with U6 per cent of the
status stable. In the working class the difference between mobile and
stable is even larger, with 72 per cent of the status stable favoring
full employment policy as opposed to but £l per cent of the downwardly
mobile. As was the case for objective mobility, the upwardly mobile
are more often economic liberals and the downwardly mobile more often
economic conservatives than are their status peers. In both cases
this is the hypothesized relationship.
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It is worth investigating what happens when the relationship
between subjective mobility and attitude toward full employment policy
is controlled for income and education. Table k9 breaks down attitudes
by income groups. In the middle class category the upwardly mobile
remain more often economic liberals in each income group. In the
working class the downwardly mobile remain more conservative within
each income group. For both middle and working classes the results
remain statistically significant. Thus it may be concluded that the
relationship is not an artifact of the differences in income between
the mobile and the status stable.
Table £0 illustrates the relationship between attitude and
mobility within educational groups. It will be recalled that the
upwardly mobile are less well educated than their status peers, while
the downwardly mobile are on average better educated than other members
of the working class. In the middle class the upwardly mobile remain
more often economically liberal within each educational group, while
in the working class the downwardly mobile remain consistently more
often conservative. For the table as a whole differences are statis-
tically significant, and it would appear clear from the consistency
of the relationship within each educational group that the relationship
is not just the result of differing educational levels.
When presented with the statement that the government ought to
see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job, the up-
wardly mobile more often agree, the downwardly mobile more often
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TABLE U9.—Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring
full employment, by income groups
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
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"About -what do you think your total income will be this year
for yourself and your immediate family?"
"The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody
who wants to work can find a job.
"
Data Source: 1956, I960.
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Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
Stable Mobile Mobile Stable
Low (0-8)
Agree 702 782
Not sure 2 9
Disagree 28 13
1002 100$
K f k7 U6
Med. (9-12)
Agree 582 732
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"The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody
who wants to work can find a job."
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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disagree than do others at the same status levels. The relationship
holds whether objective or subjective mobility is used as a measure,
though it is stronger in the case of subjective mobility. This
finding supports the hypothesis that on questions of economics the
upwardly mobile are more liberal than their status peers, while the
downwardly mobile are more conservative.
Economic Liberalism—Medicare
One further dimension of economic liberalism for which data
are available is that of attitudes toward government assistance in
obtaining medical care. In 1956 and I960 respondents were asked to
agree or disagree with the statement "The government ought to help
people get doctors and hospital care at low cost." Those of high
status more often adopted an economically conservative position, dis-
agreeing with the statement, while those of low status more often
agreed.
Data on the relationship between objective mobility and
attitudes toward medicare is reported in Table $1. In the professional
and business category only a weak relationship exists. The status
stable and the upwardly mobile adopt a liberal attitude in equal
measure, h$ per cent of each group agreeing with the statement in
some degree. While there is some slight tendency for the status
stable to more often make a conservative choice—U$ per cent of the
time as against UO per cent for the upwardly mobile—the difference
falls short of statistical significance. In the white-collar group
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TABLE 51.—Objective mobility and attitude toward medicare
Attitude a
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business "White-Collar




Agree strongly 28* 29* 37* U5* 39% 38* 37* 39* 5W 53*
Agree, but not
very strongly 17 16 20 15 11 20 12 13 15 16
Not sure, it
depends 10 15 11 3 17 8 19 12 10 8
Disagree, but
not very
strongly 11 1U 6 10 6 9 12 12 6 6
Disagree
strongly 3U 26 26 28 28 25 21 25 15 17
loo* loo* 100& 101% 101* T6d% IbT* r6T* 100* 100*
N 175 183 87 UO 18 79 10 103 389 289
Statistical Measures
X2 U.295 (df: U) 5.022 (df: 8) 11.8U7 (df: U)
Probability NS NS .05
I2 for entire table 21.165 (df: 16)
Probability NS
a
"The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital
care at low cost.
"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.

193
the status stable are somewhat more conservative than either the
upwardly or downwardly mobile, but again the difference is not
significant. In the blue-collar group differences are more marked,
69 per cent of the status stable blue-collar group favoring medicare
as compared with 52 per cent of the downwardly mobile,, In this case
the difference is statistically significant.
For subjective mobility the pattern is much the same. As
Table 52 illustrates, in the middle class the upwardly mobile are
more liberal on the question than the status stable, and in the working
class the downwardly mobile are notably more conservative than are
the status stable.
The belief that the government ought to help people get low
cost medical care is related to economic need, with those of low
income more often desiring government medical assistance. An exam-
ination of Table 53 confirms this. In all instances except that of
the downwardly mobile with high incomes the proportion of people
wanting government medical assistance increases as income decreases.
To determine whether the comparative liberalism of the upwardly mobile
and conservatism of the downwardly mobile on this issue is due just
to the income differentials between them and the status stable it is
necessary to control for income. This is done in Table 53*
In the middle class differences disappear in the medium income
group, but in the high and low income groups the upwardly mobile are
more often liberals. In the working class the downwardly mobile are
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TABLE 52.—Subjective mobility and attitude toward medicare
Respondents Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status









very strongly 11 12














X 6.909 (df : k)
Probability NS






"The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital
care at low cost."
Data Source : 1956, i960.
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Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
Stable Mobile Mobile Stable
$0-3,999
Agree $1% 11%























































































Sura of X2 for
income groups
Probability












"About -what do you think your total income will be this year for
yourself and your immediate family?"
"The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital
care at low cost. "
Data Source : 1956, I960,
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more conservative at the low and medium income levels, but not in the
high income group. In this last case, however, only eleven cases
fall into the downwardly mobile high income group, and the reversal
is probably due to chance variation. The table as a whole is highly
significant statistically even after controlling for income. Thus it
would appear that differences in attitude toward medicare between the
mobile and the status stable are due more to differences in early
political socialization than to income differences.
On the issue of medicare the data indicate that the upwardly
mobile are more often economic liberals, the downwardly mobile more
often economic conservatives than are their status peers, although
the evidence is more convincing in the case of the downwardly mobile.
The differences appear for both objective and subjective mobility. In
the objectively white-collar group the status stable, as on other issues,
are more conservative than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile.
Noneconomic Liberalism—Isolationism
Attitudes on only one dimension of noneconomic liberalism are
to be examined here, that of foreign affairs. Other dimensions of non-
economic liberalism, those concerned with civil liberties and race
relations, are treated in Chapter IX. In this section the relationship
of mobility to isolationism is examined.
Lipset's thesis is that on issues of noneconomic liberalism
those of high status are more liberal than those of low status—
a
reversal of the relationship on economic issues. On this basis those
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of low status should more often adopt an isolationist position than
those of high status. That those of low status do more often express
agreement with an isolationist sentiment is shown in Tables 5>U and f>5»
If the mobile carry with them traces of the attitude structures of
their original status, the upwardly mobile should be more often
isolationists than others of high status, and the downwardly mobile
less often isolationists than others of low status.
Support for this formulation in the case of objective mobility
is provided by Table 5U. In the professional and business group 33
per cent of the upwardly mobile agree with an isolationist statement
compared with 27 per cent of the status stable. In the white-collar
group the status stable somewhat more often evidence an isolationist
attitude than either the upwardly or downwardly mobile. Thus the
consistently deviant status stable white-collar workers would seem
to be more conservative on issues of both economic and noneconomic
liberalism than would be expected on the basis of their status. In
the blue-collar group the downwardly mobile are considerably less
often isolationists than the status stable, 27 per cent of the
downwardly mobile expressing isolationist sentiment as against hZ
per cent of the status stable.
The data in Table 55 on subjective mobility shows the same
trend as for objective mobility, though not so strongly. In the
middle class 72 per cent of the upwardly mobile disagreed with the
isolationist statement, while 78 per cent of the status stable
expressed disagreement. In the working class 62 per cent of the status
stable disagreed, compared with 67 per cent of the downwardly mobile.
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TABLE 5U. —Objective mobility and attitude toward isolationism
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F IM SS ex-FAttitude a
























U8 U3 U2 U3 57 k2 36
155^ Ib72 ioo& ~992 "992 1002 ioi2
81 35 133 76 lla 707 U75
Statistical Measures
X2 6.380 (df : U)
Probability NS
X^ for entire table
Probability






"Two different questions were used: 1952: "Some people think that
since the end of the last world war this country has gone too far in con-
cerning itself with problems in other parts of the world. How do you
feel about this?' 1956 and I960: "This country would be better off if we
just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts
of the world."
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960,
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TABLE 55. —Subjective mobility and attitude toward isolationism
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status










































"This country would be better off if we just stayed home and
did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world. n
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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When attitude toward isolationism is controlled by education,
as in Tables £6 and 57, differences between the mobile and the status
stable are reduced. In Table 56 the objectively upwardly mobile in
the professional and business category are more often isolationists
only in the relatively small group of low education. In the white-
collar category there is no substantial difference between the mobile
and the status stable. In the blue-collar category the downwardly
mobile are somewhat less often isolationists at each educational
level, but the difference approaches statistical significance only
in the high education group.
In Table 57 subjective mobility and attitude toward isolation-
ism is controlled by education. In the middle class differences again
wash out, except in the low education group where the upwardly mobile
are more often isolationists, as before. In the working class dif-
ferences may be considered to be washed out at all educational levels.
Thus the tendency of the upwardly mobile to be more often
isolationists and of the downwardly mobile to be less often isolationists
than are their status peers seems to be largely a product of the dif-
ferences in education between the mobile and the status stable. On
this particular issue of noneconomic liberalism the upwardly mobile
are more conservative, the downwardly mobile less conservative than










Head's Occupational Status &. Respondent's
Professional
and Business "White-Collar





Agree n% 60$ 50* 30$ 100$ 26$ 56$ U8$ 56$ 58$
Not sure,
depends 2 7 10 5 17 3 k h
Disagree 83 38 U3 60 68 28 U8 la 39
iW 106$ ioo$ ioo$ Ioo$ "99$ IbT$ ~99% ibT$ IoT$
N 12 55 U6 10 2 19 18 29 227 2U9
Med. (9-12)
Agree la* 37$ \x2% \a% 38$ U7$ 31$ 28$ 35$ U3$
Not sure,
depends 5 3 6 7 8 5 10 k 7 3
Disagree 53 60 52 $2 $k U7 59 68 58 5U
~99$ 100$ 100$ 10C& 100$ ™9^ 100$ 100$ 100$ ioo$
N 73 ibh 6U 27 13 59 29 69 370 178
High (12+)
Agree 22$ 22$ 29$ 32$ Uo$ 35$ 17$ 114$ 32$ 31$
Not sure,
depends 2 6 5 5 5 10 2 k 6
Disagree 76 71 67 68 55 60 72 8U 65 63
ioo$ ~99% IoT$ 100$ loofc 100$ "99% 100& IbT$ 100$












































































"This country would be better off if we just stayed home and
did not concern ourselves with the rest of the world."
b
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category,
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
Stable Mobile Mobile Stable
Low (0-8)
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Statistical Measures
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Sum of X2 for edu-
cational groups 10.507 (df 6) 3.079 (df: 6)
Probability





"This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did
not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world."




The other foreign affairs issue to be examined here is that of
attitudes toward foreign aid. The attitude of a noneconomic liberal
in this case would be in favor of foreign aid, while that of a non-
economic conservative would be against foreign aid—a formulation which
must be viewed with some trepidation, since there is also an economic
issue involved. Those of high status, who would be presumed to be in
favor of foreign aid as noneconomic liberals, could also be presumed
to be opposed to it as economic conservatives because it raised their
taxes. The resulting conflict of motives is likely to lessen status
polarization on the issue.
The relatively low status polarization on the foreign aid issue
may be seen in Tables 58 and 59. In Table 58, 58 per cent of the status
stable in the professional and business category favor foreign aid,
but so do U8 per cent of the status stable in the blue-collar category.
In Table 59, 5H per cent of the subjectively status stable middle class
favor foreign aid, but so do 51 per cent of the status stable working
class. In view of this small range the difference in the attitudes
of the mobile and the status stable would not be expected to be large.
In Table 58 the status stable in the professional and business
group are slightly more likely to favor foreign aid than are the up-
wardly mobile. In the white-collar group the status stable slightly
less often favor foreign aid than do either the upwardly or downwardly
mobile. In the blue-collar group the downwardly mobile are more often
in favor of foreign aid than are the status stable. Thus in spite of
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TABLE 58.—Objective mobility and attitude toward foreign aid
Attitude 3
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business "White-Collar




Agree strongly 35* 26* 1856 32% 33* 3<# 20* 29* 214 26*
Agree, but not
very strongly 23 27 31 3k 22 27 2U 28 2k 27
Not sure, it
depends 20 2k 1H 3 28 18 17 19 17 17
Disagree, but
not very
strongly 9 k 10 18 11 11 20 10 13 10
Disagree
strongly 13 18 27 13 6 Ik 20 lU 22 19
100* ~99% 100& 100& Ioo£ 100* 101% 100* 100& 19%





















"The United States should give economic help to the poorer
countries of the world even if they can't pay for it."
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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TABLE 59.--Subjective mobility and attitude toward foreign aid
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status














































"The United States should give economic help to the poorer
countries of the world even if they can't pay for it."
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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the small range all differences are in the same direction as found in
the case of attitudes toward isolationism.
For subjective mobility, however, the data as recorded in
Table 59 provide no evidence of a relationship between subjective
mobility and attitudes toward foreign aid in either the middle class
or working class.
When attitudes toward foreign aid are controlled by education,
as in Tables 60 and 6l, differences between the mobile and the status
stable remain negligible. The exceptions are the objectively down-
wardly mobile groups of high education in the white-collar and blue-
collar categories. Contrary to what might be expected, a higher
proportion of these groups favor foreign aid than do any other groups
in the table, although even here the differences fall just short of
statistical significance. It is only at the highest educational
level that the downwardly mobile differ in attitude from the status
stable, and the difference does not appear in the case of subjective
mobility. The evidence is far from conclusive, but there is a hint
here that where the downwardly mobile are markedly better educated
than most of their new status peers they may use enlightened attitudes
to emphasize the difference between themselves and other blue-collar
workers. This would explain the failure of the difference to appear
for the subjectively downwardly mobile, for where working class status
is accepted (an essential part of the definition of subjective down-










Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business "White-Collar





Agree 572 502 6U2 672 02 602 292 532 532 572
Not sure,
depends 29 17 20 29 16 Ik 13
Disagree U3 21 36 17 20 U3 32 33 30
10C& 1002 1002 "T6T2 "olT 1002 IoT2 1012 100^ 1002
N 7 111 1U 6 10 7 19 100 127
Med. (9-12)
Agree 592 5U2 382 502 562 61$ U32 U72 1*62 502
Not sure,
depends 13 18 25 22 9 10 2U 19 21
Disagree 28 28 38 50 22 27 1*6 29 35 29
Ioo2 1002 101^ ~Too2 ioo2 ioo2 IbT2 1002 Ioo2 Ioo2
N 32 65 32 10 9 33 21 U5 192 102
High (12+)
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Not sure,
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2 0.581 (df: 2)
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Probability
High (12+)





Sum of X2 for
educational
groups 3.8I48 (df: 6)
Probability NS



























"The United States should give economic help to the poorer
countries of the -world even if they can't pay for it."
•u.
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.

212






Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
Stable Mobile Mobile Stable
Low (0-8)
Agree $7% 6l£
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"The United States should give economic help to the poorer
countries. of the world even if they can't pay for it."
Data Source: 1956, I960.
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Although attitudes on foreign aid do not constitute a clear
test of noneconomic liberalism, the evidence for objective mobility
lends some support to the conclusion that the upwardly mobile are
more conservative on noneconomic issues than their status stable
counterparts and that the downwardly mobile are more liberal on
noneconomic issues than are their non-mobile status equals. For
subjective mobility, however, there seems to be no difference between
the mobile and stable on the issue of foreign aid.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the political attitudes of the
mobile on several economic and noneconomic issues. As Lipset has
stated, and as the data of this chapter have confirmed, on economic
issues those of high status tend to be conservative and those of low
status liberal, while on noneconomic issues the relationship is
reversed. If the mobile are influenced by the attitudes prevailing
in their status of origin the upwardly mobile should be more liberal
on economic questions and more conservative on noneconomic issues than
others of equal status. In like manner the downwardly mobile should
be more conservative on economic matters and more liberal on non-
economic matters than those of stable low status.
The data presented in this chapter in large part support the
hypothesis. The upwardly mobile are somewhat more liberal than those
of stable high status on the issues of full employment policy and
medicare, though not on the issue of public power and housing. On
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noneconomic issues of foreign affairs the upwardly mobile are some-
what more often conservative on the issues of isolationism and foreign
aid than are their stable counterparts.
The relationship is even clearer for the downwardly mobile.
They are more conservative than those of stable low status on each
of the economic issues, more liberal on both of the foreign affairs
issues. No important differences are apparent between objective and
subjective mobility in this regard, except perhaps for a hint that the
well educated among the downwardly mobile utilize enlighted attitudes
to distinguish themselves from other blue-collar workers.
The status stable members of the white-collar group are
apparently more conservative than either the upwardly or downwardly
mobile members of the group on both economic and noneconomic questions,
though rarely at a statistically significant level.
On both economic and noneconomic questions the upwardly and
downwardly mobile show attitude distributions intermediate between
those typical of groups of stable high status and groups of stable
low status. Some of this difference is attributable to their early
political socialization at a different status level, some to the
differences in income and education between the mobile and the status
stable. The evidence presented in this chapter in large part supports
hypothesis 1.0: For both the upwardly and downwardly mobile political
loyalties and attitudes tend to change in the direction appropriate to





SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT
Individuals vary greatly in the extent to -which they are
interested or involved in politics. Some people feel they understand
the issues, follow the political campaigns with interest, and never
fail to vote. Others feel baffled by politics, are little interested,
and vote sporadically if at all. This chapter attempts to investigate
the relationship of mobility to these aspects of orientation to the
political system.
One explanation of individual differences in orientation to
politics is the cross-pressure hypothesis, first set forth in The
People's Choice . This hypothesis states that voters exposed to
conflicting political influences react by political withdrawal and
indecision. There have been several attempts to apply the cross-
pressure hypothesis to the political behavior of the socially mobile,
the assumption being that the mobile are more likely to be cross-
pressured than are the non-mobile. Lipset and Bendix conclude that
because of cross-pressure both upwardly and downwardly mobile in-
dividuals "are more likely to be apathetic, to abstain from voting
P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. R. Berelson, and Helen Gaudet, The





and to show low levels of political interest than are the immobile."
Elsewhere Lipset suggests that cross-pressures related to mobility are
a factor making for lower voting rates in the United States than in
3Europe. The authors of The American Voter suggest that the tendency
to class misidentification typical of the mobile leads to cross-
ly
pressure.
As a result of these suggestions in the literature, several
hypotheses were stated in Chapter HI based, upon the assumption that
the mobile, if cross-pressured, will evidence it by having lower levels
of interest and involvement than do others at the same status level.
In testing these hypotheses in this chapter three aspects of political
orientation and their relationship to social mobility are treated.
These are (l) political interest and activity, (2) feeling of political
understanding and efficacy, and (3) voting turnout.
Social Mobility and Political Interest
Interest in politics is associated with status, with those of
high status usually more interested in politics than those of low
status. If the mobile are cross-pressured they should be less interested
in politics than are others at the same status level. This has been
stated formally: 2.1—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often
2Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Ind-
ustrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1959), p. 69.
3
"a. M. Lipset et al
.
, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of
Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey (ed. ) Handbook of Social Psychology,
Vol. II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 195U), H3U.
Angus Campbell et al.. The American Voter (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., I960), p. 372.
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show low levels of political interest than do the non-mobile at the
same status level .
Table 62 demonstrates the relationship between interest in a
political campaign and objective mobility. If only the professional
and business category were examined the hypothesis would seem to be
supported, a statistically significant proportion of the upwardly
mobile reporting less interest in the campaign than is true for the
status stable. In the white-collar category, however, both the
upwardly and downwardly mobile report more interest in the campaign
than do the status stable. Since the status stable white-collar
group has been consistently deviant in other regards this could be
considered a part of that same pattern of deviance. But in the blue-
collar category the results are clearly contrary to the hypothesis,
though falling just short of statistical significance. Thus the
hypothesized relationship seems to hold only in the case of upward
mobility.
An alternative explanation of the data of Table 62 is available.
The pattern is quite similar to that found on a number of variables in
previous chapters: the mobile occupy a position on the characteristic
intermediate between that typical of their status of origin and that
of their new status. Table 62 merits re-examination with this hypothesis
in mind. This is as would be expected if the mobile are still in-
fluenced by their early political socialization at a different status
level. The upwardly mobile in the professional and business category
are less interested in the campaign than are the status stable members
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TABLE 62. --Objective mobility and interest in the campaign
Interest
Level a
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business White-Collar





interested $2% k2% 392 \6% 322 372 362 38* 292 21a
Somewhat
interested 38 39 38 la 1*7 39 38 37 UO 38
Not much
interested 10 19 23 lU 21 2U 26 25 32 38
loog loofc 1002 1002 1002 iob2 1002 100$ ioS 1002


















"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns.
How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested,
somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political
campaigns so far this year?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category,
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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of the group, but more interested than are the status stable members
of any lower status group. Similarly, the downwardly mobile members
of the white-collar group are less interested than the status stable
professional and business people, but more interested than any group
of lower status. The same explanation accounts for the fact that the
upwardly mobile white-collar and the downwardly mobile blue-collar
members are more often very much interested in the campaign than are
the status stable blue-collar workers. From this viewpoint the only
deviant group is that of the status stable white-collar people, who
are a trifle less interested in the campaign than would be expected,
though even this deviation is quite small.
Table 63 breaks down interest in the campaign by income level.
As may be seen, tendencies largely remain in the same directions,
though the white-collar group is inconsistent and the magnitude of
differences is somewhat reduced. Still, the upwardly mobile are on
average somewhat less interested than the status stable at the same
level, while the downwardly mobile tend to be somewhat more interested
in the campaign than are their status peers.
Essentially the same thing is true when a control for education
is introduced, as in Table 6I4.. 'While differences are no longer
statistically significant, the upwardly mobile are in each case less
interested in the campaign than are the status stable in the pro-
fessional and business group, and the downwardly mobile in the blue-
collar category are more interested than are the status stable in the
highest and lowest educational groups, though the difference washes out
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TABLE 63.—Objective mobility and interest in the campaign by income
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Interest in Professional
the Campaign and Business
and Income SS UM ex-F
"White-Collar





terested k$% 33£ 302
Somevriiat in-
terested h$ U6 k3
Not much
interested 10 21 26
To5% 100$ 99%
N 29 91 69
$U, 000-7, U99
Very much in-
terested $2$ U2% kl%
Some"what in-
terested y~> 39 3k
Not much
interested 12 20 19
~99& 101% 100$
N 12U 189 77
$7, £00 up
Very much in-
terested $3% $3% U2%
Someidhat in-
terested 39 35 k2
Not much
interested 8 12 15
100? Too# ~%
N 1U8 11U 33
51$ 33^ 3\% 11% 28# 30f% 23%
32 22 U2 k2 16 36 3k
-iii Jii Jl J£l 28 3k k3
100^ 99% 100$ 100$ 101# 100$ 100$
28 9 55 29 29 321 337
k$% 2% Ul% k3% k2% 28% 26%
50 56 36 36 3k I4I U6
5 19 23 20 2k 31 28
100& 100£ 100# "~99% lOCfc 100% lOOJg
38 16 7k kk 91 372 203
37% W> kl% $$% 39% 32^ 3S%
U2 56 32 36 39 U7 33
21 a 9 22 21 29
100$ 100$ 100$ 100& 100# 100$ 100$
























































Sum of X2 for
income groups 8.099 (df:
Probability NS













"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns,
How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested,
somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political
campaigns so far this year?"
•u
"About what do you think your total income will
yourself and your immediate family?"
be this year for
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source: 1952, 1956, I960.
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TABLE 6U.~Objective mobility and interest in the campaign by education
Interest in Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
the Campaigna Professional
and Years of and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
Education SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Low (0-8)
Very much in>
terested '$Q% U5* 31*
Somewhat in-
terested 33 27 38
Not much in-
terested 8 28 31
"99* 100* 100*
N 12 60 U8
Med. (9-12)
Very much in
terested 38* 32* 38*
Somewhat in-
terested UL U7 39
Not much in-
terested 21 21 23
100* 100* 100*
N 78 15U 69
High (12+)
Very much in-
terested 56* 50* U6*
Somewhat in-
terested 37 37 38
Not much in-
terested 7 13 16
100* 100* 100*
N 219 189 69
17* 0* 30* 32* lil* 22* 21*
58 50 25 18 31 33 32
Jl 12 J£ 12 28 U5 1*7
100* 100* 100* 100* 100* 100* 100*
12 2 20 22 32 265 323
50* 15* 26* 31** 32* 32* 26*
36 62 U6 1*7 1*0 1*3 1*8
ll* 23 28 19 28 25 27
ioo* ibo* Ioo£ Too* Too% ioo* lbT*
28 13 72 32 72 399 200
1*9* 1*7* 52* 1*2* 1*5* 31** 1*6*
HO 37 35 1*2 36 1*1* hh
11 16 13 16 18 22 20
100* 100* 100* 100* 99% 100* 100*
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"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns,
How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested,
somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political
campaigns so far this year?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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at the intermediate level. The -white-collar pattern is again some-
what variable, though the status stable are inclined to be less
interested in the campaign than the mobile at each educational level.
The relationship between interest in the campaign and sub-
jective mobility is shown in Table 6£. Here again the original
hypothesis based on the assumption of cross-pressures would make a
correct prediction only in the case of the upwardly mobile, while a
hypothesis based on persistence of patterns of the status of origin
would predict correctly for both the upwardly and downwardly mobile.
The upwardly mobile are slightly less interested than are the status
stable members of the middle class, while the downwardly mobile are
more interested in the campaign than those who have inherited their
working class status.
Another aspect of political interest against which the alter-
native hypotheses may be tested is the intensity with which people
hold their preferences for a political candidate. Data on intensity
of political preference and objective mobility is reported in Table
66. As is the case for interest in the campaign, a cross-pressure
hypothesis predicts correctly only in the case of the upwardly mobile.
On the other hand, a hypothesis based on the persistence of status
patterns correctly predicts the direction of all differences except
for the low level of intensity reported by the white-collar status
stable. With this single exception, the upwardly mobile are less apt
to care intensely which party wins the election than are their status
stable peers, while the downwardly mobile are more likely to care
intensely than are their status equals.
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TABLE 65.—Subjective mobility and interest in the campaign
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status

















N 506 222 98 11 U7
Statistical Measures
Probability










"Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns.
How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested,
somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political
campaigns so far this year?"
Data Source ; 1956, I960.
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TABLE 66.—Objective mobility and intensity of political preference
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-FIntensity'
Care very
much U2% 332 302
Care pretty
much 38 U2 111
Don't care
very much 13 18 19
Don't care
at all 7 8 10
100$ 1012 100^











U02 182 332 372 352 21$ 212
38 1£ UL 29 31 la kO
10 2k 19 a 22 a 21
12 15 8 13 12 1U 18
ioo2 ~99£ ioiJ Ioo2 1002 1002 Ioo2
8U 33 lli5 82 1U7 756 5U7




9.530 (df : 3)
.05
"Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a good
deal which party wins the presidential election this fall or that you don't
care very much which party wins? 1'
u
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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Since the intensity an individual feels about the outcome of
an election is likely to fluctuate from one election to the next,
depending on the candidates involved, Table 67 breaks down intensity
of political preference by election years. An inspection of the table
reveals that the pattern remains consistent in each election year.
In every election year the downwardly mobile more often care very much
who wins than do their status stable peers, while with the exception
of the white-collar group the upwardly mobile are less likely to care
very much who wins than are their status equals.
One further aspect of the intensity of political preference
worth examination is the relationship of intensity to party preference.
It could be argued that those mobile who retain the party allegiance
typical of their status of origin find it in conflict with self-interest
in their new status position, and so are not likely to care very much
who wins, while those who adhere to the "correct" party for their new
status "over-identify" and thus care more strongly than do others in
the same circumstances. Such a supposition would not be supported by
the data reported in Table 68. In the professional and business
category the upwardly mobile less often report caring very much who
wins in each case, whether they are Republicans, Democrats, or
Independents. In the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile are
a little less likely to care strongly if they are Democrats, but
much more likely to have an intense preference when they are Republicans,
It is in the group of downwardly mobile Republicans that one finds




TABLE 67. --Objective mobility and intensity of political preference by
election years
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
Year" and and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
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Sum of X2 for
election years 12.1jlU (df 9) 15.512 (df: 18) 13.337 (df: 9)
Probability
Sum of X2 for tab!
NS NS NS
e la. 263 (df: 36)
Probability NS
"Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a good
deal which party wins the presidential election this fall or that you don't
care very much which party wins?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Summing is not entirely legitimate in this case, since some of
the same respondents were interviewed in I960 who had been interviewed
in 1956.
Data Source: 1952, 1956, I960.
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TABLE 68.—Objective mobility and intensity of political preference by
party preference
Party Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Preference3 Professional
and and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
Intensity13 SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Democrat
Care very
much 36$ 33$ 29$
Care pretty
much la 39 U6
Don't care
very much 16 18 16
Don't care
at all 8 10 8
101$ 100$ "99$
N 101 160 85
Republican
Care very
much $1% 1*2$ 38$
Care pretty
much 38 in U2
Don't care
very much 10 12 16
Don't care
at all 2 5 k
101$ 100$ 100$
N iih 128 55
Ind. , Other
Care very
much 39$ 22$ 23$
Care pretty
much 3k kl 30
Don't care
very much Ik 2k 27
Don't care
at all 13 7 20
100$ 100$ 100$
N 83 107 kh
U6$ 0$ 28$ kh% 21$ 27$ 21$




11 8 7 15 10 15
100$ 100$ 100$ "99% 100$ 100$ ~99%
37 7 6k Ul 62 377 273
U6$ 20$ 57$ 35$ 61$ 30$ 29$
39 30 32 50 22 k3 iH
30 8 8 12 17 20
7 20 3 8 5 10 10
"99$ 100$ 10b^ 101$ 100$ 100$ 100$
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21 UL 33 23 27 2k
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"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or "what?"
"Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a
good deal. which party wins the presidential election this fall or that
you don't care very much which party wins?"
\En each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source: 1952, 1956, I960.
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An explanation of the tendency of the downwardly mobile
Republicans to care intensely who wins in terms of the persistence
of attitudes learned earlier at a higher status level is in this case
insufficient. Although the hypothesis would correctly predict the
direction of difference, it is inadequate to explain the magnitude
of the difference, because the downwardly mobile Republicans care
intensely who wins even more often than do the Republicans in higher
status groups. It may be that these downwardly mobile individuals
use their Republican identification as one way of rejecting working
class status.
The relationship of subjective mobility to intensity of
preference is reported in Table 69. As before, the upwardly mobile
less often report caring very much than do other members of the middle
class, and the downwardly mobile are more apt to care very much who
wins than are the status stable members of the working class.
A final aspect of political interest to be examined is the
extent to which individuals take some political action other than
voting. The least demanding kind of action is that of talking to
other people in the attempt to get them to support one's preferred
candidate. Yet less than one-third of respondents report even this
limited activity, as may be seen in Table 70. The pattern of Table 70
for political activity as evidenced by talking to other people is
identical to that found for other indicators of political interest
and intensity. The upwardly mobile less often talked to other people
than did others of equal status, while the downwardly mobile more often
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TABLE 69.—Subjective mobility and intensity of political preference
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
Stable Mobile Mobile StableIntensity*
Care very much 37$ 3<# 332 22^
Care pretty much 38 36 37 38
Don't care very much 16 21 22 23
Don't care at all 9 12 8 17
1005* ~99% loofc 1CX#
















"Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a
good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall or that
you don't care very much which party wins?"
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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TABLE 70.—Objective mobility and political activity
Activity3
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business "White-Collar




Talked h2% 352 32# 39% 2$% 2% M 35£ 292 19%
Didn't talk 58 65 68 61 75 75 66 65 71 81
loofc loofc loofc 100$ 100% Too% 100f% Too% IW% 100%


















"Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should
vote for. one of the parties or candidates?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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tried to convince others. The same pattern is repeated in the case
of subjective mobility as shown in Table 71. Though the differences
are not statistically significant, the upwardly mobile less often
talked than did other members of the middle class, while the down-
wardly mobile more often tried to convince other people than did the
status stable members of the working class.
The evidence compels rejection of hypothesis 2.1. If the
mobile are cross-pressured it is not revealed in these data. The
results are much better explained by the same basic hypothesis that
has been supported in previous chapters: that the mobile tend to be
intermediate between their status of origin and their new status on
traits of political relevance. In the case of political interest and
involvement such a hypothesis would predict differences between the
mobile and the status stable in virtually every instance reported here,
with the familiar exception of the status stable white-collar workers,
who tend to evidence lower degrees of interest and involvement than
anticipated. With this exception the upwardly mobile are less interests d
and involved in politics than are their status equals, while the down-
wardly mobile tend to be more interested and involved than are those
of stable low status.
Social Mobility and Political Efficacy
Related to an individual's degree of political interest and
involvement is the extent to which he feels he is able to understand
political issues and has an effective voice in government. A hypothesis
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Talked 382 332 302 21$
Didn't talk 62 67 70 76
100*2 1002 1002 ioo2













1.78U (df : 1)
NS
2)
"Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should
vote for one of the parties or candidates?"
Data Source: 1956, I960.
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based upon the assumption that the mobile are cross-pressured has been
stated formally: 2.2—
'
Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more
often feel politically ineffectual than do the non-mobile at the same
status level
.
Table 72 reports the relationship of objective mobility to
feelings of political efficacy. As was the case for various indicators
of political interest, a cross-pressure hypothesis is supported only
by the data for upward mobility, that for downward mobility showing a
difference opposite to that hypothesized. As before, a hypothesis
based upon the persistence of patterns learned in the status of origin
offers a better explanation. In the case of feelings of political
efficacy reported in Table 72 the upwardly mobile more often feel that
they have no say about what the government does than do the status
stable members of the professional and business group. The downwardly
mobile less often feel politically ineffectual than do the status
stable in either the white-collar or blue-collar group. The status
stable members of the white-collar group are again the only ones un-
accounted for by the hypothesis: they feel more ineffectual politically
than any other group of any status.
When feeling of political efficacy is controlled by income,
as in Table 73, differences persist in the same direction. In the
professional and business category the upwardly mobile more often
feel unable to affect what government does than do the status stable
in both the highest and the lowest income groups, though the difference
washes out at medium income levels. In the blue-collar category the
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TABLE 72.—Objective mobility and feeling of political efficacy
Head f s Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
Attitude a SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Agree 12$ 19$ 19% 23$ k3% 21$ 21$ 192 312 Uo2
Disagree 88 81 81 77 57 76 76 81 69 60
100& 100$ 100^ 100^ 100$ 100$ iob"2 1002 1002 1002



















"People like me don't have any say about what the government does."
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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Agree 0$ 30$ 28$ 21$ 56$ 35$ 36$ 29$ 35$ 1*6$
Disagree 100 70 72 79 1* 65 6k 71 65 Sk
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N 29 92 69 28
.
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$U, 000-7, U99
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"People like me don't have any say about what the government does."
"About what do you think your total income will be this year for
yourself and your immediate family?"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source: 1952, 1956, I960.
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downwardly mobile more often feel politically efficacious than do
the status stable at every income level. In the "white-collar group
the deviance of the status stable is consistent: they are more apt
to feel politically ineffectual than either the upwardly or downwardly
mobile at each income level. For the table as a whole differences
remain statistically significant even after controlling for income
differences.
The results of controlling for education, as in Table 7U, are
virtually identical to those when income is controlled. In the pro-
fessional and business category the mobile more often feel ineffectual
in both the highest and lowest education categories, though again the
difference washes out at the intermediate level. In the blue-collar
group the downwardly mobile more often feel politically effective than
the status stable at every education level, and in the white-collar
group the status stable are more apt to feel ineffectual than either
the upwardly or downwardly mobile at every level. Again, differences
remain statistically significant for the table as a whole.
"When subjective mobility is used as a criterion, as in Table 75,
differences are in the same direction, although statistically significant
only in the middle class. The upwardly mobile more often feel politically
impotent than do the status stable in the middle class, and in the working
class the downwardly mobile less often feel themselves politically im-
potent than do the status stable.
Closely related to feelings of political efficacy are feelings
of political understanding. A man who does not feel he understands
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TABLE 7U.—Objective mobility and feeling of political efficacy, by
education
Attitude a Head ' s Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
and Professional
Years of and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
Education SS DM ex-F DM SS DM ex-F DM SS ex-F
low (0-8)
Agree n% 31*2 282 502 1002 302 1*52 302 1*32 502
Disagree 83 66 72 50 70 55 70 57 50
1002 Ioo2 Ioo2 ioo2 ioo2 ioo2 ioo2 Ioo2 ioo2 Ioo2
N 12 61 1*7 12 2 20 20 30 261 308
Med. (9-12)
Agree ZL% 192 232 222 51*2 292 192 192 262 322
Disagree 79 81 77 78 1*6 71 81 81 71* 69
100$ Tools 1002 Ioo2 Ioo2 iob"2 Ioo2 1002 ioo2 iol2
N 78 153 69 27 13 72 32 72 1*02 200
High (12+)
Agree 92 1W io2 172 302 152 162 112 212 11*2
Disagree 91 86 90 83 70 85 81* 89 79 86
100$ 100^ 1002 ioo2 ioo2 ioo2 ioo2 ioo2 1002 1002
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"People like me don't have any say about what the government does."
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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Agree i# 2% 292 352
Disagree 85 77 71 65
100$ 100$ 100$ Ioo£
















'"People like me don't have any say about what the government
does.
"
Data Source t 1956, I960.
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politics is unlikely to believe he can affect the course of events.
Data on objective mobility and feeling of political understanding
are reported in Table 76.
The relationship of feelings of political understanding to
objective mobility is similar to that already reported for feelings
of political efficacy. The upwardly mobile less often feel that they
understand politics than do the status stable in the professional and
business category, -while in the blue-collar category the downwardly
mobile are more likely to feel they understand what is going on than
do other members of the working class. In the white-collar group,
however, a difference is to be noted. The status stable members of
the white-collar category who were consistently less likely to believe
they could affect the course of political events than either of the
mobile groups, somewhat more often feel they understand politics than
do either mobile group. This difference is virtually meaningless
statistically however, while the differences in both the professional
and business and blue-collar groups are highly significant statistically.
Because feelings of political understanding are likely to be
closely related to the amount of education an individual has had it
is desirable to introduce a control for education. This is done in
Table 77. In the professional and business category the upwardly
mobile less often feel they understand politics than do the status
stable at both the highest and lowest levels, while the difference
washes out at the intermediate level. In the blue-collar category the
downwardly mobile more often feel they understand politics than do the
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TABLE 76.—Objective mobility and feeling of political understanding
Attitude3
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business White-Collar




Agree hJ>% $7% 6lg $1% $1* 60% 61$ kl% 69% 19%
Disagree 57 k3 39 hi U6 UO 36 53 31 21
100$ 100$ 100% 100$ Tob% Tw% Tools 100$ 100# 100$













2) 25.581 (df: 1)
.001
a
"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a
person like me can't really understand -what's going on."
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
lata Source: 1952, 1956, I960.
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TABLE 77.—Objective mobility and feeling of political understanding, by-
education
Attitude a Head ' s Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
and Professional
Years of and Business Vftiite-Collar Blue-Collar
Education SS UM ex-F dm SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Low (0-8)
Agree h2% 612 672 92% 1002 602 902 602 792 882
Disagree 58 39 33 9 Uo 10 Uo 21 12
1002 ioo2 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002
N 12 61 U9 12 2 20 21 30 266 315
Med. (9-12)
Agree 652 6ii2 6142 592 692 712 562 U82 6U2 712
Disagree 35 36 36 la 31 29 hh 52 36 29
100^ 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002 ioo2 1002
N 78 15U 70 27 13 72 32 71 U01 198
High (12+)
Agree M U92 5h2 U72 Uo2 U72 532 362 602 532
Disagree 66 51 U6 53 60 53 hi 6U Uo U7
1002 1002 10C& 100^ 100& 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002
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"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a
person like me can't really understand what's going on. M
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, i960.
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status stable at every educational level. In the white-collar group
the pattern is inconsistent, showing no clear evidence of difference
between groups. For the table as a whole differences between the
mobile and status stable remain statistically significant at a high
level
.
As has been the case for the other variables considered in
this chapter, subjective mobility presents a pattern similar to that
for objective mobility, but with reduced magnitude. As Table 78
illustrates, in the middle class the upwardly mobile are somewhat less
likely than are the status stable to feel they understand politics,
while in the working class the downwardly mobile somewhat more often
believe they understand politics than do the status stable. In neither
case, however, are the differences statistically significant.
On the basis of the evidence hypothesis 2.2 must be rejected.
As was the case for political interest, a cross-pressure hypothesis
is able to correctly predict differences only in the case of the up-
wardly mobile, while the downwardly mobile show a trend opposite to
that predicted. A hypothesis based upon the persistence of the in-
fluence of early political socialization at a different status level is
able to correctly predict all differences except for the case of the
status stable white-collar group. In that case individuals less often
report feelings of political efficacy than do their status peers,
though they do as often feel that they understand politics. With this
exception the upwardly mobile less often feel that they understand or
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"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a
person like me can't really understand what's going on."
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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can affect politics than do their status equals, while the downwardly
mobile more often believe they understand and can affect political
events than do their status equals.
Social Mobility and Voting Turnout
One of the traits supposed to accompany political cross-
pressure is a lower voting rate. This was stated as a formal
hypothesis: 2.3—Both the upwardly and downwardly mobile more often
abstain from voting than do the non-mobile at the same status level .
But since the evidence already examined does not support the assumption
that the mobile are cross-pressured, there is no reason to expect the
hypothesis to hold in the case of voting rates. A more probable result
is that those groups which evidence high interest and involvement in
politics will have a high rate of voting turnout, and that those less
interested and involved will more often abstain from voting.
Evidence on the relationship of objective mobility to voting
turnout is reported in Table 79. An examination of the table reveals
that the pattern is identical to that to be expected if high interest
levels are assumed to lead to high turnout rates. In the professional
and business category the status stable have voted more regularly than
have the upwardly mobile. In the blue-collar category the downwardly
mobile have voted more regularly than have the status stable. Finally,
in the white-collar category the status stable group evidence their
lesser interest in politics by having voted less regularly than either
the upwardly or downwardly mobile. Differences between the mobile and
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Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business "White-Collar







All of them 61* 55* kl% W W 55* 51* U2* 38* 27*
Most of them 2k 20 26 ZL 17 13 22 20 19 20
Same of them 7 9 12 1U 17 13 16 17 16 ZL
None 8 16 15 17 26 19 11 21 27 31
100* 100$ 100* 100* 100? 100* loo* 100* 100* ~~99%


















"In the elections for president since you have been old enough
to vote, would you say that you have voted in all of them, most of them,
some of them, or none of them?
"
In each case chi square computation; omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1952, 1956, I960.
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the status stable are statistically significant in this case only
for the professional and business category.
The relationship of subjective mobility to voting turnout,
as shown in Table 80, is similar to that for objective mobility.
In the middle class the status stable have voted slightly more regularly
than have the upwardly mobile, though the difference has no statistical
significance. In the working class the downwardly mobile have voted
quite a bit more regularly than have the status stable, and in this
case the difference is statistically significant.
Thus hypothesis 2.3 must also be rejected on the basis of the
evidence. As was the case for other variables examined in this chapter
the facts accord more closely to the hypothesis that the mobile are
intermediate between their status of origin and their new status on
political traits.
Conclusion
All three hypotheses derived from the assumption that the
mobile are cross-pressured examined in this chapter have had to be
rejected on the evidence. Although the data reveals clear and con-
sistent differences between the status stable and the mobile with
regard to levels of political interest, feelings of political efficacy
and regularity of voting turnout, these differences are not compatible
with a cross-pressure interpretation. An alternative interpretation
fits the data better: that the mobile are still sufficiently influenced
by their status of origin that they retain traces of the political
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TABLE 80.—Subjective mobility and voting turnout
Respondent's Subjective Glass and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
Voteda Stable Mobile Mobile Stable
All of them $6% $2% hl% 31$
Most of them 22 2U 26 22
Seme of them 10 11 11 19
None 12 13 16 25
100& 100^ 100^ 100$















"In the elections for president since you have been old enough
to vote, would you say that you have voted in all of them, most of them,
some of them, or none of them?"
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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behavior typical of that status. As this hypothesis would predict,
the mobile evidence a distribution on all measures of political
interest and involvement that is between that shown by the status
stable in their status of origin and the status stable in their new
status
.
Whether objective or subjective mobility is used as a measure,
at high status levels the upwardly mobile are less often interested
in politics, less often feel they understand or can affect political
events, and vote less regularly than do those of stable high status.
At the lower end of the status scale the downwardly mobile tend to
be more interested in politics, to feel they understand and can affect
political events, and to vote more regularly than do those of stable
low status. The one deviant group is again the status stable white-
collar category, where though the status stable feel they understand
politics as well as do the mobile at the same level, they are less
often interested or involved in politics, less often feel they can af-
fect political events, and are less often regular voters than are





SOCIAL MOBILITY, PREJUDICE, AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
The literature on social mobility is full of suggestions that
the mobile are less secure or less well integrated in their social
environment than are the non-mobile. This presumed insecurity of
the mobile has been said to be reflected in hostility toward minority
groups, reduced concern for the rights of others, lower rates of
participation in voluntary organizations, lower rates of union member-
ship, and dissatisfaction with society and their place in it. "While
evidence of varied scope and quality has been offered in support of
these generalizations, varying sample bases and differing definitions
of mobility make it difficult to determine their validity for the
mobile as a whole.
This chapter offers data bearing on several kinds of attitude
in which the mobile have been said to differ from the non-mobile.
Since all of the data are from the same source, handled in the same
manner, and subject to the same criteria of mobility, generalization
is easier and it is possible to determine whether varying results
reflect different issue orientations rather than simply different
sample bases.
Most of the questions treated in this chapter are of the
kind to which Lipset's term "noneconomic liberalism" was applied
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in Chapter VII. As will be seen, however, not all of these non-
economic issues fit easily on the same liberal -conservative dimension.
The race issue in particular seems not to share the same attitude
distribution with other noneconomic issues.
Attitudes of the mobile toward minority groups and the rights
of others are examined in this chapter in terms of attitudes toward
Negroes getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, toward school
desegregation, and toward rights of government employees. The member-
ship rates of the mobile in voluntary organizations and in unions are
compared with those of the non-mobile. The general orientation of the
mobile toward society is examined by comparing them with the non-mobile
in terms of trusting or distrusting groups and on several expressions
of attitude which reflect satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their
social situation.
Fair Treatment of Negroes in Jobs and
Housing
One of the issues of noneconomic liberalism specifically
mentioned by Iipset is that of race relations. It is Lipset's thesis
that on noneconomic issues, of which race relations is an example,
those of high status are more tolerant than those of low status. If
racial prejudice is associated with status there are grounds for
suspecting that it may also be associated with mobility. But research
on the relationship between mobility and prejudice has resulted in
Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N. Y.
:
Anchor Books, 1963), p. 318.
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conflicting findings. Various studies have reported that prejudice
2
is: (l) associated with both upward and downward mobility, (2) associ-
r>
ated with downward mobility only, (3) unrelated to mobility except
through the individual's attitude toward mobility, and (U) highest
among those of stable low status and lowest among those of stable
high status, with both upwardly and downwardly mobile in the middle.
Unfortunately the data used here do not include questions
permitting a direct test of racial tolerance. Data are available,
however, on two issues of race relations from which tolerance or
intolerance may be inferred. The first of these is the issue of
whether government should take action to see that Negroes receive
fair treatment in jobs and housing. The second is whether the govern-
ment should take action on the question of school desegregation.
p
Joseph Greenblum and Leonard I. Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility
and Prejudice: A Socio-Psychological Analysis," in Seymour M. Lipset
and Reinhard Bendix (eds.), Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press, 1953), pp. U80-U91.
3
Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, The Dynamics of Prejudice
(New York: Harpers, 1950).
^red B. Silberstein and Melvin Seeman, "Social Mobility and
Prejudice," AJS, LXV, No. 3 (November, 1959), 258-26H.
Melvin M. Turain and Ray C. Collins, Jr., "Status Mobility and
Anomie: A Study in Readiness for Desegregation," British Journal of
Sociology , X, No. 3 (September, 1959), 253-267.
Any inference must be cautious, however. An individual may be
personally tolerant, but against government action to insure that
Negroes get fair treatment because he is against any expansion of govern*
ment activity. Alternatively, a man may be personally intolerant, but
agree with the abstract proposition that Negroes should get fair treat-
ment. In spite of these objections it is reasonable to infer that a
higher proportion of intolerant people will be found among those opposed




To the extent that attitudes on whether the government should
see to it that Negroes receive fair treatment in jobs and housing reflect
racial tolerance the evidence does not support Lipset's thesis that those
of high status are more tolerant. As Table 81 shows, in the professional
and business category 62 per cent of both the status stable and the
upwardly mobile agree that the government should insure fairness, but
an even larger 73 per cent of the status stable blue-collar group take
7
the same stand. Objective mobility appears unrelated to attitudes on
the racial issue in either the professional and business category or
the white-collar category, but in the blue-collar category a strong
relationship is apparent. The downwardly mobile in the blue-collar
category oppose government action to insure fair treatment of Negroes
considerably more often than do the status stable in the same category,
and the difference is statistically significant at a high level.
The same relationship is apparent when subjective mobility is
used as a criterion, as in Table 82. Mobility appears unrelated to
the attitude for the middle class, but in the working class the down-
wardly mobile are more often opposed to government action on behalf
of the Negro than are the status stable. The downwardly mobile, who
in Chapter VII were found to be more liberal than their status stable
peers on noneconomic foreign affairs issues, are less liberal on the
noneconomic issue of race relations.
7
The direction of this difference can probably be better ex-
plained in terms of greater reluctance on the part of high status
individuals to see any kind of expansion of government activity rather
than necessarily indicating greater racial prejudice.
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TABLE 81.—Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair
treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing
Attitude
Head's Occupational Status & Respondents
Professional
and Business White-Collar





strongly k3% k3% kQ% 572 502 632 302 3k% $3% $3%
Agree, but
not very
strongly 19 19 19 lit 25 10 28 23 20 2k
Not sure,
it depends 111 10 8 8 6 11 5 6 7 6
Disagree, but
not very








































35.970 (df : h)
.001
"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing,
the government should see to it that they do.
"
y.
In each case chi-square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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TABLE 82. --Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring
fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
Stable Mobile Mobile StableAttitude'
Agree strongly Wo m k% $w
Agree, but not




very strongly 8 13





















11.081 (df : k)
.05
"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing,
the government should see to it that they do.
"
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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It is to be expected that attitudes on race relations -will
vary with the respondent's place of residence, with Southern residents
being less liberal on the subject. Table 83 reports differences on
attitudes toward fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing by-
regions of the country. Surprisingly, on this particular issue
Southern respondents are not markedly less liberal than non-Southerners.
The principal difference to be noted is that in the South mobility is
apparently unrelated to attitude toward the issue in all occupational
categories, while outside the South the downwardly mobile blue-collar
workers remain markedly less in favor of government action on behalf
of the Negro than their stable peers.
When subjective mobility is controlled by region, as in Table
81;, the upwardly mobile somewhat more often oppose government action
on behalf of the Negro than do the status stable members of the middle
class. In the working class mobility is apparently unrelated to
attitude in the South, but outside the South the downwardly mobile
disagree with the proposal twice as often as do the status stable.
"When attitude is controlled by race, as in Tables 85 and 86,
the result is as would be anticipated. Negroes are virtually unanimous
in believing that the government should act to insure their fair
treatment. Among whites a majority in every group agree that the
government should take such action, but with less unanimity than is
true of Negroes. As before, mobility is related to attitude only in
the case of those of low status, and as before it is the downwardly
mobile who are most apt to disagree. The results for the downwardly mobile
are statistically significant both for objective and subjective mobility.
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TABLE 83.—Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring




Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business White-Collar





Agree 65$ 61* 67$ 70$ 79$ 85$ 59$ 56$ 7# 762
Depends 15 10 6 11 7 2 9 2 5 6
Disagree 21 26 27 19 lit 111 32 U2 21 18
IoT$ 100$ 100$ 100$ 100$ iol$ 100$ loofc 101$ 100$
N 121* 136 U9 27 1U 58 22 81* 309 175
South
Agree 514$ 57$ 65$ 70$ 5o$ U6$ 56$ 59$ 65$ 77$
Depends 13 11 11 33 18 16 6
Disagree 33 33 2U 30 5o 21 liU 23 19 18
loofc IoT$ lOOfc 100$ 100^ 100$ 100& 100$ 100$ 101$












15.56U (df : 2)
.001













Southern sample includes interviews in Maryland, Washington,
D.C., Kentucky, Arkansas, Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, North Carolina,
Georgia, Tennessee, Florida, Virginia, South Carolina, and Mississippi.
"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and
housing, the government should see to it that they do."
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source ; 1956, I960.
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TABLE 8iu—Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring




Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status






























































Southern sample includes interviews in Maryland, Washington,
D.C., Kentucky, Arkansas, Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, North Carolina,
Georgia, Tennessee, Florida, Virginia, South Carolina, Mississippi.
"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and
housing, the government should see to it that they do."
Data Source ; 1956, I960.
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TABLE 85. --Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair
treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing, by race
Race
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
Mobility Category
and and Business White-Coll ar Blue-Collar
Attitude3 SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM S3 ex-F
White
Agree 612 622 652 692 732 712 552 552 702 712
Depends 11* 11 8 9 7 12 5 6 7 7
Disagree 25 28 27 23 20 17 39 39 23 22
1002 1012 1002 1012 Ioo2 1002 ~992 1002 1002 1002
N 168 180 83 35 15 77 38 100 329 228
Negro
Agree 100^ 1002 1002 1002 ioo2 1002 1002 832 962 982
Depends h 2
Disagree 17
1002 1002 1002 ioo2 ioo2 ioo2 1002 ioo2 1002 1002
N k 2 3 l i 5 l 6 U8 5U
Statistical Measures
White









0.9U8 (df : k)
NS











"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing,
the government should see to it that they do.
"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Not computed because of small number involved.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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TABLE 86.—Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring




Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status






































12.605 (df : U)
.02
7.U85 (df : 2)
.05
Probability





"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing,
the government should see to it that they do."
Not computed because of low cell frequencies.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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Since the evidence on attitudes toward government action to
insure fair treatment of Negroes does not support Upset's contention
that those of high status are more liberal on the subject of race
relations, one further relationship is worth examination. Lipset
argues that the liberalism of those of high status on noneconomic
issues is due to "education, general sophistication, and probably
ft
to a certain extent psychic security. " The relationship between
education and attitude may be examined by controlling for education.
This is done in Tables 87 and 88.
Neither table affords clear evidence that tolerance increases
with education any more than it seems to increase with status. For
the downwardly mobile the evidence of Table 87 is that for those who
have been downwardly mobile into the blue-collar group tolerance
decreases at higher educational levels. The downwardly mobile blue-
collar workers with more than twelve years of education are the only
group in the entire table with less than £0 per cent of respondents
agreeing that the government should insure fair treatment of Negroes.
Essentially the same thing is true for subjective mobility, where the
group most opposed to government action is that of downwardly mobile
members of the working class with more than twelve years of education.
For both objective and subjective mobility the downwardly mobile are




. , p. 318.
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TABLE 87.—Objective mobility and attitude tovjard government insuring fair
treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing, by education
Years of Head f s Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Education Professional
and and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
Attitude3 SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Low (0-8)
Agree n% 932 6$% 1002 02 782 672 562 802 832
Depends 6 11 17 5 5
Disagree 29 7 29 11 33 28 15 12
1002 loojg 1002
'
1002 ~% ioo2 1002 TbT2 1002 1002
N 7 ik 17 7 9 6 18 111 136
Med. (9-12)
Agree 552 632 682 602 752 812 612 652 702 702
Depends 21 7 13 10 13 8 11 2 8 6
Disagree 2k 30 ,19 30 13 11 28 33 21 23
100& 1002 1002 1002 1012 Too2 1002 1002 ~99% "992
N 33 67 31 10 37 18 51 203 115
High (12+)
Agree 632 572 662 652 752 61$ 502 U62 692 692
Depends 13 11* 5 10 Ik 5 5 9
Disagree 2U 29 29 25 25 22 50 U9 27 22
To52 1002 ioo2 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002 1012 ioo2


































































Sum of X2 for edu-
cation groups
Probability













"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing,
the government should see to it that they do.
"
\En each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.

275
TABLE 88.—Subjective mobility and attitude toward government insuring





Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status


































































































Sum of X2 for
education groups
Probability












"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in Jobs and housing,
the government should see to it that they do.
"
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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Joseph Greenblum and Leonard Pearlin indicate that prejudice
is linked with subjective class identification. They report that the
upwardly mobile individual who claims middle class membership and is
presumably less secure about his status tends to be more prejudiced
9
than the upwardly mobile individual who claims working class status.
This relationship may be examined in Table 89, where the attitude of
the objectively mobile is controlled by subjective class.
If a "depends" or "disagree" answer to the question of whether
government should see to it that Negroes get fair treatment in jobs
and housing is taken as indicating some degree of racial prejudice,
the data of Table 89 offer some support to the Greenblum-Pearlin
hypothesis. The upwardly mobile who claim middle class membership
are somewhat more often prejudiced than those who claim working class
membership. Of the upwardly mobile who place themselves in the middle
class, hZ per cent of the professional and business category and 38
per cent of the white-collar category may be classified as prejudiced,
compared with 32 and 19 per cent respectively for those who claim
working class membership. But if the examination of Table 89 is pursued
further it may be seen that the tendency is not confined to the upwardly
mobile. In each occupational status and each mobility category those
who claim middle class membership are more often prejudiced than are
those who claim working class membership. There is no indication that
this tendency is any more marked for the mobile than for the status stable.
9Greenblum and Pearlin, loc. cit .
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TABLE 89.—Objective mobility and attitude toward government insuring fair
treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing, by subjective class




and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Middle Class
Agree 58$ 58$ 60$ 67$ 71$ 61$ 53$ U8$ 61$ 67$
Depends 16 11 9 8 19 6 6 8 11
Disagree 26 31 31 25 29 19 la \6 32 22
100$ 100$ 100$ 100$ 100$ ~99% 100$ ~99$ 101$ 100$
N 137 117 35 2k 7 36 17 31 79 36
Working Class
1
Agree 71$ 68$ 71$ 77$ 78$ 81$ .57$ 61$ 76$ 78$
Depends 6 9 8 8 11 5 5 6 7 6
Disagree 19 23 21 15 11 1U 38 33 17 16
~% 100$ 100$ 100$ 100$ 100$ 100^ 100& 100$ 100$




































Attitude and Business White-Coll ar Blue-Collar




U) 3.509 (df: 8) 10.U71 (df: k)
Probability- NS NS .05
Sum of X2 for
entire table 16.0^8 (df: 16)
Probability NS
"There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social
classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or to the
working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of these
classes? Which one?"
"If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing,
the government should see to it that they do.
"
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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With subjective class controlled there is little difference
between the mobile and the status stable in either the professional
and business or the white-collar category in Table 89. In the blue-
collar category the downwardly mobile are somewhat more often prejudiced
than the status stable within both the subjectively middle class and
subjectively working class groups, although the difference is statistically
significant only in the latter case.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the evidence examined in
this section. First, attitudes on the issue of whether the government
should see that Negroes get fair treatment in jobs and housing are
not closely related to social status. Second, upward mobility is at
best only weakly related to attitudes on the issue, but there is a
clear association between downward mobility and attitude. Those who
are downwardly mobile into the blue-collar or working class categories
are much less likely to favor government action to insure fair treat-
ment of Negroes than are those of stable low status. Finally, there
is a relationship between tolerance and subjective class, but it is
not confined just to the mobile as Greenblum and Pearlin suggest. When
objective status is held constant, middle class identifiers in all
status and mobility categories are less in favor of government action
on behalf of Negroes than are working class identifiers.
School Desegregation
An issue closely related to that of fair treatment of Negroes
in jobs and housing is the issue of government intervention to enforce
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school desegregation. As before, the data from the 1956 and i960
elections reveal no evidence that those of high status are any more
consistently liberal on the issue than are those of low status. In
Table 90, k2 per cent of the status stable in the professional and
business category think the government should stay out of the de-
segregation issue compared with kO per cent of the status stable in
the blue-collar category who take the same stand.
Attitude patterns on the school desegregation issue are quite
similar to those already reported for the jobs and housing issue. In
Table 90 no relationship is apparent between upward mobility and
attitude. In the blue-collar category, however, f>U per cent of the
downwardly mobile believe that the government should stay out of the
school desegregation issue, compared with UO per cent of the status
stable. The difference is statistically significant.
When subjective mobility is used as the measure of mobility,
as in Table 91, there is again no difference between the status stable
and the upwardly mobile in the middle class. In the working class £1
per cent of the downwardly mobile think the government should stay out
of the school desegregation issue, compared to U6 per cent of the status
stable. The difference, though small and not statistically significant,
is in the same direction as for all other instances of race relations
examined.
Attitudes toward school desegregation are controlled by education
in Tables 92 and 93. For objective mobility, as shown in Table 92, there
is not much difference between attitudes of the mobile and the status
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TABLE 90.—Objective mobility and attitude toward government's role in
school desegregation
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F BM SS ex-FAttitude'
Agree h2% IM 5c# 111* Urf \&% 572 51$ hot $L%
Not sure, it
depends 8 7 13 7 9 9 6 6 6
Disagree 50 50 38 51 56 he 3k UO ^ U2
ioo# IoT£ TJJL% 1% ioo£ ioo£ lOOjg 1005& IoT# "99^


















7.580 (df : 2)
.05
"The government in Washington should stay out of the question of
whether white and colored children go to the same school."
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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Agree k9% k9% SIS U6£
Not sure, it
depends 7 7 6 8
Disagree hh liU U3 k$
ioo& Too% Ioo£ ~99%















"The government in Washington should stay out of the question of
whether white and colored children go to the same school."
Data Source ; 1956, I960.
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TABLE 92.~Objective mobility and attitude toward government's role in
school desegregation, by education
Years of Head f s Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Education Professi onal
and and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
Attitude3 SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Low (0-8)
Agree 292 50^ 532 292 02 562 1*32 552 U32 532
Depends 29 7 18 11* 11 lU 9 U
Disagree U3 1*3 29 57 33 U3 U5 1*8 1*3
ioS ibo"2 ioo2 1002 02 lbofc 1002 1002 ioo2 10Q2
N 7 lU 17 7 9 7 20 110 11*3
Med. (9-12)
Agree H82 1*22 672 1*22 Uii2 382 572 522 392 U82
Depends 3 5 9 10 5 k 5 9
Disagree 1*8 53 2i* 58 56 51 38 1*1* 57 1*1*
~99% 1002 ioo2 100& ioo2 1% loofc ioo"2 ioT2 Ioi2
N 31 62 33 12 9 39 a 1*8 213 117
High (12+)
Agree i*i2 1*1*2 3h2 1*52 1*32 U92 632 572 382 572
Depends 8 8 13 9 8 11 n 3 7
Disagree $1 U9 53 1*5 57 1*3 26 32 58 37
Ioo2 ioi2 ioo2 ""992 ioo2 ioo2 1002 ioo2 "992 1012


































































Sum of X2 for edu-
cation groups 2.61*2 (df
:
Probability NS











"The government in Washington should stay out of the question of
whether white and colored children go to the same school."
In each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.

286
TABLE 93. —Subjective mobility and attitude toward government's role in





Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status




























































































1.582 (df : 2)
NS
Sum of X2 for
education groups
Probability













"The government in Washington should stay out of the question of
whether white and colored children go to the same school."
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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stable in either the professional and business or 'white-collar cate-
gories at any educational level. In the blue-collar category the
downwardly mobile more often agree that the government should stay
out of the school desegregation question than do the status stable
at every educational level, although the difference is statistically
significant only at the high education level.
For subjective mobility, as reported in Table 93, differences
between the subjectively mobile and subjectively status stable are
small in both the middle and working classes. The largest percentage
difference is again between the well-educated downwardly mobile and
the status stable of low status, but even here the difference does
not approach statistical significance.
Thus on both the issues of whether the government should insure
fair treatment of Negroes in jobs and housing and the issue of whether
the government should act on school desegregation the downwardly
mobile are less liberal than are their status peers. This is in
contrast to the earlier finding that they were more liberal than
those of stable status on noneconomic issues of foreign affairs. It
is necessary to examine the relationship between downward mobility and
other types of noneconomic issues before any conclusion can be reached
on whether the downwardly mobile exhibit a generalized pattern of




Rights of Government Employees
Noneconomic issues are not confined to race relations.
Evidence is available which bears on an issue of individual rights of
another sort. In 1956, at a time when Senator McCarthy's charges of
communism in government were still a fresh memory, respondents were
asked to agree or disagree with the statement "The government ought
to fire any government worker who is accused of being a communist
even though they don't prove it." Responses to this question are
recorded in Tables 9k and 95
•
The pattern of responses to the question conforms to that for
Lipset's noneconomic liberalism. Those of high status more often dis-
agreed with the proposal to fire government employees subject to
unproved accusations than did those of low status. The pattern is
thus similar to that for foreign affairs issues—those of high status
are more often liberals, those of low status comparatively more often
conservatives.
The relationship of mobility to this dimension of noneconomic
liberalism is also similar to that found in the case of foreign affairs,
In the professional and business category of Table 9h only 12 per cent
of the status stable want to see government employees fired on the
basis of unproved charges, compared with 22 per cent of the upwardly
mobile. In the white-collar category no relationship between mobility
and attitude is apparent. In the blue-collar category the downwardly
mobile are somewhat more liberal than the status stable, 79 per cent
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TABLE 9U. —Objective mobility and attitude toward rights of government
employees
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business White-Coll ar Blue-Collar
















5.831 (df : 2)
NS
12 11
75 73 72 59
ico£ Ioo2 ioo2 io52









8.78U (df : 2)
.02
*3
"The government ought to fire any government worker who is accused
of being a communist even though they don't prove it."
















Agree 20$ 25$ 28$ 27$
Not sure, it depends 7 11 5 9
Disagree 73 65 67 6U
ioo£ 101$ 106? 100$
N U03 167 75 766
Statistical Measures












"The government ought to fire any government worker who is






of the mobile expressing disagreement as opposed to 68 per cent of the
status stable. The difference is just short of statistical significance
for the professional and business category, but is significant in the
blue-collar category.
For subjective mobility, as reported in Table 95>, 2$ per cent
of the upwardly mobile middle class would fire accused employees, an
attitude shared by 20 per cent of the status stable. In the working
class sample there is no relationship between mobility and attitude
on the issue.
Attitudes toward firing accused government employees are
controlled by education in Tables 96 and 97. In Table 96 the upwardly
mobile in the professional and business category are somewhat more
willing to fire government employees arbitrarily than are the status
stable at each educational level. In the white-collar category no
clear pattern is evident. In the blue-collar category, however,
differences between the downwardly mobile and the status stable wash
out at the two lower educational levels. On this issue the greater
tolerance of the downwardly mobile is confined to the high education
group—the same individuals who were least often tolerant on racial
issues. Apparently their good education and their early socialization
influence them toward a liberal position on noneconomic issues of
foreign affairs and civil liberties but do not prevent them from being
racially intolerant.
In Table 97 differences between the subjectively mobile and
the subjectively status stable approach statistical significance only
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Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
Mobility Category
and and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
Attitude a SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Low (0-8)
Agree 02 252 172 332 02 02 U32 352 282 302
Depends 17 8 Ik 7 9
Disagree 83 75 75 67 100 U3 65 65 61
loofc 1062 1002 1002 02 1002 1002 1002 1002 Ibo2
N 6 12 12 6 7 7 17 9k 105
Med. (9-12)
Agree 182 282 252 252 lW 202 392 282 192 272
Depends Ik 5 18 lU 10 6 11 6
Disagree 68 67 57 75 71 70 56 73 70 67
Io6]S loofc 1002 Ioo2 "992 ioo2 1012 1012 Ioo2 100^
N 28 58 28 8 7 30 18 Uo 172 96
High (12+)
Agree 112 182 182 172 252 162 82 32 182 322
Depends 6 7 3 6 16 17 3 16 k
Disagree 82 7U 79 78 75 68 75 9k 67 6k
~99% 1s% 1002 T5T2 1002 1002 1002 1002 ioi2 1002




























































Sum of X2 for edu-
cation groups
Probability













"The government ought to fire any government worker who is accused
of being a communist even though they don't prove it."










Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status




























































































1.797 (df : 2)
NS
Sum of X2 for
education groups
Probability








3.360 (df : 6)
NS
"The government ought to fire any government worker who is accused




in the case of those with little education who classify themselves
as middle class, where UU per cent of the upwardly mobile would fire
accused employees, compared with only 2k per cent of the status
stable.
It may be concluded that for both objective and subjective
mobility differences between the attitudes of the mobile and the
stable on this issue are at least partially due to differences in
education. The pattern found here for this non-racial noneconomic
issue differs from that found on racial noneconomic issues, and is
similar to that reported earlier for foreign affairs issues. As is
the case for foreign affairs, the attitudes of both the upwardly and
downwardly mobile may be accounted for by a socialization hypothesis:
that the mobile are influenced both by the attitudes held by others
in their status of origin and in their new status, and as a result
show an attitude distribution intermediate between that typical of
the status stable at high and at low levels. The upwardly mobile are
less liberal on the issue than are those of stable high status, the
downwardly mobile more liberal than those of stable low status.
Group Membership
Several previous studies have examined the relationship of
mobility to membership in organizations. Works on mobility and trade
union membership have reported that the downwardly mobile are less
likely to be union members than are non-mobile workers, and that
upwardly mobile non-manual workers are ;more likely to belong to a
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union than are the non-mobile. Other work on mobility and membership
in a variety of types of organization suggests that the upwardly mobile
have a rate of participation about the same or only slightly less than
others of the same status, while the downwardly mobile have a somewhat
lower rate of participation than their status equals.
Two formal hypotheses are to be tested here: 3.2—Both the
upwardly and downwardly mobile less often belong to voluntary organi-
zations than do the non-mobile at the same status level ; and 3 .3—The
downwardly mobile less often belong to trade unions than do the non-
mobile at the same status level .
Data to test hypothesis 3.2 are available from the 1952 study,
as reported in Table 98. In the professional and business category
67 per cent of the status stable belong to two or more groups or
organizations, while only Ijl per cent of the upwardly mobile belong
to as many. In the white-collar category, probably due to the small
number of cases, no clear pattern emerges. In the blue-collar category
31 per cent of the status stable belong to two or more organizations,
compared with only 22 per cent of the downwardly mobile. The evidence
Seymour Martin Lipset and Joan Gordon, "Mobility and Trade Union
Membership," in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), op. cit. , pp. H91-500; Richard
F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Union Membership in Detroit: A
Replication," Social Forces
.
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (October, 1959), 69-71.
Morris Janowitz, "Consequences of Social Mobility in the United
States," Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology , 1956,
Vol. Ill, 193; Richard F. Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Membership
in Formal Voluntary Associations: .A Note on Research," ASR, Vol. XXIV,
No. 6 (August, 1959), 8U6-8U8.
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TABLE 98. --Objective mobility and membership in groups or organizations
Number of Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Groups to Professional
"Which Respond- and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
ent Belongsa SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F IM SS ex-F
None 111* 25$ 30$ 33% 5C# 26£ 30% kW 332 h3%
One 19 30 30 25 53 30 33 35 31
Two or more 67 hi ko U2 50 21 UO 22 31 26
100$ 100$ 100% 10C# 100& 160% ioc# ~9% ~9§% 100$






















Total number of groups or organizations (formal and informal) to
which R belongs. (Question asked only in post-election study of about
one-third of the respondents.)
u




supports hypothesis 3.2 in both the professional and business and the
blue-collar categories, though statistically significant only in the
former case.
Data on union membership are reported in Tables 99 and 100.
Using objective mobility as the criterion of mobility, as in Table 99,
in the professional and business group the upwardly mobile slightly
more often report union membership than do the status stable. The
difference, though not statistically significant, is noteworthy
because as noted above, the upwardly mobile are less often members
of organizations in general. In the white-collar category the status
stable report no union memberships at all, which accords with the
generally conservative orientation of the group. In the blue-collar
category the data support hypothesis 3.3« The downwardly mobile report
union membership in ijl per cent of cases, while 53 per cent of the
status stable are union members.
The situation is different in the case of subjective mobility.
In the middle class portion of Table 100 the subjectively upwardly
mobile are more frequently union members than are the status stable.
But in the working class the status stable are less often union members
than are the subjectively do-wnwardly mobile, a difference opposite to
that hypothesized, though not statistically significant. As noted
before, classification as subjectively downwardly mobile implies
acceptance of working class status, because it depends on class self-
identification. Thus the reduced rate of union membership of the
downwardly mobile depends on their rejection of working class status.
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TABLE 99.—Objective mobility and union membership, males only-
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
















1.000 (df : 1)
NS
83 100 78 69 59 U7 6l
T6o% ioc# loofc loo^ loog ioc# ioc#







"Does anyone in this household belong to a labor union? (IF YES)
"Who is it. that belongs? " Table is in terms of respondent's membership or
non-membership only.
i_
In each case chi square computation emits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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R. belongs 10% 22£ ko% y&
R. doesn't belong 90 78 60 65
loofc Ioo# 100# 100&
















"Does anyone in this household belong to a labor union? (IF
YES) Who is it that belongs?" Table is in terms of respondent's member-
ship or non-membership only.
.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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"Where membership in the working class is accepted, the downwardly mobile
are union members as often as are those who inherit their class member-
ship.
Both hypotheses 3.2 and 3.3 are supported in the case of
objective mobility. The mobile are less often members of groups or
organizations than the non-mobile at the same status level, and the
upwardly mobile are more often union members, the downwardly mobile
less often union members than others at the same status levels. In
the case of subjective mobility, however, evidence was not available
to test group membership, and in the case of union membership the
findings for the working class were opposite to those hypothesized,
a difference explained in terms of the influence of subjective class
identification. Thus the hypotheses may be accepted in the case of
objective mobility, but not in the case of subjective mobility.
Groups Trusted or Distrusted
The lower rate of participation by the mobile in groups and
organizations is presumably evidence that they are less closely
integrated in their social environments than are the non-mobile.
Pitirim Sorokin suggests that "Mobility favors skepticism, cynicism,
. . . diminishes intimacy and increases psycho-social isolation and
12loneliness of individuals. " One means of examining the prevalence
of skepticism and cynicism among the mobile is to inquire into their
attitude of trust or distrust toward other groups in the society.
12




The evidence presented in Table 101 for objective mobility does
not reveal any marked tendency for the mobile to be less willing to
express trust in groups than are the non-mobile. In all three
occupational categories the proportion of respondents trusting various
numbers of groups is relatively uniform.
For subjective mobility, as reported in Table 102, both the
upwardly and downwardly mobile are somewhat less likely to express
trust in groups than are the status stable, although the difference
is statistically significant only for the middle class.
Perhaps a more direct test of cynicism is the number of groups
distrusted. Table 103 reports the numbers of groups distrusted by
respondents in the various objective mobility categories. As before,
little difference exists between the mobile and the non-mobile, though
in the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile are somewhat more
likely to report distrusting two or more groups than are the status
stable. Even here, however, the difference is not statistically
significant.
Subjective mobility and number of groups trusted is reported
in Table 10U. Both the subjectively upwardly and downwardly mobile,
who somewhat less often express trust in groups than do the status
stable also somewhat less often express distrust. The mobile are
thus less likely to express either strong negative or strong positive
feelings about groups.
The evidence on numbers of groups trusted or distrusted does
not reveal any marked difference between the mobile and the non-mobile.
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Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business White-Collar




None 61* 72$ m 65$ 60$ 6It$ 69$ 51$ 50$ U5$
One 17 7 25 26 30 25 6 18 26 25
Two 12 12 13 6 13 22 13 17
Three or more 7 9 17 9 10 6 13 8 10 lU
100$ Tools ~99$ 100$ ioo£ 101$ 101$ ~99% "99$ 101$



















"In election campaigns, different groups work for one candidate
or another. Are there any groups on this list (GIVE CARD) that you
particularly trust—that is, would you be more likely to vote for candidates
they recommend? Which group? Are there any groups on the list that you
don't trust, that is, would you be more likely to vote against candidates
that they recommend? Which groups?"








Respondents Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status
































"In election campaigns, different groups work for one candidate
or another. Are there any groups on this list (GIVE CARD) that you
particularly trust—that is, would you be more likely to vote for
candidates they recommend? Which group? Are there any groups on the
list that you don't trust, that is, would you be more likely to vote








Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business White-Collar




None 65% 70$ 58% 70# 10% 60* 63% fiL* 682 67%
One 16 12 25 9 20 23 19 18 21 15
Two Ik 8 12 17 10 9 16 12 8 12
Three of more k 9 6 u 8 3 8 3 6
~99% ~% 101% locfc 10® 100$ lOlfc "99% 100% 100$
















3.302 (df : 3)
NS
"In election campaigns, different groups work for one candidate
or another. Are there any groups on this list (GIVE CARD) that you
particularly trust—that is, would you be more likely to vote for candidates
they recommend? "Which group? Are there any groups on the list that you
don't trust, that is, would you be more likely to vote against candidates
that they recommend? "Which groups?"
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None $1% $1% 16% 61$
One 28 2k 22
Two 13 11 2U 9
Three or more 8 8 $
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"In election campaigns, different groups work for one candidate
or another. Are there any groups on this list (GIVE CARD) that you
particularly trust—that is, would you be more likely to vote for
candidates they recommend? Which group? Are there any groups on the
list that you don't trust, that is, would you be more likely to vote




If the mobile as a group tend to be suspicious, cynical, and skeptical
it is not revealed in these data. While there is same suggestion that
the mobile may hold themselves somewhat more withdrawn from strong
feelings about groups than do their non-mobile peers, the difference
is apparently of small magnitude.
Satisfaction—Dissatisfaction
Another approach to the question of whether the mobile are
more isolated from society and unhappy with their place in society
is to examine their response to questions designed to determine their
general level of satisfaction with their lives. Data on several such
questions are reported in this section.
In the I960 survey respondents were asked: "Do you feel that
you are the kind of person who gets his share of bad luck or do you
feel that you have mostly good luck?" The results for objective
mobility are reported in Table 105>. Those of high status seem to
find their luck better than do those of lower status, but in none of
the three occupational categories do very large differences exist
between the mobile and non-mobile. Such differences as do exist are
in the direction of the upwardly mobile in the business and professional
category somewhat more often feeling they have bad luck than do the
status stable, while in the blue-collar category the downwardly mobile
find their luck somewhat better than do the status stable.
When subjective mobility is used as a measure as in Table 106,
differences remain small. In the middle class sample there is virtually
no difference between the response of the mobile and the non-mobile.
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TABLE 105.--'Objective mobility and feeling of being lucky
&, —=, ' .
•
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business White-Collar Blue-Collar
Attitudea SS UM ex-F DM SS UM ex-F EM SS ex-F
Mostly good
luck 81$ 76$ 712 672 672 782 662 672 612 652
Depends, both k 5 8 5 11 2 7 U 6 8
Bad luck 12 19 21 29 22 20 28 28 33 27
100$ 1002 1002 1012 1002 1002 lbT2 ~99% 1002 1002














0.78U (df : 2)
NS
"Do you feel that you are the kind of person who gets his share
of bad luck or do you feel that you have mostly good luck?"




TABLE 106.—Subjective mobility and feeling of being lucky-
Respondent's Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status






























"Do you feel that you are the kind of person who gets his share




In the working class sample the downwardly mobile again somewhat more
often feel that they have good luck than do the status stable.
Another question asked in the I960 survey was "Some people feel
like other people push them around a good bit. Others feel that they
run their own lives pretty much the way they want to. How is it with
you?" Responses to this question in the various objective mobility
categories are reported in Table 107. As was the case for feelings
of being lucky, there is little difference between the mobile and non-
mobile on feelings of being pushed around. The status stable in the
•white-collar category show a differential from the mobile, but with
only nine respondents in the group the difference is not significant.
In the blue-collar group the downwardly mobile somewhat less often
feel pushed around than do the status stable, though this difference
too is well short of statistical significance.
The pattern is the same for subjective mobility, as reported
in Table 108. There is virtually no difference in the middle class
sample, while in the working class sample there is a small difference
in the direction of the status stable more often feeling pushed around
than do the downwardly mobile.
While it might be expected that there would be an association
between mobility and belief in the availability of opportunity, the
data reported in Table 109 do not reveal one. In the professional
and business category 91 per cent of both the status stable and the
upwardly mobile think that there is opportunity to get ahead in America.
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TABLE 107.—Objective mobility and feeling of being pushed around
Attitudea
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business White-Collar




Run o-wn lives 9\& 92% 92% 91% 78# 90% 90% 96% 90% 87$
Depends, both 3 h 2 5 11 3 1 2
Get pushed
around 3 U 6 5 11 10 6 h 9 11
100$ Too% T66% IraS 1002 100^ ~99% Tob~% 100& 1CX&















1.579 (df : 2)
NS
a
"Some people feel like other people push them around a good bit.
Others feel that they run their own lives pretty much the way they want
to. How is it with you?"




TABLE 108.—Subjective mobility and feeling of being pushed around
Respondents Subjective Class and Mobility Category
Middle Class Working Class
Status Upwardly Downwardly Status















ld 1.8^7 (df: 2)
Probability NS









12.702 (df : k)
.02
.01
"Some people feel like other people push them around a good bit.
Others feel that they run their own lives pretty much the way they want
to. How is it with you?"





TABLE 109.—Objective mobility and belief in opportunity in America
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's Mobility Category
Professional
and Business "White-Collar Blue-Collar
Attitude 3S UM ex-F m SS UM ex-F DM SS ex-F
Opp ortunity—
yes 1$% 71* 11% 78* 71* 72* 71* 65* 67* 62*
Opportunity-
yes, quali-
fied 16 20 15 18 12 17 21 32 21 21
Pro—Con 1 2 1 6 3 2 3
Little oppor-
tunity—no,
qualified 5 5 k 2 12 7 9 3 6 6
Little oppor-
tunity—no 2 1 2 2 2 U 7
"99% ~% "99$ 100* 101* 10T* 101* 100* Too* "99*
















3. 723 (df: k)
NS
"Some people say there's not much opportunity in America, today
—that the average man doesn't have much chance to really get ahead. Others
say there's plenty of opportunity, and anyone -who works hard can go as far
as he wants. How do you feel about this?"




In the "white-collar category the status stable may be some"what more
pessimistic about the availability of opportunity than are either
the upwardly or downwardly mobile, but the difference is small and
not statistically significant. In the blue-collar category a full
97 per cent of the downwardly mobile think that there is opportunity
in America, a sentiment with which 88 per cent of the status stable
are in agreement. The data give no indication that upward mobility
is associated with optimism about chances or that downward mobility
is associated with pessimism, as might be assumed. The downwardly
mobile are not only not pessimistic, but more often than any other
group believe that opportunity exists in .America.
One final question is available for the examination of the
relative satisfaction levels of the mobile. In the 1956 and I960
surveys respondents were asked how well satisfied they were with
the way they were getting along financially. The results for
objective mobility are recorded in Table 110. In the professional
and business category the mobile and the status stable express virtually
identical levels of satisfaction. In the white-collar category the
upwardly mobile are perhaps the most satisfied, but in view of the
sample sizes the differences are not large. In the blue-collar
category differences are again quite small, but the downwardly mobile
may be a bit more satisfied with finances than are the status stable.
The results for subjective mobility are somewhat different,
as reported in Table 111. In the middle class sample the status stable
are better satisfied with their finances than are the upwardly mobile,
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TABLE 110.—Objective mobility and satisfaction with financial situation
Financial
Satisfaction
Head's Occupational Status & Respondent's
Professional
and Business White-Collar




Satisfied k9% 1|B* m 36* 2Q% k2% h3% m UOjg Uo£
More-or-less
satisfied 35 37 ko U5 61 U6 37 36 39 111
Not satisfied
at all 16 1U 13 19 11 12 20 a a 19
100# ~% 1012 loofc 10C& loofc 100& 1VL% 100$ ioo£



















'We are also interested in how people are getting along financially
these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say
that you are pretty well satisfied, more-or-less satisfied, or not satis-
fied at all?"
Jin each case chi square computation omits the ex-farm category.
Data Source : 1956, I960.
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Satisfied 5256 htt 33$ 37$
More-or-less
satisfied 3U U3 la ia
Not satisfied
at all 1U 15 26 21
100$ 10C# 10C# ~99%













"We are also interested in how people are getting along financially
these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that
you are pretty well satisfied, more-or-less satisfied, or not satisfied
at all?"
Data Source: 1956, I960.
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and the difference is statistically significant. In the working class
sample differences are much smaller, but the downwardly mobile are
somewhat less satisfied than are the status stable.
The principal conclusion to be drawn from the evidence presented
in this section is that there isn't very much difference between the
mobile and the non-mobile with regard to their levels of satisfaction
with various aspects of their lives. While differences are not con-
sistent, they seem to incline in the direction of the upwardly mobile
being somewhat less satisfied than their non-mobile peers, while the
downwardly mobile, somewhat surprisingly, seem to be a bit more satis-
fied with at least some aspects of their lives than are the status
stable at the same level. Quite certainly none of the evidence here
supports a contention that the mobile are much more likely to be
bitter, dissatisfied, or alienated from society than are the non-mobile.
Conclusion
With the exception of attitudes on race relations the findings
of the chapter are largely that there is not much difference between
the mobile and the non-mobile with regard to their adjustment to society.
On the two issues of race relations there was no difference at high
status levels between the mobile and the non-mobile, but at low status
levels the downwardly mobile less often were in favor of government
action to insure fair treatment of Negroes than were those of stable
low status. This is noteworthy because it is a reversal of the re-
lationship on other kinds of noneconomic issues. On both foreign
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affairs and the issue of protection of rights of accused government
employees the downwardly mobile are more liberal than their status
stable peers.
On membership in organizations, both the upwardly and the
downwardly mobile tend to belong to fewer organizations than do their
equals of stable status. The downwardly mobile less often belong to
unions than do status stable blue-collar workers, while at higher
status levels the upwardly mobile somewhat more often belong to unions
than do the status stable at the same level.
The lesser participation of the mobile in groups is apparently
not a reflection of any very deep-seated dissatisfaction with society.
While the upwardly mobile slightly more often report bad luck or dis-
satisfaction with finances than do others of high status, they do not
seem to feel any more pushed around or distrustful of groups in the
society. The downwardly mobile, while a bit less satisfied with
finances, tend to feel luckier, more in charge of their own lives,
and to see more opportunity than do those of stable low status.
Thus although the mobile may be considered less well integrated
in society to the extent that they have a lower rate of participation
in groups and organizations than do the non-mobile, with the exception
of the attitudes of the downwardly mobile on race relations there is
little evidence in these data that the mobile are any more bitter,





The ever-increasing polarization of society into politically-
antagonistic classes predicted by Karl Marx has not come to pass. The
influence of social mobility on the political system is almost certainly
one of the most important reasons that Marx's prediction failed. Al-
though many authors have suggested that social mobility tends to reduce
status polarization in politics, little previous empirical evidence
has existed to support this view.
As noted in Chapter III, there is implicit in the suggestion
that mobility reduces status polarization an assumption about the
effect of mobility upon individual political behavior. Social mobility
can operate to reduce political polarization only if the mobile
individual's political behavior is less status polarized than is that
of the non-mobile individual, or if his presence in a new social
position somehow reduces the status polarization of those around him,
or both. The evidence, although more directly applicable to the first
point than the second, suggests that mobility operates in both ways.
Before discussing the effects of mobility upon the political system in
any detail, it is worthwhile to review briefly some of the more





Perhaps the best characterization of the upwardly mobile is
that in many ways their transition from one status level to another is
incomplete. "Whether objective or subjective mobility is used as a
measure the upwardly mobile average less income and less education
than do those of stable high status, and are more often of the Catholic
faith. In each instance the upwardly mobile group is intermediate
between those of stable high status and those of stable low status.
The upwardly mobile care less about politics and are less
likely to vote than are those of stable high status. They less often
feel they understand or can affect politics than do others of high
status. But though less interested and involved in politics than
are those of stable high status, the upwardly mobile are more interested
and involved than are those of stable low status. Thus the mobile again
are intermediate between those of stable high status and those of stable
low status.
On political preferences, too, the upwardly mobile display an
intermediate distribution. They are more often Democrats than are
those of stable high status, but less often Democrats than are those
of stable low status. On political issues they are somewhat more often
liberals on economic questions than the non-mobile of high status, but
less often than the non-mobile of low status. On noneconomic issues
they are less liberal than the non-mobile of high status on foreign
affairs and government employee rights, but show about the same
attitude distribution as the non-mobile on rights of Negroes. With
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the exception of the issue of Negro rights their position is again
intermediate between the non-mobile of high and low status.
Finally, on a series of questions intended to determine how
well integrated the mobile are in their social environments the upwardly
mobile report themselves less often participants in voluntary groups
or organizations than do those of stable high status, but more often
than do those of stable low status. They are more often union members
than others of high status, but less often than those of low status.
Although they may be somewhat less satisfied with their lives than are
those who inherited high status, they are more often satisfied than
are those who inherited low status. There is no suggestion in any of
the data that the upwardly mobile are disproportionately unhappy or
maladjusted.
The picture of the upwardly mobile painted by the evidence
is of individuals in the process of fairly smooth passage from a low
status in society to a higher status. They have adopted a certain
measure of the attitude structure typical of those who inherited
their high status, but retain clear traces of the attitudes toward
politics that were learned in their youth. Consequently, on almost
every measure of political relevance the upwardly mobile occupy a
position in between those of low status and those of high.
The Downwardly Mobile
As with the upwardly mobile, on most traits of political
relevance the downwardly mobile are intermediate between those of
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stable high status and those of stable low status. In comparison with
those of stable low status they are more often Protestants, and on the
average have higher incomes and better educations.
Compared with those of stable low status the downwardly mobile
are more interested and active in politics and more often feel they
understand political events. They are more often Republicans than
are their new status peers, but less often Republicans than those of
stable high status. They are much more conservative than the non-
mobile of low status on economic issues, but more liberal on issues
of foreign affairs and the rights of government employees—each of
these attitudes reflecting their higher status origin.
Questions on satisfaction with their social situation indicate
that the downwardly mobile are, if anything, slightly more satisfied
with their lives than are those of stable low status. On the other
hand, there is some indication that they are more often mistrustful,
belong to fewer voluntary groups, and are less often union members,
though only in the case of union membership are the differences
statistically significant. Though no evidence was available that
directly reflected racial intolerance, the downwardly mobile are
considerably less often willing to see the government act on behalf
of Negro rights than are any other group, a finding in harmony with
that of previous studies which report an association between prejudice
and downward mobility.
The downwardly mobile retain even clearer evidence of their
origin at a different status level than they now inhabit than do the
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upwardly mobile. On all traits of political relevance examined other
than the racial issue their attitudes reflect their higher status
origin.
The White -Collar Category
The status stable group in the white-collar category is con-
sistently deviant on almost all of the dimensions of political behavior
examined, although due to the relatively small sample involved the
differences are in most cases not statistically significant.
Within the white-collar category the upwardly mobile and the
downwardly mobile in most regards differ from each other in the
hypothesized way—the upwardly mobile closer to those of stable low
status, the downwardly mobile closer to those of stable high status,
thus reflecting their early political socialization. The status stable
group, however, does not occupy an intermediate position between the
two mobile groups as might have been expected.
Compared with either the upwardly mobile or downwardly mobile
members of the white-collar category the status stable are more often
of native stock, are more often Protestants (none are Jewish), are
more often Republicans, and more often have Republican parents—though
not necessarily Republican friends. They tend to be conservative on
both economic and noneconomic issues, but though they feel they under-
stand politics as well as do their socially mobile peers, they are less
often interested or involved in politics. The status stable members
of the white-collar group would appear to be worth further investigation
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to determine if the deviant tendencies exhibited by the small sample
used here hold up to more searching investigation.
Political Extremism
One of the most often repeated assertions about the mobile, and
particularly about the downwardly mobile, is that they are inclined
toward political extremism. In all the rather considerable data examined
in" the last several chapters the only evidence to support such an
assertion concerned racial attitudes. The downwardly mobile more often
oppose government action on behalf of Negroes than do any other group,
and this tendency is most marked among those downwardly mobile individuals
with the best educations. This hints that downward mobility may under
certain circumstances incline individuals toward intolerance or extremism.
But on noneconomic issues not concerned with race the downwardly mobile
are more often liberals than are those of stable status. Even on non-
economic issues where measures of the intensity of the attitude are
available the downwardly mobile are no more likely to have strong
feelings than are other groups. Thus there is no evidence in the data
to support a connection between downward mobility and political
extremism, other than their attitudes toward racial issues.
Any assertion that the upwardly mobile are likely to be political
extremists is even less supported. On virtually every dimension of
political attitudes and behavior the upwardly mobile occupy a position
between those of stable high and stable low status. These data would




But to say that the data do not reveal that the mobile are
extremists is not exactly the same thing as saying that they are not
potential recruits to extremism under certain circumstances. After
all, these data cover only an eight year span that, with the possible
exception of McCarthyism, includes no extremist political movement of
any size. Is there any indication here that the mobile might be
more susceptible to extremist political movements under conditions of
stress?
Reinhard Bendix describes the kind of person who was most
susceptible to one type of extremist political movement—the German
Nazi movement:
the impetus to radicalization among the German masses arose
in the first instance among those who were just entering
political life. It is probably characteristic of many non-
voters to regard political participation as 'useless,* to
believe that politics will only benefit the crooks anyway,
and to profess a lack of concern with public affairs. Such
people are likely to vote only under extreme provocation,
and they are likely to support a party which proposes to
clean the Augean stables and to establish an entirely new
order. •*-
How does this portrait compare with that of the socially mobile? When
compared with the status stable of equivalent status, the downwardly
mobile are more interested and active in politics, care more who wins,
feel more capable of influencing politics, and vote more often. On
these same measures the upwardly mobile, though less interested and
involved than those of stable high status, are more so than those of
Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power,"
in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Iipset (eds.), Class , Status and
Power (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 606-607.
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stable low status. Neither the downwardly nor the upwardly mobile
come at all close to fitting the particular pattern of susceptibility
to extremism painted by Bendix.
There are certain characteristics of the downwardly mobile, how-
ever, that could be interpreted as making them at least potentially
vulnerable to the appeals of political extremism. They are, for example,
quite a bit more conservative on economic issues than are others of
low status, and even in some cases more conservative than are those of
high status. Attitude differences between the downwardly mobile and
the status stable in some cases increase with age, indicating a
failure to become socialized into new group norms. In several cases
attitude differences increase with education, with the best educated
among the downwardly mobile being the least tolerant, a difference
opposite to that which would normally be expected. The downwardly
mobile tend to have lower membership rates in formal organizations,
and are perhaps less likely to react to formal groups at all, less
often expressing either trust or distrust of them. These items may
indicate some degree of frustration and isolation on the part of the
downwardly mobile, but as noted, it is not reflected in any of the
indices of satisfaction with various aspects of life or in feelings
of political understanding or efficacy.
One issue was examined that might be considered an index to
extremism in that it involves attitudes toward what would be a clear
violation of individual rights. "When asked to react to the prepos-
terous proposal that any government worker accused of being a
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communist should be fired without proof, the downwardly mobile more
often disagreed than did those of stable low status. Thus on the one
issue available for examination the downwardly mobile somewhat less often
adopt an extreme position than do others of equivalent status. This
seems to me particularly significant in view of the frequency with which
interpreters of the American radical right have asserted a connection
between it and downward mobility. I find no convincing evidence in
any of the data that the mobile are any more often political extremists
or any more susceptible to extremist appeals than are other individuals
of low status. Although the evidence is neither unequivocal nor of
large magnitude, there is some indication that the opposite is true:
the downwardly mobile appear to be somewhat more often political
moderates than are their status stable peers.
Partisan Change
One of the most striking findings of research on voting behavior
is the persistence of partisan identification, in many cases long after
p
the original reasons for the identification have become irrelevant.
Even the political behavior of the mobile reported in this study may
be considered a special case of the same pattern. The mobile tend to
2
See, for example: V. 0. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social
Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana, in Eugene
Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), American Voting Behavior (Glen-
coe, 111.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 281-299; V. 0. Key, Jr.. Politics,
Parties and Pressure Groups (Uth ed. , New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,
1958), p. 233; Angus Campbell et al.. The American Voter (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, I960), pp. 552-558.
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retain the party preference that is predominant in the stratum of
their birth in spite of their move to a new status. How is the
persistence of party preference to be reconciled with the fact that
in a democratic system political parties alternate in power? That is,
if party preferences are so stable, why doesn't one party win all of
3
the time?
The classic model of democratic politics affords an inadequate
explanation. In this model of politics the flexibility of the system
is the result of rational calculation on the party of informed, interested
citizens who choose between parties on the basis of their performance
and proposals. Yet in reality it is not the best informed, most inter-
ested citizen who is likely to change his vote from one party to
another. The authors of Voting state the matter thusly:
Curiously, the voters least admirable when measured against
individual requirements contribute most when measured against
the aggregate requirement for flexibility. For those who
change political preferences most readily are those who are
least interested, who are subject to conflicting social
pressures, who have inconsistent beliefs and erratic voting
histories. Without them—if the decision were left only to
the deeply concerned, well-integrated, consistently-principled
ideal citizens—the political system might easily prove too
rigid to. adapt to changing domestic and international con-
ditions.
^This is a fairly crucial question. A political system in which
one party did win all of the time would not fit many definitions of
democratic politics.
^Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee,
Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19£U), p. 316.
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It is the view of the authors of Voting that it is cross-pressured
individuals who provide the main element of flexibility in the
political system.-'
Although contrary to hypothesis the evidence does not indicate
that the mobile are any more often cross-pressured than are other
people, it seems to me that social mobility contributes to the flex-
ibility of the political system in two ways. First, the mobile are
themselves more likely to change votes from election to election.
Second, the phenomenon of social mobility increases the number of
cross-pressured individuals, and thus the proportion of voters
susceptible to shifting.
On the first point, both the upwardly and downwardly mobile
report having changed parties somewhat more often than do the non-
mobile, and on average they report somewhat weaker party preferences.
Perhaps more significant, the evidence on votes for President indicates
that both upwardly and downwardly mobile are more likely to shift their
vote from one party to another. Between 1956 and I960, for example,
more of the mobile switched their votes from Eisenhower to Kennedy
than did the non-mobile.
Talcott Parson3 concurs in this view. See Talcott Parsons,
"Voting* and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in
Burdick and Brodbeck (eds.), op. cit
. , pp. 80-120.
The term cross-pressured is used here because this is the
way the matter to be described has usually been referred to in the
literature. It is not at all necessary to the argument that the cross-
pressure hypothesis be correct. It is sufficient that contact with
people of varying political views makes political shifting more likely—
a point hardly to be disputed.
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The reasoning behind the second point, that the phenomenon of
mobility increases the number of cross-pressured individuals, is more
roundabout. The examination of various indicators of cross-pressure
in Chapter VUI revealed no evidence that the mobile are any more often
7
cross-pressured than are the non-mobile. But this finding is suscep-
tible to two interpretations. It may be that social mobility is not
associated with cross-pressure, or it may be that the phenomenon of
social mobility creates cross-pressure on both the mobile and non-
mobile in relatively equal measure. Iapset, for example, has argued
that the hope of improving one's class position can lead to cross-
Q
pressures and lower voting rates. Although none of my data bear
upon the effect of the hope of mobility upon the likelihood of
individuals being swing voters, another approach to the effect of
mobility upon swing voting is possible.
A substantial portion of any status group consists of persons
who have been socially mobile. Thus the mobile constitute a portion
of the social environment to which the non-mobile are exposed. Sorokin
failed to understand this when he stated that because portions of the
population are not mobile "a part of the population during one or two
o
or more generations, still remains in a regime like a caste system."
7
This finding is probably limited to political systems of
relatively low status polarization. Where polarization is higher cross-
pressure effects seem more likely, c.f. Robert R. Alford, Party and
Society (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), p. 305.
o
S. M. Lipset et_aL. , "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis
of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey (ed. ), Handbook of Social
Psychology , II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 195>U), 113U.




But to belong to a caste group -where all of your peers have inherited the
same social status is a very different matter from belonging to a group
where substantial numbers have been socialized at other status levels.
The potent influence of friends and co-workers on political behavior may
be seen in Table 112. The presence of even one friend or co-worker with
a different political preference is sufficient to noticeably alter the
probability that an individual will vote in a certain way. Because the
mobile are themselves more likely to have political preferences in-
congruent with their status, their presence as part of the social en-
vironment of others makes it more likely that the non-mobile will them-
selves be exposed to conflicting political attitudes. As a result
more of the non-mobile are likely to shift parties between elections
than would be true if they were not exposed to socially mobile individuals.
Status Polarization
Closely related to the effect of social mobility on the
flexibility of the political system is its effect upon the degree
of status polarization that exists in the system. There is an
inherently divisive element in the operation of a democratic political
system. The electorate must choose among alternative policies or
leaders, and the resultant choosing up of sides necessarily results
in a certain degree of division of the society into competing camps.
As Wilensky and Edwards have noted, the militancy of miners,
seamen, and longshoremen has often been explained in terms of their
exposure only to those of identical occupation and social class. Social
mobility serves to minimize this kind of social isolation, (cf . H. L.
"Wilensky and Hugh Edwards, "The Skidoer: Ideological Adjustments of
Downward Mobile Workers," American Sociological Review, XXEV, No. 2
(April, 1959), 215-231. .

33U






RRR RRD RDD HDD
Co-workers' Votes





12 26 52 85
100$ 100$ 100$ 100$
2U5 58 29 79
86$ 75$ $3$ 19$
1U 25 U7 81
100$ 100$ 100$ 100$
98 36 19 32
Adapted from Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and
William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 195U),
p. 98, Chart XUII.
RRR means all three Republican, RRD means two Republican and
one Democrat, and so on.
Data Source : Elmira, New York, 19U8.
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Yet if a democratic political system is to work properly the division
cannot become too deep. This is because it is fundamental to the
functioning of democracy that the political game be played according
to certain rules. The losers of an election must acquiesce in the
ascension of the victors to power, and the victors must not misuse
their power so as to make their defeat at subsequent elections
impossible. These rules are likely to be obeyed only -when the lines
of political division are not too deep. As Gabriel Almond has noted,
"A game is a good game when the outcome is in doubt and when the stakes
are not too high. When the stakes are too high, the tone changes from
excitement to anxiety.
"
If the rules are to be obeyed the stakes must not become so
high that large numbers of individuals or groups feel that in the
interests of self-preservation they must break the rules. Thus politics
in successful democracies is often characterized as a "politics of
compromise." Where parties must appeal to a broad spectrum of voters
11
Although status polarization and political intensity are not
the same thing, they are closely related. Where all of the supporters
of a party are drawn from one portion of society (i.e. high polarization)
it loses any reason for compromising its program in an attempt to win
support from other sectors of society. Thus in highly polarized political
systems parties are more likely to pursue radical programs that dis-
criminate against those groups from -which they draw no support, for they
stand to lose no votes by antagonizing those who won't vote for them any-
way. As a result, the stakes of politics go up, and with more to win
and more to lose intensity is likely to be higher than in political
systems with low status polarization, where parties draw support from
all sectors of society and thus try to avoid antagonizing any sub-
stantial group.
12
Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," The
Journal of Politics
. XVin (August, 1956), 391-U09.
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the resulting policies are compromises that are not likely to be so
threatening to any substantial segment of the society that they feel
impelled to break the democratic rules. It is on this basis that
Seymour Lipset argues:
A stable democracy requires a situation in -which all the
major political parties include supporters from many
segments of the population. A system in which the support
of different parties corresponds too closely to basic
social divisions cannot continue on a democratic basis, for
it reflects a state of conflict so intense and clear-cut
as to rule out compromise. *-3
One of the most basic social divisions along -which the party system
is liable to divide is that of social class, and social mobility is of
political importance as a mechanism to prevent the full identification
of class and party.
Pitirira Sorokin, writing in 1927, stated three propositions
describing the effect of social mobility upon status polarization:
A. Within present Western societies, children of fathers
of the same occupation, and often children of the
same family, are dispersed among the most different
occupational groups.
B. Each of the occupational groups at the present moment
is recruited from the offspring of the most different
groups.
C. The preceding two propositions mean that in present
Western societies different occupational groups are
strongly interwoven, and the cleavages between them are
considerably obliterated, or, more accurately, are some-
what indefinite and not clearly cut. ^
13Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books,
1963), p. 13.
^Sorokin, op. cit.
, pp. 1;35, U37-U38.
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Although Sorokin describes the effect of social mobility upon status
polarisation, he lacks the data necessary to specify the mechanisms
by -which it acts. The findings on mobility reported here suggest
three ways in which social mobility operates to reduce status polari-
zation.
First, the mobile themselves are less status polarized than
are the non-mobile. The mobile are more often class misidentifiers,
more often prefer the "wrong" political party for their status
position, and show less status polarization on political issues than
do the non-mobile. Because the mobile are a numerically important
portion of both high and low status groups, their presence dilutes
political polarization at both ends of the social spectrum.
Second, as described in the previous section, the presence of
the mobile at different status levels reduces the polarization of the
non-mobile by reducing the homogeneity of the social milieu in which
the non-mobile live their lives.
The third way in which mobility serves to reduce polarization
is not directly tested by the data. Most commentators agree that a
belief in the possiblity of social mobility serves to reduce status
polarization in a political system. V. 0. Key exemplifies this view
when he states:
A rigid class system, with the associated harshness of
political conflict, probably can more readily develop
when expectations are general that children are frozen
in the status of their parents. 1?
15
"v. 0. Key, Jr. , Public Opinion and American Democrac:/ (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. Wl
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Because, other things being equal, a belief in the possibility of
mobility is more likely -when substantial numbers of people are in
fact mobile, this too should serve to reduce status polarization—
though it should be repeated that this effect is not tested by the
available data.
Limitations of the Analysis
Although any study is subject to limitations -which need no
apology, it is well to point out those which seem most important.
In the present case the analysis was entirely in aggregate terms,
and though a number of controls were introduced, it is entirely
possible that the behavior of significantly deviant groups was masked
by the aggregate.
Another limitation, which I find more serious, is that no
satisfactory instrument for the measurement of extreme or rapid
mobility was available. It seems to me quite possible that those
who have been subject to a more abrupt or extensive social transition
than is common are subject to pressures and anxieties leading to
political behavior quite different from that reported here for the
general run of mobile individuals. In certain of the preliminary
analyses movement from the highest to the lowest status groups or
from the lowest to the highest was treated as extreme mobility, but
no important differences between the moderately and extremely mobile
were uncovered by the technique, and the results have not been re-
ported here. I do not find the lack of difference convincing, however,
On this point see note 2U, p. 6U.
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and attribute it primarily to the inadequacy of the index of extreme
mobility used. Something approaching a status biography would be
necessary to adequately pinpoint those who had been subject to extreme
or rapid mobility, and these data are not normally obtained in survey
17
research.
Although one of the conclusions is that in the United States
social mobility serves to reduce political polarization and the
severity of class conflict, this is a conclusion that is difficult
to generalize to other cultures. It is probable that where mobility
results in serious anxieties, or where the process of mobility is by
means to which substantial numbers of people deny legitimacy, social
mobility can be disfunctional to the political system. Only comparative
study between cultures where the process of mobility differs can pro-
vide satisfactory evidence on this point.
Conclusion
The effect of social mobility upon the political system has
been the subject of much folklore and speculation, but of few tested
propositions. The evidence examined here indicates that, contrary to
frequent assertion, the mobile are no more likely to be political
17
It seems to me that whether or not mobility results in un-
usual pressures and anxieties for the individual depends on the re-
lationship of at least three variables: (l) the magnitude of social
ascent or descent; (2) the rapidity of ascent or descent; (3) the
effectiveness of the agencies of socialization to which the individual
is exposed. Pressures and anxieties are most likely to be present
where the magnitude of the social move is large, where it takes place




extremists than are the non-mobile—at least under the conditions
prevailing in the election years included. The influence of mobility
on the political system would rather seem to be as a moderating factor:
lending flexibility to the electoral process, reducing the stakes
involved in elections, and diluting the class content of politics.
The political system of the United States is characterized
by relatively low status polarization. Although those of high status
are more likely to be Republicans and those of low status are more
often Democrats, adherents of both parties are found at all status
levels. The socially mobile are even less polarized than the rest
of the population. The result of this low status polarization is
that in a statistical sense social status accounts for only a small
portion of the variance in political preference. Because the mobile
are even less polarized, mobility accounts for an even smaller
proportion of political variance. It would be a serious mistake to
conclude from this that social mobility is unimportant as a political
phenomenon, for it is precisely because social mobility successfully
reduces polarization that it is not a good predictor. That only
small political differences exist between groups of different status
and mobility classifications is testimony to the efficacy of mobility





1952 OCCUPATION CODE (SRC STUDY UOO)
"What is your occupation? I mean, What kind of work do you
do? (if Respondent is not head of the household) What kind of work
does the head of your household do?"
Code only full-time jobs—not interested in part-time jobs.
If house-wife or student works part-time, code as housewife or student.
1. Professional and semi-professional
2. Self-employed business men and artisans; managers and
officials
3. Clerical and sales; buyers, agents, brokers
H. Skilled and semi-skilled








The more elaborate codes used in the 19£6 and I960 election
surveys were recoded to conform with the 19^2 code.
Cases coded 1 or 2 were placed in the professional and business
category. Cases coded 3 were assigned to the white-collar category.
Cases coded U, 5>, or 6 were assigned to the blue-collar category.
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Occupation as coded for the 1956 and i960 elections has been
recoded to conform to the 1952 code. The 1952 code is reproduced in
Appendix A.
"What kind of work did your father do for a living while you
were growing up?" Father's occupation has been recoded in the same





RESPONDENT'S PERCEPTION OF HIS OWN SOCIAL CLASS AND THAT OF HIS FAMILY




Respondent's Classification of His
Family While He Was Growing UpD













































"There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social
classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or to
the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of
these classes? Which one?" Includes those who do not normally con-
sider themselves as belonging to a class, but who when pressed were
willing to assign themselves to one.
,rWhat would you say your family was when you were growing up,
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